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This thesis will explore the socio-legal response(s) to women who kill. 
Interrogating the constructions of “woman” and “femininity” within criminal legal 
discourse it will argue that the agency (that is, the ability of an individual to choose 
to act in a particular way) of women who kill is denied, both passively and actively 
within criminal legal discourse. It will be argued that denying the agency of women 
who kill is problematic for numerous reasons, including but not limited to, the 
construction and reinforcement of gender discourse surrounding femininity and 
issues of justice both being done and being seen to be done for women who kill and 
for their victims. In order to address these issues, this thesis will therefore propose 
an agency-based model for women who kill, which will interrupt both the passive 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
Between 2001 and 2012, 738 women were indicted for homicide in England and 
Wales, 502 of those women were convicted.1 
 
1.1 Women Who Kill: An Original Approach 
The trial and conviction of Joanne Dennehy in 2014 ensured that the issue of 
women who kill again made headlines. During her trial and the consequent passing 
of a whole-life sentence, a significant amount of media commentary focused on 
addressing questions, such as: ‘[w]hat makes a female serial killer tick?’2 as well as  
exploring historical cases involving women who kill.3 However, there are other, 
arguably more important questions that need to be, but have yet to be, asked that I 
will address within this thesis. This thesis will take an original approach to the topic 
of women who kill by asking new, pertinent questions of the socio-legal response to 
these women, in particular of the ways in which the agency of these women is 
denied within criminal legal discourse. At the outset it is important to note that the 
working definition of agency used in this thesis is: the ability of an individual to 
                                                          
1 Office for National Statistics, “Focus on: Violent Crime and Sexual Offences, 2011/12 – Appendix 
Tables” available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-
tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-290621 Table 2.12 
2 The Week, “Joanne Dennehy: what makes a female serial killer tick?” available at 
http://www.theweek.co.uk/crime/57263/joanne-dennehy-what-makes-female-serial-killer-tick  




choose to act in a particular way. This is only a working definition, with the issue of 
agency being explored in detail in chapters two and four. There are three substantive 
original contributions that this thesis makes to the existing body of research in this 
area. 
Firstly, the analysis undertaken is specifically conducted in the context of 
criminal legal and societal discourse within the criminal law of England and Wales. I 
draw upon a range of case studies from within the English Legal System and conduct 
a detailed critical evaluation of the criminal law and legal provisions relevant to this 
jurisdiction. This can be contrasted with existing research in the field which uses case 
studies from several different jurisdictions as well as taking largely criminological and 
sociological approaches.4  
Secondly, within the context of English criminal legal discourse I conduct an 
intricate analysis of the agency denials of women who kill. Although the agency 
denial of women who kill has been explored in the existing literature,5 I suggest for 
the first time that within criminal legal discourse women who kill have their agency 
denied both passively and actively.6 I explore the symbiotic relationship between 
labelling these women as either mad, bad or victims and what I term as an active 
denial of their agency, I also explore how these women have their agency passively 
                                                          
4 See for example: Morrissey, Belinda, When Women Kill: Questions of Agency and Subjectivity 
(London: Routledge, 2003); and Seal, Lizzie, Women, Murder and Femininity: Gender Representations 
of Women Who Kill (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010)  
5 See particularly; Morrissey, 2003 
6 See below, section 1.3, pp. 7-8, for definitions of, and a detailed explanation on the use of these 
terms 
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denied due to their construction as legal objects, rather than subjects within criminal 
legal discourse.7  
Finally, engaging in such a detailed analysis with the issue of the agency 
denials of these women allows me to propose an agency-based model for women 
who kill within criminal legal discourse. Having critically engaged with criminal legal 
theory and discourse, as well as relevant legal provisions, I propose a model that 
interrupts both the passive and active denials of agency8 for these women, 
something which has not yet been proposed in any significant detail within existing 
academic research.   
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 Reflecting the original contributions I will make, this thesis is underscored by 
and will address three key, and interrelated, research questions. Firstly, what are the 
constructions of “woman” and “femininity” within criminal legal discourse?; 
secondly, is there a relationship between these constructions and the agency of 
women, with the consequence that women who kill currently have their agency 
denied within criminal legal discourse?; and finally, if so, how might their agency be 
recognised? In order to answer these research questions, this thesis will critically 
engage with, and take forward the existing research in the field of women who kill. 
 
                                                          
7 See below, section 1.3, pp. 7-8, for a more detailed explanation of this argument. See also chapter 
four, sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 
8 See below, section 1.3, pp. 7-8, for definitions of, and a detailed explanation on the use of these 
terms 
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1.3 Terminological Definitions and Explanations  
 Having outlined the original approach being taken in this thesis and the 
research questions it sets out to answer, it is necessary to provide further definitional 
clarification for some of the terminology which has been mentioned and which will 
be used throughout the thesis. Initially it is worth noting that I will be using the terms 
“women who kill”, “female killers” and “homicidal women” throughout the thesis, all 
of which make specific reference to an individual’s sex. However, this thesis will be 
focused specifically on gender discourse, namely the concept of femininity. Thus the 
use of terms such as “women who kill” which refer to sex, rather than gender, are 
reflective of the fact that it is the woman as a physical embodiment or sexed being, 
who has done the act of killing. The importance and relevance of gender discourse 
becomes clear when exploring the socio-legal responses to these women and the 
ways in which they are judged according to their deviance from their gender, that is 
appropriate femininity, which is largely assumed within socio-legal discourse to 
correspond with an individual’s sex.9     
 The key concept that underlies the discussions and arguments being made in 
this thesis is that of agency. Therefore it is important at the outset that I provide a 
basic outline of what I mean by the term agency within the context of this thesis. 
Agency is an interdisciplinary, contextually varied term with numerous different 
definitions and attached meanings. However, the majority of definitions comprise 
the ability or capacity of an individual to act and their ability to make choices with 
regards to their behaviour. For example, Messerschmidt defines agency as referring 
                                                          
9 See chapter 3, sections 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 
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‘[t]o the behaviours in which a person chooses to engage in order to shape his or her 
experiences within social structures in light of his or her understanding of the social 
structures that surround and constrain his or her options.’10 A detailed engagement 
with the concept of agency will take place throughout this thesis, particularly in 
chapters two, four and five, exploring in significant detail the issues surrounding the 
concept. Thus, at this introductory phase the working definition of agency that will 
be used throughout this thesis is: the ability of an individual to choose to act in a 
particular way. Throughout this thesis this definition of agency will be positioned and 
contextualised in relation to women, taking into account the patriarchal society and 
social structures that are relevant to agency exercise.  
The fact that I am positioning my definition of agency within the context of 
patriarchy is an important methodological point in itself. Patriarchy is a system of 
social governance whereby men are dominant over women and men overwhelmingly 
dominate the mainstream institutions of power. Patriarchy is not simply the 
domination of men and oppression of women; a society that is patriarchal involves 
the participation of both men and women.11 However, their participation in that 
society is marred by significant power differences that allow men to ‘[s]hape culture 
in ways that reflect and serve men’s collective interests.’12 Patriarchal societies are 
not only male dominated, they are also male identified, ‘[i]n that core cultural ideas 
about what is considered good, desirable, preferable, or normal are associated with 
                                                          
10 Messerschmidt (1993) in Greeson, Megan and Campbell, Rebecca, “Rape survivors’ agency within 
the legal and medical systems” Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35, 4 (2011) 582, p.583 
11 Johnson, Allan G., The Gender Knot: Unraveling Our Patriarchal Legacy (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, revised and updated edition, 2005) p.5  
12 Johnson, 2005, p.6 
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… men and masculinity’,13 as well as being male centred, with ‘[t]he focus of 
attention [being] primarily on men and what they do.’14  Finally, an essential element 
of patriarchy is control: 
men are assumed (and expected) to be in control at all times, to be 
unemotional (except for anger and rage), to present themselves as 
invulnerable, autonomous, independent, strong, rational, logical, 
dispassionate, knowledgeable, always right, and in command of every 
situation, especially those involving women. These qualities, it is assumed, 
mark them as superior and justify their privilege. Women in contrast are 
assumed (and expected) to be just the opposite, especially in relation to 
men.15 
These elements of patriarchy are reflected in the analysis which occurs throughout 
this thesis, and therefore the concept of patriarchy is an essential grounding for the 
arguments made within the thesis, particularly in relation to the criminal law’s 
passive denial of women’s agency.  
However, I am aware that one criticism of my methodological approach may 
be that my discussions on norms and discourse in the context of agency 
acknowledgement are on discourse that takes place within a patriarchal society. Thus 
one criticism of my approach could be that I have not suggested a method by which 
patriarchy could be removed before moving on to deal with acknowledging women’s 
agency. I have purposefully taken this approach as one of the aims of this thesis is 
                                                          
13 Johnson, 2005, p.6 
14 Johnson, 2005, p.10  
15 Johnson, 2005, p.14 
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not to eradicate patriarchy within society. This would be a utopian ideal that could 
not be achieved simply in the context of a thesis, not least because challenges to 
patriarchy have historically been silenced and maligned.16 Rather I am suggesting 
that by acknowledging women’s agency within criminal legal discourse and within 
the patriarchal institution that is law, criminal legal discourse can take the lead and 
initiate positive changes within societal and gender (and thus patriarchal) discourse 
to ameliorate the position of women. Acknowledging women’s agency within 
criminal legal discourse would be a first step in attempting to alter the power 
relationships and dynamics that exist in a patriarchal society to the detriment of 
women. 
 Having defined agency, it is also important to explain what the terms “active 
agency denial” and “passive agency denial”, and their variations, mean in the context 
of this thesis. The term passive agency denial is used to describe the agency denial 
that occurs due to women’s lack of status as legal subjects with agency. I have used 
the word passive to describe this because the masculine gendering of the legal 
subject within criminal legal discourse is a continuing pre-existing state of affairs.   
Indeed, the construction of women as legal objects who are acted upon, rather than 
as legal subjects within criminal legal discourse, is a pre-existing state of affairs, 
reflecting a given in patriarchal society. It simply is. No positive act was ever required 
to bring this state of affairs at law into existence into such a society.  
In contrast, active agency denial refers to the agency denial that is symbiotic 
to labelling women who kill as either mad, bad or victims. More specifically the active 
                                                          
16 Johnson, 2005, p.17 
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agency denial is referring to the creation of a new identity for women who kill 
through labelling. So not only do the labels attached to women who kill reflect the 
deviance and gendered constructions of these women, but the labelling also creates 
a new all-consuming identity for them. As such this is, I would argue, a positive act of 
doing, and is reflected in the use of the term active. Differentiating between passive 
agency denial, which reflects the pre-existing position of women as legal objects, and 
active agency denial, in which labelling women who kill creates a new identity for 
them, allows a comprehensive engagement with how the agency of women who kill 
is ultimately denied within criminal legal discourse. In turn this allows a detailed 
engagement with the issue of how the agency of these women can successfully be 
acknowledged within criminal legal discourse   
 
1.4 Rationale and Justification for Study  
 The existing research on women who kill clearly acknowledges the labelling of 
these women that occurs, as well as the subsequent denials of their agency. 
However, it does not provide a clear solution to the problem which I would suggest is 
rooted in altering criminal legal discourse and legal reform within England and Wales. 
Therefore, arguably a clear rationale for conducting the research undertaken in this 
thesis is to go some way towards providing a solution which acknowledges the 
agency of women who kill. Indeed, this is something that I attempt to do with a 
proposed agency-based model for women who kill which seeks to interrupt current 
agency denials, both passive and active.  
 9 
 Women who kill are given different judicial treatment in sentencing, 
depending on whether they are labelled as either mad, bad, or a victim and the 
subsequent way in which their agency is actively denied. For example, women who 
kill labelled as mad or as victims are often given lesser or more lenient sentences 
than those labelled as bad, who are often punished more harshly than arguably they 
should be. The approach by the judiciary to the sentencing of women who kill is a 
dichotomous one which pigeonholes women who kill into being labelled with 
seemingly little room for any middle ground. This is perhaps most evident in the case 
of Nicola Edgington,17 who had two homicide cases brought against her and was 
labelled as mad in the first case, and as bad in the second, with a clear divergence in 
punishments in the two cases. Edgington was pigeonholed into the labels she was 
given, when arguably her actions suggested an element of both “madness” and 
“badness” were present. I would therefore suggest that a further rationale for this 
study can be found in the need for a clear middle ground in cases of women who kill 
which is cognisant of the existing normative framework of labelling and that this 
could at least be partially addressed by an acknowledgment of the agency of these 
women within criminal legal discourse. 
Another justification can be found in some of the continuing themes found in 
existing feminist literature. Indeed, much of the existing literature on women and 
violence focuses on women as victims, rather than as perpetrators of serious 
violence.18 Although this focus should undoubtedly be commended, not least for the 
                                                          
17 For a more detailed discussion on the case of Nicola Edgington see section 5.5, pp.217-220 
18 See for example: Christie, Nils, “The Ideal Victim” in Fattah, Ezzat (Ed), From Crime Policy to Victim 
Policy: Reorienting the Justice System (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1986); and Meloy, Michelle, and 
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improvements that have been made in attempting to combat violence against 
women, it is submitted that by continually focusing on women as victims and 
consequently failing to acknowledge their propensity as perpetrators it has the 
potential to undermine the feminist quest for equality. Indeed, I would argue that in 
order to truly end the subordination of women and domination of men within 
societal discourse, it is necessary to acknowledge and explore not only the injustices 
faced by women within society, but also the pejorative actions of women which 
affect others.  
A similar approach has been taken by Murphy and Whitty in their article “The 
Question of Evil and Feminist Legal Scholarship”,19 where they argue that feminist 
legal scholars should engage directly with the question of evil, partially in order to 
‘[d]evelop the narrative of woman-as-victim.’20 This thesis simultaneously develops 
upon, and can be distinguished from, the approach taken by Murphy and Whitty. 
Rather than focusing explicitly on the issue of evil in order to develop the narratives 
surrounding women who kill, a term which in and of itself could be construed as a 
label which denies agency, this thesis builds upon their acknowledgment of the need 
to explore agentic models of women who kill.21 Therefore, although exploring the 
issue of women who kill may seem at first glance to be counter-intuitive to the 
feminist campaign for equality by painting women in a pejorative light, in fact I would 
argue that engaging with this issue has the potential to have the opposite effect. For 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Miller, Susan, The Victimisation of Women: Law, Policies and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011) 
19 Murphy, Thérèse and Whitty, Noel, “The Question of Evil and Feminist Legal Scholarship” Feminist 
Legal Studies, 14, 2006, 1 
20 Murphy and Whitty, 2006, p.19 
21 Murphy and Whitty, 2006 , pp. 22-23  
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example, focusing on women who kill and interrogating the discourses surrounding 
this issue allows a renewed focus on the gender norms associated with appropriate 
femininity, which play such a significant role in the continued oppression of, and 
inequalities faced by women.  
The final justification for conducting this study draws inspiration from a quote 
taken from the work of Susan Edwards:  
Like it or not, law is the most powerful tool we have at our disposal and 
efforts to reveal its genderedness and also to challenge the significance which 
is given to law as ultimate truth and ultimate justice and attempts to 
transform it, are neither futile nor doomed. But the inexorable fact remains 
that inter alia law is holistically, root and branch, viscerally, temporally male. 
Do we have a choice not to challenge, engage and transform it, if we value 
our “existence”?22 
Conducting this study is an opportunity not only to engage with the gendered nature 
of law, but also to challenge it within the context of perhaps what can be perceived 
to be the most gendered deviant group of individuals: women who kill. 
Acknowledging the agency of this particularly deviant sector of women provides an 
opportunity to challenge the gender norms and discourse which are so pervasive 
within criminal legal discourse. By challenging these norms in this study and 
suggesting ways in which the agency of these women can be recognised within 
criminal legal discourse, there is also the opportunity to transform the way in which 
                                                          
22 Edwards, Susan, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (London: Blackstone Press Limited, 1996) p.7 
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the criminal law responds, not only to women who kill, but also to all perpetrating 
women who come into contact with the criminal justice system. 
 
1.5 Methodological and Theoretical Approaches  
I have taken a qualitative research approach in this thesis. Having defined the 
parameters of my research questions and certified the key concepts that would 
underlie my thesis, a qualitative research methodology would most readily allow me 
to analyse the socio-legal discourse surrounding women who kill, and thus effectively 
answer my research questions. Indeed, in order to develop a theoretical framework 
which would allow me to answer the final question of how the agency of women 
who kill can be recognised, a qualitative approach was most appropriate. In taking 
this qualitative approach, I collected and analysed primary sources including a body 
of case law involving homicidal women and relevant statutes. I also utilised 
secondary sources, such as written commentaries on case law and legislation, journal 
articles and monographs. This qualitative methodological approach allowed me to 
critically engage with both primary and secondary sources to successfully question 
the constructions of “woman” and “femininity” within criminal legal and societal 
discourse, and the relationship between these constructions and the agency denials 
of women who kill. Conducting qualitative research allowed a gap within the existing 
literature to be recognised and allowed me to go some way in filling that gap in this 
study with the agency-based model for women who kill which is ultimately proposed.  
 13 
A fundamental underpinning of this thesis is interrogating the constructions 
surrounding “woman” and “femininity” as found in gender discourse, and their 
relationship with, and influence on, law and legal discourse.  Therefore I have taken 
an inter-disciplinary socio-legal approach. Indeed, the very nature of gender 
discourse is that is a social construct, which is often (re)inforced within societal 
institutions such as law and the justice system. Moreover, looking specifically at the 
topic of women who kill, one of the key arguments advanced in this thesis is that 
these women may be viewed as ‘doubly deviant’23 because they have not only 
offended against society, but also against their gender  therefore demonstrating that 
in this context the law does not exist in its own existential vacuum. Rather it interacts 
with societal and gendered norms when responding to women who kill. Therefore 
taking a black-letter approach would not have been appropriate in the context of this 
study and a socio-legal one was required. This is further enhanced by an 
acknowledgment that some of the consequences that may arguably arise as a result 
of the agency recognition proposed in this thesis are not specifically related to law, 
but have wider societal and sociological remits and implications.  
This thesis is theoretically informed by feminist legal theory. Utilising a 
feminist legal analysis is helpful in allowing an interrogation of the constructions of 
“woman” and “femininity” to be undertaken, as well as to explore the 
interrelationship between gender and criminal legal discourse. The terms “feminist 
theory” and “feminism” are umbrella terms which encompass a whole host of 
different meanings and concepts. At their most basic they refer to the undertaking of 
                                                          
23 Lloyd, Ann, Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: Society’s Treatment of Violent Women (London: 
Penguin, 1995) 
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an analysis of the status and subordination of women within society with the aim of 
improving women’s lives.24 More specifically “feminist legal theory” ‘[p]roceeds from 
the assumption that gender is important in our everyday lives and recognises that 
being a man or a woman is a central feature of our lives …’25 Applying this within a 
legal context, feminist legal theory examines ‘[h]ow gender has mattered to the 
development of the law and how men and women are differently affected by the 
power in law’,26 in particular women’s subordination by the law.27 Feminist legal 
theory suggests ‘[t]here is something … about the very structure or method of 
modern law which is hierarchically gendered.’28  
Lacey succinctly lays out three broad conceptions that underlie feminist legal 
theory. Firstly, ‘feminists … claim that sex/gender characterises the shape of law as 
one important social institution’29 and therefore aim to provide a more sophisticated 
analysis and conception of law incorporating the influence of sex/gender.30 Secondly, 
feminist legal theorists argue that the concepts of sex/gender are not only utilised as 
a form of differentiation, but also of ‘[d]iscrimination, domination or oppression.’31 
Therefore, feminist legal theorists aim to (re)construct the law and legal principles to 
allow equality and justice between and for both sexes/genders.32 Thirdly and finally, 
‘[f]eminist legal theorists are almost universally committed to a social constructionist 
                                                          
24 About.com, “Feminist Theory: An Overview” available at 
http://sociology.about.com/od/Sociological-Theory/a/Feminist-Theory.htm  
25 Chamallas, Martha, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (New York: Aspen Publishers, second ed, 
2003) p.xix 
26 Chamallas, 2003, p.xix 
27 Chamallas, 2003, p.xx 
28 Lacey, Nicola, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1998) p.2 
29 Lacey, 1998, p.3  
30 Lacey, 1998, p.3  
31 Lacey, 1998, p.3  
32 Lacey, 1998, p.3  
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stance: … the idea that power and meaning of sex/gender is a product not of nature 
but of culture … gender relations are open to revision through the modification of 
powerful social institutions such as law.’33 These conceptions are largely reflected in 
the analysis which takes place throughout this thesis and reflected in one of the 
major justifications for undertaking this study: that of law taking the lead with the 
modification of gender norms.  
Within feminist legal theory, several schools of thought have emerged, the 
most important of which within the context of this thesis is that of gender difference. 
Within gender difference there are two distinguishing and dichotomous theories 
which exist. The first, liberal feminism, focuses on gender neutrality/equality before 
the law with ‘[d]octrinal arguments that women and men should be treated the 
same’34 and that any so-called “special treatment” given to women only serves to 
(re)emphasise unequal and disadvantaged treatment for women.35 In contrast, 
difference feminists argue that there is such a vast difference in the societal 
circumstances for men and women that differential treatment is required: ‘[m]ere 
formal equal treatment could not sufficiently address existing structural and 
ideological inequalities.’36 This form of feminism seeks to highlight the gendered 
nature of institutions, including law, by questioning ‘[t]he legitimacy of existing 
gender norms and their implications for society’s institutions and legal structures.’37  
                                                          
33 Lacey, 1998, p.3  
34 Fineman, Martha, “Feminist Legal Theory” American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy and 
the Law, 13(1), (2005), 13, p.16 
35 Fineman, 2005, p.16 
36 Fineman, 2005, p.17  
37 Fineman, 2005, p.17  
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 Drawing upon both of these arms of feminist legal theory allows for a critical 
interrogation and multi-faceted approach to be taken when exploring the discourse 
surrounding women who kill. The outcome of this multi-faceted approach is perhaps 
most evident in chapter six, with the proposed agency-based model for women who 
kill. Within this model, elements of both the gender equality and difference schools 
of thought can be seen. The notion of gender equality is reflected in the 
(re)construction of the criminal legal subject as being gender neutral, thus allowing 
women to be recognised as legal subjects alongside men. However, elements of 
difference feminist discourse can be pinpointed in the notion that although women’s 
agency must be recognised, it must also be acknowledged that the ability of women 
who kill to have made a choice to behave in a particular way (to have exercised their 
agency) may have been limited to varying degrees by existing social structures and 
their societal experiences, both of which differ from that experienced by men. As 
Fineman notes, typically there is a tension between the notions of gender difference 
and gender neutrality, however it is possible to argue for equality norms and gender 
neutrality whilst making some, albeit often minor, concessions for women’s unequal 
material circumstances and life experiences.38 
 Within the context of utilising a feminist legal methodology, of particular 
importance to this thesis were the methods developed within the Feminist 
Judgments project.39 The project was ‘[i]nformed by feminist theoretical concerns 
                                                          
38 Fineman, 2005, p.19  
39 Hunter, Rosemary; McGlynn, Clare; and Rackley, Erika, (Eds), Feminist Judgments From Theory to 
Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010)  
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about the way in which law constructs gender’40 and aimed to critically engage with, 
and thus disrupt, the process of gender construction within legal discourse, thereby 
allowing the introduction of ‘[d]ifferent accounts of gender that might be less 
limiting for women.’41 Indeed, many of the feminist judgments focused upon 
addressing the treatment of those women perceived as deviating from appropriate 
femininity, instead trying to ‘[i]nsert the perspective of the woman herself into the 
picture, to understand her position and the (often limited) choices she faced.’42 This 
methodological approach is one that fundamentally underpins my thesis, with a clear 
aim of this research being to interrogate the existing gender discourse and norms 
surrounding appropriate femininity, within the context of women who kill. A 
significant part of that interrogation involves critically analysing the deviance of 
women who kill from appropriate femininity and exploring the socio-legal responses 
to this deviance by exploring the active denials of agency of these women by 
labelling them as either mad, bad or victims.  
 Perhaps of most importance within the context of this thesis, is the way in 
which the Feminist Judgments project seeks to assert and acknowledge women’s 
agency. Hunter et al. explicitly acknowledge the gendering of agency as masculine, 
dichotomised with the feminine gendering of vulnerability and victimhood, which has 
the consequence that ‘[w]omen often find that when they attempt to exercise 
                                                          
40 Hunter et al., 2010, p.7 
41 Hunter et al., 2010, p.7 
42 Hunter et al., 2010, p.21 
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agency, such as in the context of refusing to consent to sexual activity or medical 
treatment, they are not taken seriously.’43 Thus several of the feminist judgments: 
[a]ssert the possibility of occupying positions both of autonomy and 
vulnerability, agent and victim at once. The fact that one occupies a position 
of vulnerability need not deprive one of agency; and conversely, the fact that 
one acted in a way that appears autonomous does not means that one’s 
autonomy was not in fact circumscribed or impaired by experiences of 
vulnerability or victimhood.44 
Deconstructing this either/or dichotomous view of agency is reflective of the 
fundamental arguments and aims underpinning this thesis; that of acknowledging 
the agency of women who kill, whilst simultaneously recognising the lived 
experiences of these women that may impact upon the choices that they make. 
Drawing upon the methods utilised in the Feminist Judgments project will therefore 
support me in developing an agency based model for women who kill.  
 Feminist criminological theory also plays a significant role within this thesis. 
Feminist criminology developed from the 1960s onwards alongside second-wave 
feminism as a response to the marginalisation of women within criminology, and a 
significant disregarding of their lived experiences in relation to crime. Therefore a 
central theme of feminist criminology is critiquing extant criminology for oversights 
in relation to women. These critiques include: ‘the failure to theorise or to engage in 
the empirical study of female offending; the neglect of female victimisation and, 
                                                          
43 Hunter et al., p.22 
44 Hunter et al., p.22  
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particularly, male violence against women [and]; the over-concentration on the 
impact of the criminal justice system on male offenders.’45  
Daly and Chesney-Lind have suggested that there are five key characteristics 
underpinning feminist criminology that differentiate it from male-dominated 
theories of crime. Firstly, gender is socially constructed and although related to 
biological sex, is not simply derived from it.46 Secondly, social life is fundamentally 
ordered by gender discourse and relations.47 Thirdly, the constructions of masculinity 
and femininity are not equal, rather masculinity is constructed as superior to, and 
dominant over, femininity.48 Fourthly, ‘systems of knowledge reflect men’s views of 
the natural and social world; the production of knowledge is gendered.’49 Finally, 
women should not be at the periphery of intellectual inquiry, but rather at the centre 
of it.50 These characteristics which underlie feminist criminology can be found as 
both underpinning principles, and explicit arguments throughout this thesis. For 
example, an entire chapter51 is devoted to a discussion on the construction of gender 
and the norms associated with appropriate femininity.    
 Of particular importance within the context of this thesis is the criminalisation 
of women. Several authors within feminist criminology, including Smart and 
Edwards, have suggested that when women enter the criminal justice system as 
defendants they are judged as ‘doubly deviant’. As Edwards explains; ‘female 
                                                          
45 Newburn, Tim, Criminology (Cullompton: Willan, 2007) p.305 
46 Daley, Kathleen and Chesney-Lind Meda, “Feminism and Criminology” Justice Quarterly, 5, 1988, 
497, p.504 
47 Daley and Chesney-Lind, 1988, p.504 
48 Daley and Chesney-Lind, 1988, p.504 
49 Daley and Chesney-Lind, 1988, p.504 
50 Daley and Chesney-Lind, 1988, p.504 
51 See chapter three 
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defendants are processed within the criminal justice system in accordance with the 
crimes which they committed and the extent to which the commission of the act and 
its nature deviate from appropriate female behaviour.’52 Thus, in response to, and to 
ameliorate this perceived double deviance of these women the response to their 
criminal behaviour is often to (re)construct and thus relocate them within the norms 
of appropriate femininity.53 This particular gendered approach to the criminalisation 
of women is one which is considered and critiqued throughout this thesis in the 
context of women who kill.   
 
1.6 Methodological Concerns  
It is worth noting that a particular “quirk” of the methodological approach 
taken in this thesis is that it is written in the first person. This was a conscious 
methodological decision and was made to reflect the concept of agency which is so 
integral to this thesis. By writing in the first person I am taking ownership of the 
choices that I have made and the arguments that I am making in this thesis, thus 
reflecting the concept of agency which I am arguing for an acknowledgment of, as 
well as the particular definition of agency which is used: that of the ability of an 
individual to make a choice.  
It is also important to note that from a methodological perspective it is 
difficult not to compare the agency of women with men. Indeed, in order to fully 
                                                          
52 Edwards, Susan, Women on Trial: A Study of the Female Suspect, Defendant and Offender in the 
Criminal Law and Criminal Justice System (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984) p.213  
53 Newburn, 2007, p.313  
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explore and illustrate the imbalance and inequality that women face in the context of 
agency denials it is certainly tempting to compare their position to that experienced 
by men. However, I have made the conscious decision to try not to take such a 
comparative approach because by doing so I would implicitly be confirming women 
as “the Other”.54 The position I will take throughout the thesis is that women should 
not be “Othered” but rather in contrast that they should be given full legal 
subjecthood.   
Another potential methodological concern within this study is that despite 
being underpinned by feminist legal theory, this thesis may not be considered as 
“feminist” in the traditional sense of the term. Indeed, as noted above, typically 
feminist research critically interrogates and explores the status and subordination of 
women within society with the aim of improving women’s lives.55 However, one 
potential implication which may arise as a result of the agency-based model being 
proposed in this study is that women who kill who are labelled as mad or as victims 
may receive harsher prison sentences than is currently the case. Arguably this does 
not have the effect of improving the lives of these particular women affected, and in 
fact may put them in a more pejorative position than the existing state of affairs in 
which their agency is denied. However, I would argue that although acknowledging 
the agency of women who kill may have a pejorative impact on some individual 
women, this is outweighed by the wider impact on ameliorating gender discourse for 
                                                          
54 Beauvoir, Simone de, The Second Sex (translation by Borde, Constance and Malovany-Chevallier, 
Sheila) (London: Random House, 2010) p.6   
55 About.com  
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women, mentioned above and discussed in detail in chapter six.56 Indeed, this 
potential amelioration of gender discourse arguably does largely reflect the aims of 
feminism: namely ending the subordination of women.  
Although this thesis explicitly critiques the use of labels specifically attached 
to women who kill57 as well as labelling theory58 more widely, I am aware that within 
this study I myself am also guilty of invoking and attaching labels. For example, 
throughout the thesis I utilise the label of “woman”, thus reflecting the meanings 
typically associated with this label within societal discourse. However, doing so is 
necessary in order to allow me to critically engage with and interrogate this label. 
Indeed as Butler notes: ‘I am led to embrace the terms that injure me because they 
constitute me socially.’59 Thus, in this thesis I have had to embrace the injurious term 
of “woman” when discussing women who kill, precisely because it is this term and its 
associated societal and gendered norms and connotations that are reflected within 
criminal legal discourse and contribute to the agency denials of women who kill. 
However embracing this term does not mean accepting it, a notion reflected in the 
interrogation of the construction of “woman” which occurs throughout this thesis 
and ultimately in the acknowledgment of women’s agency through the model 
proposed in chapter six. Indeed as Butler notes; ‘[o]nly by occupying — being 
occupied by — that injurious term can I resist and oppose it, recasting the power that 
constitutes me as the power I oppose.’60 Thus it is only by utilising and thus 
                                                          
56 See chapter six, section 6.1  
57 See chapter five  
58 See chapter two, section 2.3  
59 Butler, Judith, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1997) p.104 
60 Butler, 1997, p.104 
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embracing the term woman, that I am able to interrogate and oppose its current 
construction.  
I also consciously utilise the label “battered women who kill”. Although I am 
aware that this is a loaded term with both social and psychological connotations, I 
have used it because it is the term that is most frequently used within the existing 
academic literature that focuses on women who kill their abusive partners.61 
Moreover, the discussion on the use of battered woman syndrome which takes place 
in chapter five62 is reflective of the use of this particular label.    
It is also worth noting that in chapter six itself, where I propose the model 
which acknowledges the agency of women who kill, I have purposefully invoked the 
use of labels in the form of the following acronyms: when referring to women who 
kill labelled as bad I will use WKB, for women who kill labelled as mad I will use WKM 
and for women who labelled as victims I will use WKV. Again, I am aware that it may 
seem contradictory in making use of labels myself when acknowledging the agency 
of women who kill, especially when a significant aspect of my thesis criticises the 
current use of the labels mad, bad and victim. However, by doing so I do not mean to 
undermine the arguments I am making with regard to labelling, but rather I am doing 
so for ease of clarity and understanding for the arguments that I am making in 
chapter six.  
 
                                                          
61 See for example: Radford, Lorraine, “Pleading for Time—Justice for Battered Women Who Kill” in 
Birch, Helen, Moving Targets—Women, Murder and Representation (London: Virago Press Ltd, 1993); 
and, Noh, Marianne; Lee, Matthew, and Feltey, Kathryn, “Mad, bad or reasonable? Newspaper 
portrayals of the Battered Woman Who Kills” Gender Issues 27, (2010), 110 
62 See in particular section 5.1  
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1.7 Thesis Outline and Structure   
This introductory chapter has been termed as Chapter One, and is followed by 
five substantive chapters and a conclusion, which is termed as Chapter Seven for 
continuity. Chapter Two is titled “Terminology and Literature Review”. It will explore 
some of the key concepts and research terms that form the basis for the arguments 
being advanced in this thesis, such as agency, labelling theory, construction theory 
and Butler’s theory of performativity. I critically engage with the existing literature 
on these topics, highlighting their gendered dimension and thus allowing a 
contextualisation for the concepts that form the basis of the thesis. Chapter Three 
moves on to explore the concept of gender and within this the discourse surrounding 
appropriate femininity. This chapter expands on the gendered analysis from Chapter 
Two, exploring key ideas such as the construction of gender within law and the 
construction of woman and some key aspects of appropriate femininity, including 
motherhood, physical appearance, sexuality and emotions.  
 
Chapter Four draws on the discussions in the previous two chapters. It 
engages in more detail with the concept of agency, specifically the relationship 
between agency and women and agency within the criminal law, exploring how the 
interrelation of these concepts leads to women’s agency being passively denied. In 
particular I argue that passive agency denial occurs because women are constructed 
as legal objects rather than legal subjects. I question whether the criminal law is a 
gendered construct through a critical engagement with the construction of the 
criminal legal subject and by exploring whether the defences to murder are 
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themselves gendered. More specifically, I argue that the criminal legal subject is the 
reasonable person, which although positing itself as a gender neutral construct is 
actually gendered masculine, thus excluding women from legal subjecthood. Agency 
is specifically considered to be the property of subjects, and therefore when women 
who kill come before the criminal law it is their status as women, lacking legal 
subjecthood, which passively denies their agency.  
 
Having explored the passive agency denial of women who kill, in Chapter Five 
I argue that it is this passive agency denial which then allows the agency of women 
who kill to be actively denied when they are labelled as either mad, bad or victims by 
both society and the law. Therefore this chapter examines these labels attached to 
women who kill within socio-legal discourse and the relationship between these 
labels and the ways in which the agency of these women is actively denied. Each of 
these labels attached to women who kill actively denies their agency in subtly 
different ways, invoking imagery and discourses of madness, mythic monstrosity and 
victimisation. However each of these labels, when attached to women who kill as 
legal objects whose agency is denied, is all-consuming and is reflective of a new 
identity for the women they are attached to. I argue that regardless of the different 
ways in which this active agency denial occurs, the overall issue of agency denial, 
both passive and active, has a number of significant consequences for these women 
and for their victims, specifically around justice both being done and being seen to be 
done for women who kill and for their victims. 
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In Chapter Six, the final substantive chapter of this thesis, I suggest that 
alongside ameliorating the consequences of agency denial in Chapter Five, there are 
several reasons why the agency of women who kill should be recognised, including 
challenging gender norms and discourse and acknowledging the ability of women to 
perpetrate serious violent crimes. Having explored how the agency of women who 
kill is both passively and actively denied, I suggest the introduction of what I term to 
be an “agency-based model” for women who kill, which would allow the agency of 
these women to be acknowledged. In order to interrupt women’s passive agency 
denial I argue that the current construction of the legal subject and thus the 
reasonable person needs to be altered in order to help facilitate it to become a 
gender neutral concept, rather than simply pertaining to be. Interrupting women’s 
passive denials of agency allows the active agency denial symbiotic to labelling to 
also be interrupted.  
It is important to note here at the outset, that I will not be suggesting that the 
labels of mad, bad and victim will no longer be attached to women who kill. Rather I 
will argue that recognising women as legal subjects with agency mean that when 
these labels are attached to women who kill as legal subjects and agents, they are 
less influential and pervasive as identities than when attached to women as legal 
objects. Thus the active agency denial which occurs with labelling is interrupted.  It is 
also important to note here that I acknowledge that even once women’s agency is 
recognised within criminal legal discourse, their ability to actually exercise this 
agency will arguably be read through the prism of patriarchy. Indeed, throughout this 
thesis it will be acknowledged that any agency exercise which occurs has to be 
contextualised within the existing social structures of a patriarchal society. 
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Finally Chapter Seven, the conclusion, summarises the arguments that have 
been presented throughout the thesis, exploring the implications that arise from the 
research conducted and the agency-based model proposed in this thesis, as well as 
examining potential areas of future research. 
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Chapter Two - Terminology and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Literature Review Methodology 
Having introduced the main issues as conceived by this study, it is now 
necessary to examine in more detail some of the problematic words, themes, issues 
and constructs presented by both the subject matter and the literature surrounding 
it. The purpose of this chapter is to question and critically engage with the existing 
literature on the various terminologies and theories that will underpin this thesis, 
including labelling and construction theory and Judith Butler’s seminal work on 
performativity. I will also explore some of the literature surrounding the concept of 
agency. It is perhaps worth noting that in structuring my thesis, I found myself in a 
quandary as to where to place this initial discussion on the concept of agency 
because it forms such a pivotal part of the thesis. I ultimately made the decision to 
include a largely descriptive initial discussion of the concept at the beginning of this 
chapter because of the relationship between agency and labelling and construction 
theory, which becomes evident throughout the thesis. A critical engagement with 
the concept of agency occurs throughout later chapters in the thesis, particularly in 
chapters four, ‘passive denials of agency, and five, ‘active denials of agency’, and 
thus an initial descriptive engagement with the concept is all that occurs in this 
chapter. 
 
During the initial research and chapter planning and drafting process of 
writing my thesis, I made the decision to use a qualitative research methodology. 
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One consequence of this was the repeated use of numerous research terms, 
including “agency”, “labelling”, “constructing” and “performative(-ity)”. These terms 
were ones that were appearing most frequently in my research, that I was using as 
part of my search parameters, as well as being some of the ones which I was using 
myself to describe my research questions. Throughout the thesis these concepts will 
be used and therefore it is necessary to contextualise them and to explore their 
potentiality, not merely as words, but their importance as practical and symbolic 
constructs and labels. In doing so this chapter aims to both position and explain the 
use of these theories not only within the broader context of the thesis, but more 
specifically within the context of agency and ultimately creating an agency-based 
model for women who kill.  
 
Indeed as will be validated later in the thesis, the concept of agency is one 
that is gendered and thus concepts such as labelling and construction theory and 
performativity are relevant when exploring this gendering. For example, labelling is 
relevant to agency because of the symbiotic relationship between the gendered 
labelling of women who kill as mad, bad or victims and the active denials of agency 
that occur within criminal legal discourse. Similarly, the masculine gendered 
construction of the criminal legal subject ensures the continued objectification of 
women, denying their status as legal subjects and thus passively denying their 
agency. Finally, a critical engagement with the concept of performativity enables a 
closer analysis of the underpinnings of the gendered construction of the legal subject 
to take place. Therefore, this chapter will now move on to critically engage with the 
literature surrounding each of these key concepts in turn.  
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2.2 What is Agency? – The Existing Academic Literature  
The concept of agency, at its most basic, is the capacity to act for oneself1 and 
includes the ‘[a]bility to make effective choices and to transform [them] into desired 
outcomes.’2 The Oxford English Dictionary defines agency in its most basic form as 
‘action, capacity to act’.3 Expanding on this idea of capacity to act into three, more 
detailed subcategories, the dictionary states that agency is:  
ability or capacity to act or exert power; active working  or operation; action, 
activity … action or intervention producing a particular effect; means, 
instrumentality, mediation … such action embodied or personified; a being or 
thing that acts to produce a particular effect or result.4 
These basic definitions of agency underlie much of the literature on this topic.  
Taking a more detailed approach to the topic, agency can be described as a 
liberal, post-enlightenment construct, heavily influenced by René Descartes and 
Immanuel Kant, and their work on the mind-body dichotomy. Descartes’ work, 
although not inventing the position regarding the mind-body distinction, was 
extremely influential on later thinkers. Indeed Descartes is viewed by many scholars 
                                                          
1 Mahoney, Martha, “Victimisation or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence and Agency” in Fineman, 
Martha Albertson and Mykitiuk, Roxanne, The Public Nature of Private Violence – The Discovery of 
Domestic Abuse (New York: Routledge, 1994) p.59 
2 The World Bank, “World Development Report 2012: Gender, Equality and Development” (2011) 
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-
1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf p.150 
3 Oxford English Dictionary, “agency, n.” available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/3851?redirectedFrom=agency#eid (OED Third Edition, September 
2012) 
4 Oxford English Dictionary, “agency, n.” 
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as the founder of modern Western philosophy.5 He posited the theory that the 
physical could be separated from the mental, with the consequence that the mind is 
privileged over the body. In his monograph Meditations6 Descartes argued that 
although he was in possession of a physical body, it was an ‘[u]nthinking thing …’ 7 
devoid of reasoning, as it was absolutely distinct from his mind. For Descartes, the 
mind itself was distinct even from the brain and thus could exist without the body at 
all.8 Thus following this theory, Western philosophy conceptualised humans ‘[a]s 
disembodied minds …’9 By privileging the mind over the body, Descartes’ theory has 
clear importance for the concept of agency because it suggests that ‘[h]uman agency 
is distinct. It is the mind acting freely through acts of will which make us unique …’10 
Thus, when humans act freely or voluntarily through their exercise of agency, 
morality and responsibility must also be considered by examining the nature of the 
voluntary act(s) to determine whether praise or punishment is deserved.11  
Descartes’ work, particularly that on agency, is both reflected in and 
expanded upon in the propositions advanced by Kant, and what has come to be 
termed as Kantian principles. These principles focused more specifically on the 
notion of the “moral agent” and the theory of autonomy. The Kantian moral agent is 
                                                          
5 Rollinson, Matthew, “Re-reading criminal law: Gendering the mental element” in Nicolson, Donald 
and Bibbings, Lois (Eds), Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000) 
p.105 
6 Descartes, René, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy (translated by Haldane, 
Elizabeth S.) (Digireads.com Publishing, 2005) 
7 Descartes, 2005, p.72 
8 Descartes, 2005, p.72  
9 Rollinson, 2000, p.105 
10 Rollinson, 2000, p.105 
11 Morris, Katherine, “Bêtes-machines”, in Gaukroger, Stephen; Schuster, John, and Sutton, John,  
Descartes’ Natural Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000) p.404 
 32 
one who perceives situations in the context of their moral characteristics.12 
According to Kant, ‘[d]eveloping into a moral agent requires learning about the 
“subjective conditions of freedom” and, importantly, practicing one’s virtue in order 
to develop a moral character.’13 The relationship between morality and autonomy is 
a significant one within Kantian principles. Namely the idea that individuals can act of 
their own volition in a morally righteous way.14  
Consequently, for Kant, when individuals exercise their moral agency they are 
acting based upon their own moral imperatives, rather than those that are externally 
imposed; ‘[t]hey are governing themselves by their own standards …’15 However, it is 
notable that Kant also acknowledged that agents can act to satisfy other inclinations, 
rather than acting from purely a moral standpoint at all times,16 thus suggesting that 
agency exercise can take more than simply a moral form. 
 The work of Descartes and the development of Kantian principles in relation 
to agency had a central focus on an individual’s actions.17 Their liberalist views 
constructed a subject who became human due to their possession of agency. That is, 
an individual ‘[w]hose humanity consisted in [their] theoretically unlimited potential, 
and … capacity to exercise meaningful choice in the direction of [their] own life.’18 
                                                          
12 Herman, Barbara,  The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) p.83   
13 Moran, Kate A., Community and Progression in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Washington DC: The 
Catholic University of America Press, 2012) p. 166 
14 Hill, Thomas E., Jr., Human Welfare and Moral Worth – Kantian Perspectives (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) pp.33-34 
15 Hill, Thomas E., Jr., 2002, p.33 
16 Hill, Thomas E., Jr., 2002, p.34  
17 Chiu, Elaine, “Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers” S. Cal. L. Rev, 74, (2000-2001), 1223, 
p.1241 
18 Abrams, Kathryn “Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory” Colum. L. Rev, 
95, (1995), 304, p.326 
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Applying these theories to today’s contemporary society, it is suggested that all 
“humans” inherently possess agency, something that is reflected in various academic 
literature.19 Thus individuals who possess and exercise agency are assumed to be 
rational agents who can make reasoned choices with regards to appropriate actions 
and behaviour. 20 
 The work of Albert Bandura is also important in the context of understanding 
the concept of agency. Bandura has suggested that there are four core features of 
human agency; intentionality, forethought, self-reactiveness and self-
reflectiveness.21 The most important of these for the purposes of this thesis and its 
focus on criminal legal discourse is that of intentionality. Intentionality, according to 
Bandura, refers to how individuals choose to behave: ‘an intention is a 
representation of a future course of action to be performed. It is not simply an 
expectation or prediction of future actions but a proactive commitment to bringing 
them about.’22 Bandura goes on to explain that: ‘in short, the power to originate 
actions for given purposes is the key feature of personal agency. Whether the 
exercise of that agency has beneficial or detrimental effects, or produces unintended 
consequences, is another matter.’23 For Bandura then, agency and intention are two 
fundamentally intertwining concepts. When an individual is imbued with agency 
                                                          
19 This can be seen in statements such as ‘[a] capacity for agency is as much a given for humans as the 
capacity for respiration’ (Sewell, William, H., Jr, “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and 
Transformation” American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), (1992), 1, p.20); and ‘[a]ll human beings, by 
nature, have agency …’ (Eduards, Maud L., “Women’s Agency and Collective Action” Women’s Studies 
Int. Forum, 17, 2/3, (1994), 181, p.181)  
20 Duff, Anthony, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability – Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) p.101 
21 Bandura, Albert, “Social Cognitive Therapy: An Agentic Perspective” Annu. Rev. Psychol. 52, (2001), 
1, pp.6-11 
22 Bandura, 2001, p.6  
23 Bandura, 2001, p.6 
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their actions are arguably simultaneously invested with a sense of intention and 
purpose. This is particularly evident in the context of the criminal law, which will be 
discussed in detail later in chapter four.  
Another particularly important aspect within the concept of agency is the 
ability of “an acting subject” to transform society with their intentional and chosen 
acts.24 However, any action which individuals choose to take occurs within the 
context of their situated position within society. Their choice of actions, the 
outcomes and ultimately their ability to transform society is influenced by their 
identity and power relationships with others within existing social structures.25 This 
idea was expanded on further by Sewell who explains that agency can only be 
exercised by individuals within the context of existing social structures. Consequently 
it is individuals within those structures with the requisite power to successfully 
control, reinterpret or mobilise resources that are able to exercise their agency.26  
Individuals imbued with agency make both conscious and unconscious 
choices about their behaviour that can result in both intended and unintended 
consequences.27 It is therefore reasonable to assume that agentic individuals can be 
held responsible for their actions and the consequences that stem from the 
behavioural decisions that they make. As explained by Duff, ‘in holding someone 
responsible for his actions, we suppose that he is in some relevant sense a “free” 
                                                          
24 Marchbank, Jennifer and Letherby, Gayle, Introduction to Gender: Social Science Perspectives 
(Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007) p.316 
25 Hitlin, Steven and Elder, Glen H., Jr., “Time, Self and the Curiously Abstract Concept of Agency” 
Sociological Theory, 25(2), (2007), 170, p.185 
26 Sewell, 1992, p.20  
27 Hays, Sharon, “Structure, Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture” Sociological Theory, 12(1), (Mar 
1994), 57, p.64 
 35 
agent; that he has, in the traditional terminology “free will.”’28 However, it would be 
incorrect to think that agency equates with choices being made wholly and 
completely freely by individuals. Rather, the choices that agents make are always 
influenced by society. That is to say that the ability of an individual to exercise 
agency is always constrained, to varying degrees depending on the individual 
concerned, by social structures, discourses and norms. As explained in Hays’ work on 
agency, ‘[a]gency … is the individual and collective autonomy made possible by a 
solid grounding in the constraining and enabling features of social structure.’29 So it 
is social structures that both initially enable, and ultimately constrain, an individual’s 
exhibition of agency: ‘[a]gency is made possible by the enabling features of social 
structures at the same time as it is limited within the bounds of structural 
constraint.’30  
Whilst it is apparent from the above analysis that individuals are ascribed 
agency, the concept extends also to collectives, or groups. An agentic collective or 
group then encompasses individuals with shared beliefs who coordinate their actions 
‘“[t]o form collective projects, to persuade, to coerce, and to monitor the 
simultaneous effects of one’s own and others’ activities”’31 with the aim of achieving 
shared goals and producing particular results. Collective agency exercise can be seen 
in the work of many groups and organisations within society, through for example 
protests and political activities.32  
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From the above analysis, it is apparent that although particular definitions of 
agency have emerged within the literature that differ slightly, there are some key 
similarities and themes which have emerged. The most recurrent of these are choice, 
action and the role of social structures. Therefore, the particular definition of agency 
which will be used within this thesis is: the ability of an individual to choose to act in 
a particular way. It must be noted here that this definition will be positioned and 
contextualised within existing social structures. This largely reflects the importance 
of “choice” as the key recurring theme within the preceding discussions on the 
definitional concept of agency. For example, Lacey defines agency as being 
‘[r]esponsible conduct which the agent chooses.’33 The definition of agency which 
will be used in this thesis is also one which is largely reflected in Messerschmidt’s 
work: ‘[a]gency refers to the behaviours in which a person chooses to engage in 
order to shape his or her experiences within social structures in light of his or her 
understanding of the social structures that surround and constrain his or her 
options.’34 Although the concept of agency is arguably the most important within this 
thesis its importance cannot be fully acknowledged without exploring the other key 
theories which underpin the argument being proposed; the first of which is labelling 
theory. 
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2.3 Labelling Theory 
Labelling theory explores the process by which deviant labels are applied to 
and received by individuals.35 These labels are applied once an individual’s behaviour 
deviates from that which has been normalised and has thus deemed as acceptable 
within societal and socio-legal discourse, with the result that the offending person is 
labelled as deviant. Put simply, labelling occurs as a response to actual or perceived 
deviance or norm contravention. The importance of labelling theory in the context of 
this thesis can be found in the labelling of women who kill and the consequences 
that this ultimately has for the agency denial of these women. 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s labelling theory was ‘[t]he dominant sociological 
theory of crime’36 and was developed as a response to positivistic criminology. The 
idea behind the introduction of the theory was that criminologists should move their 
focus from the causes of crime, of which there were many, to instead concentrate on 
exploring the societal reactions to crimes and their perpetrators.37 The key labelling 
theorists are widely accepted to be Tannenbaum, Lemert and Becker. Modern 
labelling theory was developed by Tannenbaum in his publication Crime and the 
Community.38 Tannenbaum argues that labelling, describing and thus identifying a 
deviant person as criminal has the effect of evoking such traits in them. Put simply: 
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‘the person becomes the thing he is described as being.’39 Tannenbaum argues that 
it is irrelevant who is doing the labelling, even if they are doing so in an attempt to 
reform the deviance or criminality, rather than punish it. By labelling an individual as 
deviant rather than suppressing the illicit behaviour, it instead has the effect of 
enhancing it. Therefore for Tannenbaum ‘the way out is through a refusal to 
dramatise the evil’40 through labelling. This reflects the notion posited in this thesis 
that labelling women who kill as mad, bad or victims offers excuses and explanations 
for their actions by denying their agency.  
 
Keeping these issues in mind, it is perhaps unsurprising that in his version of 
labelling theory Tannenbaum focuses on the direct impact that the labelling process 
has, that is the role that the consequent stigmatisation of the individual ‘[p]lays in 
generating delinquent and criminal careers.’41 Most importantly for Tannenbaum is 
the ‘“[d]ramatisation of evil”, that is the process of public labelling.’42 According to 
Tannenbaum, once society publically labels an individual’s actions as deviant, this 
results in the person themselves being so labelled. Consequently, self-labelling 
occurs with ‘[t]he person's self-image [changing] in a similar direction’,43 and them 
identifying with the deviant behaviour.   
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Tannenbaum’s work was expanded upon in 1951 with the publication of 
Social Pathology44 by Edwin Lemert, which offered what Leonard describes as ‘[t]he 
first sophisticated version’45 of labelling theory. Lemert offers a definition of the 
deviant individual to whom labels are applied. He suggests they are defined as 
someone: 
[w]hose role, status, function, and self-definition are importantly shaped by 
how much deviation he engages in, by the degree of its social visibility, by the 
particular exposure he has to the societal reaction and by the nature and 
strength of the societal reaction.46 
Like Tannenbaum, Lemert is concerned with the societal reaction to deviance and 
the consequent stigmatisation processes that occur once an individual has been so 
labelled. However, Lemert also expands on Tannenbaum’s work, developing the 
distinction between primary and secondary deviance. He explains primary deviance 
as incidents of deviance which provoke little reaction from others and thus do not 
‘[l]ead to symbolic reorganisation at the level of self-regarding attitudes and social 
roles.’47 In contrast, Lemert argues that secondary deviance occurs when there is 
some societal reaction to the individual’s deviant behaviour with the consequence 
that a label is attached which simultaneously acknowledges and stigmatises their 
illicit behaviour. In secondary deviance, once an individual is labelled and thus 
stigmatised, they self-label and thus identify pejoratively with the traits associated 
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with the label attached to them. The labelled individual may reorganise themselves 
around the label, with the label thus becoming their primary identity.48 
 
As is clear above, central to Lemert’s theory of labelling is the pivotal role that 
societal reaction plays because it is not until societal reaction occurs through 
labelling that a formal stigmatisation take place. It is this labelling and stigmatisation 
that may ultimately drive an individual ‘[d]eeper into a deviant life.’49 Therefore, it is 
arguable that ‘[s]ocietal reaction may be more important than anything that 
occurred before a person’s involvement in rule breaking’50 because it is this that 
causes individuals to reorganise themselves around the deviant label that they have 
received.  
 
This previous work on labelling theory by Tannenbaum and Lemert was 
furthered by that of Becker, a second generation sociologist. His book Outsiders: 
Studies in the Sociology of Deviance,51 is widely regarded within sociological 
criminology as the most important work on labelling theory. Becker’s aim in his work 
on labelling theory is to acknowledge the point of the view of the deviant individual. 
He emphasises that the person being labelled as deviant, or as Becker puts it as “an 
outsider”, may actually not accept the label being attached to them: ‘he may not 
accept the rule by which he is being judged and ... may feel his judges are 
outsiders.’52 Rather than simply succumbing to the label and reorganising their 
primary identity around it, Becker argues that these individuals actually had enough 
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intelligence and control over their lives to be able to reject it.53 However, although 
an individual may themselves reject the label being attached to them, Becker also 
acknowledges that once a deviant label is attached to an individual, this becomes 
their ‘master status’ in society. As explained by Leonard, ‘once labelled deviant, this 
identification outweighs any other, colouring all social relationships. Being known as 
an 'ex-convict', for example, is the central fact of your social existence as far as 
others are concerned ...’54  
 
In his discussion on deviance Becker notes that deviance was created by 
society and more specifically by social groups: 
The central fact about deviance: it is created by society ... social groups create 
deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by 
applying those rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. 
From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person 
commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and 
sanctions to an “offender”. The deviant is one to whom that label has 
successfully been applied; deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so 
label.55 
For Becker then, it is not the act of deviance, nor the characteristics of the deviant 
themselves that are especially important, rather it is the responses of others to the 
deviance and the consequent process of labelling which takes place that is integral to 
labelling theory. Indeed, he highlights the fact that behaviour viewed as deviant by 
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one social group at one time may not be viewed as such by a different social group at 
a different time. Similarly the particulars of the individual who is participating in the 
behaviour can also have an impact on whether such conduct is viewed as deviant or 
not. ‘In short, whether a given act is deviant or not depends in part on the nature of 
the act (that is, whether or not it violates some rule) and in part on what other 
people do about it.’56 
 
Therefore, it is clear that ‘[d]ifferentials of race, age, sex and social class are 
influential in determining whose rules are operating.’57 Before an act is viewed as 
deviant and an individual is labelled as such for participating in such an act there 
must be “a rule” created which defines the act as deviant. 58 However only certain 
people have the requisite power to make, and also to enforce, these socially 
constructed norms and rules.59 This is a job which Becker notes is normally done by 
the ‘[p]rofessional enforcer who, by enforcing already existing rules, creates the 
particular deviants society views as outsiders.’60 It is clear then that not only do 
differentials of race, age, sex and social class influence whether an individual has 
deviated from socially constructed norms and whether they will consequently be 
labelled, but that these factors are also significant in who can enforce these rules and 
norms. Thus when labelling occurs, power differentials and enterprises are present in 
numerous ways.  
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 Becker also developed a number of other major insights in relation to 
labelling theory. One such development was the notion of the ‘secret deviant’; an 
individual who deviates from socially constructed norms or rules but whose deviance 
is not noticed and consequently not stigmatised and labelled.  This illustrates that 
actions can still be deviant even if they are not publicly stigmatised61 and that 
conversely individuals must therefore be able to be incorrectly stigmatised and 
labelled.62 According to Becker, this non-labelling of secret deviants and incorrect 
labelling of others highlights that ‘[t]he process of labelling may not be infallible ...‘63  
 
2.3.1 Women and Labelling 
It is apparent from the discussions above that sex and power differentials 
exist within the labelling process. However, despite the fact that women are 
constantly labelled in various ways, including being labelled as deviant, relatively 
little academic research has been conducted into the relationship between labelling 
theory and women. It must be noted here that “woman” is itself a label and it is with 
some reluctance that I am using it as I am aware of its contextual and contingent 
nature. However, for the purposes of this chapter, it is difficult to discuss the subject 
under consideration without acknowledging and attaching a label which has been 
subjectively chosen and possesses a number of inherent, often injurious, meanings, 
something my later analysis acknowledges.  
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Any mention of labelling theory being applied to women by Tannenbaum, 
Lemert or Becker was at best minimal. It was not until several years later that women 
and labelling theory were considered together in any detail. In Outsiders Becker 
briefly looked at the role that family, particularly wives, played in the lives of jazz 
musicians. The portrayal of women given is ‘uniformly an unattractive one.’ As noted 
by Naffine;  
Their principal role is that of the 'square' wife … she represents the other side 
- the conventional order which threatens to destroy all talent and imagination 
… As wife, she is invariably colourless and conformist. Her husband, by 
contrast is “spontaneous” and “individualistic”. Her sole preoccupation 
appears to be to expunge these characteristics and to drag her partner down 
to her level.64  
Becker also discusses women in the context of how the application and enforcement 
of rules varies depending on the consequences. More specifically, he discusses 
Vincent’s work on the unmarried mother, where Vincent suggested that illicit sexual 
relations without consequences rarely had pejorative consequences for those 
involved. In contrast however if there was a consequence to such relations, for 
example the woman becoming pregnant, the social censure, stigmatisation and 
punishment was normally severe. It is important to note here that Vincent made the 
point that such stigmatisation and punishment was normally exclusively reserved for 
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the unmarried mother, rather than the father,65 thus demonstrating ‘[t]he 
differential enforcement of rules on different categories of people.’ 66  
 
Indeed, more extreme examples of this differential enforcement of rules on 
women can be seen in relation to women who are raped, then consequently 
incorrectly and unjustly convicted of adultery and stoned to death in some religious 
cultures.67 A similar fate does not necessarily await the perpetrating rapist. This 
discussion by Becker on Vincent’s work illustrates that when women do not conform 
to appropriate gendered behaviour they are more readily labelled as deviant by the 
powerful within society, that is men within the context of a patriarchal society. 
Although statistics demonstrate that women are less frequently sentenced for 
criminal behaviour when compared to men68 and are therefore comparatively less 
frequently labelled deviant for criminal behaviour, their deviance from the socially 
enforced rules and norms that embody appropriate femininity69 results in their 
labelling and stigmatisation.   
 
 Since Becker’s work, other scholars have attempted to present a theory of 
labelling in the context of female criminal behaviour. Harris was one such scholar 
who produced a theory that he argued was ‘[a]n extension of, and an improvement 
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on, labelling theory …’70 He argues that women’s greater conformity to criminal legal 
norms could be explained by ‘[t]heir manipulation by … powerful men who convince 
them that crime is a wholly inappropriate activity for women.’71 According to Harris, 
men want women to remain law-abiding in order for them to perform the vital social 
functions traditionally associated with women, such as child-rearing. If women are 
involved in crime and imprisoned there is no-one to perform these functions, and 
consequently the nuclear family could break-up, thus threatening ‘“[t]he institutional 
hegemony of the socially dominant.”’72 Harris argues that the powerful define the 
type-scripts of people who should (men), and should not (women), be involved in 
criminal activity and therefore there is no need for official labelling. Consequently, 
‘[t]hose who are “scripted” as criminals assume the role even before they come into 
contact with law enforcement agencies.’73    
  
 Fox is another scholar who has discussed labelling theory in the context of 
female criminal behaviour. She argues that women choose not to offend primarily 
for two reasons. Firstly, literature makes it clear that women who are labelled as 
criminals are considered to be fallen women and therefore they will suffer 
stigmatism and public ostracism.74 Secondly, ‘[w]omen obey the law because social-
value constructs, such as “good girl”, “lady” and “nice girl” exhort them to be model 
citizens or [alternatively] risk negative social evaluation.’75 Similarly to Harris’ model 
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there is no need for official labelling because women are controlled by societal and 
gendered norms and rules, thus actively discouraging them from becoming involved 
in criminal activity. According to Fox if women deviate, even slightly, from 
appropriate feminine behaviour, society will willingly withdraw the “good girl” label.  
   
Other feminist criminologists have also explored the relationship between 
labelling theory and women, primarily in the context of women who commit crime. 
The American feminist criminologists Klein and Kress have suggested a theory 
attempting to explain why women are often not subject to the same labelling as men 
when they commit particular crimes.76 Female sex offenders are often treated more 
punitively than their male counterparts because their behaviour is viewed as 
‘[j]eopardising their socially prescribed reproductive function’,77 and thus 
threatening the dominant typification of motherhood for all women. In contrast, 
women who engage in less serious offences, such as shoplifting, are not considered 
to be a serious threat to the social order.78 This theory is supported to some degree 
by Lees, who carried out a study on teenage girls and found that ‘[t]he ways in which 
young men and young women label young women act as a powerful mechanism of 
social control.’79  Finally, Carlen et al. have ‘[s]hown the ways in which labelling 
influences the patterns of female crime and the ways in which female criminals are 
labelled unfeminine.’80 Indeed, as will be highlighted and discussed in detail in 
chapter five, in the context of women who kill, there is a clear relationship between 
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the degree of women’s deviance from appropriate femininity and the way in which 
they are labelled.  
 
From the above discussions on the origins and development of labelling 
theory it is clear that labelling theory in its original and traditional form was not 
intended to be applicable to women. One explanation available for this lack of 
engagement between labelling theory and women is that traditionally women are 
constructed as “the Other”.81 This status as “the Other” has meant that women are 
considered to be subordinate to men and therefore the application of labelling 
theory to women was not a priority. As a result, when attempting to combine 
labelling theory with female deviance it is necessary to manipulate the theory. 
Indeed, such manipulation is evident in the work of all of the scholars examined who 
have attempted to combine labelling theory and women. The fact that such 
manipulation is required demonstrates that a number of issues are raised when 
applying traditional labelling theory to women, particularly women who commit 
crime. 
 
The primary concern with the application of labelling theory to women who 
are labelled as criminals is the theory of secondary deviance: that is that deviant 
individuals will identify with their label, resulting in a negative self-image and 
subsequent re-offending. As noted by Naffine, it is mainly men who reoffend, rather 
than women.82 It therefore becomes apparent that traditional labelling theory is 
arguably incompatible with female crime because secondary deviance is not 
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generally present when women commit crime. Despite this, labelling theory has 
remained largely concerned with deviance in the context of criminal behaviour. It 
should however be noted that although women do not offend as frequently as men, 
when they do offend they are often treated more punitively than men, facing 
harsher labelling and greater stigmatisation. This is particularly so when women 
commit violent crime such as murder.83  
 
As examined earlier in this chapter, labelling does not only occur within the 
context of criminal deviance, but also in the context of societal and gendered 
deviance. Indeed, women are frequently labelled as deviant as a result of not 
conforming to appropriate feminine behaviour dictated by societal and gender 
discourse. This is because ‘widespread violation of gender norms by women 
constitutes a serious threat to the entire gender system.’84  Women may violate 
various gender norms including; ‘[(1)] presentation of self … (2) marriage and 
maternity, (3) sexuality … and (4) occupational choice.’85 Despite this, labelling 
theory has failed to address the labelling of non-criminal, deviant women in detail. 
This is despite the fact that when women deviate they are often labelled ‘[t]o get 
them back in line.’86 One historical example of using labelling as a social control 
mechanism for women was the labelling of deviant women as witches.87 It is 
arguably somewhat ironic that labelling theory has traditionally been applied only to 
criminal deviance in the context of women, despite the fact that social deviance 
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occurs much more frequently. Moreover, the social requirement that women adhere 
to appropriate feminine behaviour makes it much more likely that they will be 
labelled should they deviate, however marginally, from this behaviour. Deviance 
does not have to take the form of criminal behaviour for women, yet this appears to 
be a fact largely overlooked within labelling theory.  
 
Not only is the relationship between labelling theory and women 
problematic, there is a question relating to the extent to which it denies the agency 
of women. Labelling theory, as developed by Becker, was designed to focus on the 
individualism and agency of the male deviant. However, rather than producing the 
same outcome when applied to female deviants, labelling theory instead adds to the 
existing stereotypes and devalues women. When applied to women, labelling theory 
has ‘[e]xpunged the agency of the female.’88 As noted by Naffine, accounts of the 
female lived experience which invest women with sense of purpose, decision-making 
ability and choice are missing from the existing labelling literature. ‘Neither the 
criminal nor conforming woman has been given … a voice: the opportunity to say in 
her own words how she perceives her own social reality.’89   
 
Indeed, many criminologists within the labelling school ‘[h]ave assumed that 
women are unable to shed light on the reasons for their own actions. They possess 
no critical insights.’90 Instead, women are assumed to be unable or unwillingly to 
question their position within society because they are merely a product of social 
engineering and thus have their agency over their actions denied. Moreover, as 
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argued by Harris and Fox, deviant women do not need to be officially labelled 
because they are being controlled long before they become deviant through 
constructs such as the typical offender and the “good girl”.91 As is so-often the case 
when discussing women, within labelling theory arguments have been developed 
about the socialisation of women to the point that they are perceived merely as the 
objects of socialisation and consequently their agency is denied.  
 
Despite the problems outlined above that applying labelling theory to the 
behaviour of women has presented, there are some aspects of the theory which are 
particularly useful when discussing female deviance both in a criminal and non-
criminal context. The power relationships which exist in the labelling process are 
particularly pertinent in the context of the labelling of women. As noted in the 
discussions above, those creating the labels are the powerful within society, those 
being labelled deviant are not. Women operate from a disadvantaged position of 
power92 and therefore ‘it is often not women who are doing the labelling [because] 
…Women do not have the power to label...’93 This lack of power results in the 
continued subordination and suppression of women. Indeed, the power hierarchy as 
demonstrated within labelling theory goes some way towards explaining the 
persistent labelling and categorisation by the criminal justice system of women who 
kill as either mad, bad, or victims.94 This in turn also offers some explanation, 
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however inadequate, for the continued denial of female agency, which if recognised 
would simultaneously attribute and acknowledge power to women.  
 
Another useful aspect of labelling theory, linked to the above discussions on 
power relationships, is its demonstration of how behavioural rules are created and 
enforced within societal discourse. Similar to the way in which society proscribes 
deviance, ‘certain forms of behaviour considered unacceptable for women are 
proscribed.’95 Appropriate feminine behaviour as dictated by gender discourse exists 
in its current form as a result of behaviour(s) sanctioned or punished by society and 
law. The rules pertaining to acceptable feminine behaviour are created in much the 
same way as the rules pertaining to deviance are created in labelling theory. That is 
to say that it is always the powerful who create the rules for the powerless to follow. 
Becker states that ‘[i]t is true in many respects that men make the rules for women 
in our society.’96 Therefore if women do not conform to acceptable forms of 
feminine behaviour, regardless of whether this behaviour is criminal in nature, they 
are labelled as socially deviant. If women also engage in criminal behaviour they are 
considered to be doubly deviant, as they are ‘[p]erceived as having not only broken 
the law but also as having transgressed their gender roles.’97 It is therefore 
submitted that aspects of labelling theory generally reflect the relationships between 
women and society and women and the law.  
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It is the case of course, that the mere act of attaching a label to an individual 
could be argued to be a “construction” of the category of “woman”. Given this 
relationship between labelling theory and construction, it is to construction theory 
that I now turn. 
 
2.4 Construction Theory 
Construction theory is linked to labelling theory, in that labelling theory 
arguably in and of itself can constitute a “construction” in the context of construction 
theory. Moreover labelling women deviant, as noted above, directly contributes to 
damaging constructions of women. Construction theory developed from the work of 
theorists such as Simone de Beauvoir98, Berger and Luckmann,99 and Bennett and 
Feldman.100 Hacking also discussed construction theory in detail in his book The 
social construction of What?101 He looked at the general aims and beliefs of 
construction theorists regardless of the subject (X) they were interrogating. He broke 
these aims down into three main points; 
(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at 
present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable...  
(2) [X] is quite bad as it is 
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(3) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least 
radically transformed.102 
At the heart of construction theory is the idea that whatever the subject, it is not 
fixed or inevitable, rather it is ‘[t]he product of historical events, social forces and 
ideology.’103  
 
Applying this general theory of constructionism to gender, that is replacing X 
with “gender”, Hacking produced a basic sequence: 
Feminists convinced us (1) that gendered attributes and relations are highly 
contingent. They also urged (2) that they are terrible, and (3) that women in 
particular, and human beings in general, would be much better off if present 
gender attributes and relations were abolished or radically transformed.104 
Hacking also notes that social constructionism has the potential to be liberating to 
those it is applied to.105 To support this assertion he uses the example of women and 
their role as mothers; arguing that motherhood and its associated meanings are not 
fixed but rather that in contemporary society women can to some degree construct 
their own lived version of motherhood, without the same constraints which 
historically bound them so tightly. He remarks; ‘they need not feel quite as guilty as 
they are supposed to if they do not obey either the old rules of family or whatever is 
the official psycho-paediatric rule of the day, such as “you must bond with your 
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infant, or you both will perish”’.106 It is clear then that for Hacking because the 
subject of construction has been so constructed by historical and social forces, 
norms, and ideologies, there is potential for the subject to be liberated and thus re-
constructed over time by these same forces.  
However Hacking’s assertion that construction theory is liberating is, I would 
suggest, somewhat flawed. Taking Hacking’s example of women and their role as 
mothers: it is true that in today’s society there is more awareness surrounding 
motherhood, and its associated issues, such as extreme fatigue and exhaustion and 
post-natal depression. Indeed, in particular the issue of post-natal depression is one 
that has received widespread attention and publicisation by the media and mental 
health charities, in an attempt to raise awareness of and provide support to 
mothers.107 However, such “awareness” is part and parcel of the labelling of 
“woman” as the subject of law, for example in the defence of Infanticide, which 
requires a diagnosis of puerperal psychosis, an extreme form of postnatal 
depression, with the consequence that the women who make use of it are labelled as 
mad.108  
 
It is also pertinent that the social construction of woman and motherhood is 
still determined by the powerful within society, much in the same way as labelling 
theory, discussed earlier in the chapter. That is to say that it is men within a 
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patriarchal society who determine the socially accepted construction of motherhood 
for women. The socio-legal construction of the subject is ‘grounded in patriarchy, as 
well as in class and ethnic divisions.’109 The result of this is that social constructions 
surrounding women and motherhood are still being determined by patriarchy within 
society. The media has also had an increasing role in social construction. Indeed, the 
media often highlights and makes examples of so-called “bad mothers”. The 
particular social construction of women and motherhood which continues to exist is 
extremely limiting in the particular behaviours which are deemed to constitute a 
“good mother”. As noted in a Sunday Times article: 
Mothers ... are living through a permanent exam wherein we must meet some 
impossible ideal: we must be endlessly patient and available, always cheerful, 
never yell, not project our own neuroses on our children, have perfectly turned 
out children, cook like Nigella and never be too tired for sex.110 
These requirements of good motherhood have become known as the “motherhood 
mandate”, the notion that women must devote all their time to their children and 
their family, be the homemaker and put the needs of family before her own. This 
concept is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.111 It is apparent then that 
social construction can actually result in the continued suppression of women 
through the enforcement of particular behaviours and stereotypes associated with 
appropriate femininity. 
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2.4.1 “Constructing” The Subject Of Law 
 The law claims to be neutral, objective and impartial. As Ronald Dworkin 
explained, we are all ‘[s]ubjects to law’s empire’.112 That is to say that we are all 
‘[l]iegemen to its methods and ideals, bound in spirit ...’113 Indeed every branch of 
the law has a subject, even corporate law where the subject is the corporation. Legal 
subjects are given particular characteristics, that is to say that they are ‘[d]eemed to 
act in certain ways, to wield certain rights and to assume certain responsibilities.’114 
As noted by Naffine and Owens; ‘the legal person, or legal subject, plays an 
absolutely critical part in law. The attributes accorded by law to its subject serve to 
justify and rationalise law’s very forms and priorities.’115  
 
Despite assertions that the legal subject is a neutral subject, that is to say that 
it is ‘[a] gender-less, race-less, class-less individual ...’116 many feminists claim that it 
is in fact gendered. As Lacey explains the legal subject is an individual who has ‘[t]he 
capacities for rational understanding, reflection and control of their own actions.’117 
These traits are typically associated with masculinity, thus explaining the equation of 
legal subjecthood with this gender construction.118 This argument is further 
reinforced by Davies who argues that the law is gendered masculine, reflecting the 
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social and gendered construction of masculinity.119 Put bluntly, the legal subject is 
‘[a] white, middle class, man.’120 The masculine gendered nature of the legal subject 
therefore ensures that women’s position as “the Other” is unyielding. Women have 
the option of either assuming masculine stereotypes and consequently being labelled 
and stigmatised as unnatural, (yet still lacking status as legal subjects), or maintaining 
their femininity and also lacking legal subjecthood.121 
 
Feminist legal scholars have taken different approaches when exploring the 
gendered construction of the legal subject. MacKinnon is an American feminist 
lawyer. During the early eighties her work was a major catalyst for a dramatic shift in 
feminist legal thought and discourse.122 MacKinnon argued that within a patriarchal 
society “woman” was a social construction constructed by, and for, men. ‘What was 
thought of as the female sex was not in fact the nature of women. Women's 
apparent sexual difference from men, indeed their very sexuality, was not theirs - for 
women were simply the expression of men's desire.’123 This construction of women, 
in relation to, and by men, formed the basis for MacKinnon’s epistemological views 
on the construction of the legal subject. In her monograph, Feminism Unmodified: 
Discourses on Life and Law,124 MacKinnon proposes that; 
[g]ender is socially constructed as difference epistemologically; sex 
discrimination law bounds gender equality by difference doctrinally. A built-in 
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tension exists between this concept of equality, which presupposes 
sameness, and this concept of sex, which presupposes difference. Sex 
equality thus becomes a contradiction in terms, something of an 
oxymoron...125 
According to MacKinnon therefore, sex equality can never truly exist because by 
their very nature the sexes of men and women are inherently different. The 
construction of gender as binary in nature also means that there cannot ever truly be 
gender equality.  
 
Rather than ensuring equality, the power relationships within gender 
construction produce male supremacy and female subordination. The legal subject is 
inherently masculine and consequently the legal subject is judged by the values 
associated with masculinity: ‘[w]hen a man and woman stand before the law, it is not 
that law fails to apply objective criteria when faced with the feminine subject, but 
precisely that it does apply objective criteria and these criteria are masculine.’126 As a 
result it is arguable that when a woman comes before the law she is not judged 
objectively, but rather subjectively in her role as man’s Other. These women must 
therefore construct a biography that is reflective of the socially constructed woman 
and the associated norms of appropriate femininity. Despite being judged 
subjectively against the criteria of femininity, women’s continuing status as man’s 
Other arguably means that she is viewed as a legal object rather than a legal subject. 
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Expanding on the work done by MacKinnon, Naffine notes how when creating 
its subject the law has failed to include the lived experiences of women and instead 
only invoked ‘[t]he experiences, the expectations and the values of the male.’127 
Despite this, Naffine argues that women actually have a role to play in the 
construction of the legal subject explaining that ‘[w]oman’s role as “other” is integral 
to man’s construction as “one”...’128 Lacey succinctly summarises Naffine’s 
arguments in her book Unspeakable Subjects:129 
[O]fficially the legal subject is potentially anyone, anywhere. And it is this any-
personness of the legal person which is supposed to ensure that the law is at 
the disposal of us all, equally, without fear, favour or affection ...  However... 
the legal subject [is] someone with a quite specific set of distinguishing 
characteristics. But these characteristics do not sit easily together. On the one 
hand our man of law is assumed to be a freestanding, autonomous creature, 
rationally self-interested and hard headed; on the other hand he is a being 
who is assumed both to have and to need access to the values of 
Gemeinschaft, the family values, though he must not display them in his 
public, legal Gesellschaft life. The legal person described here is thus 
essentially a paradox ... The law ... assigns to women the job of holding the 
two worlds together ... As the courts continue to tell us, the Gemeinschaft 
functions are vital and necessary ones, but they are most appropriately 
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performed by dutiful wives and mothers - not by the man of the law. 
Women's domestic labours sustain the paradox of the man of law.130 
Thus, the female body and the feminine, as the hidden “Other” complements and is 
a partial constitution of the masculine legal subject.131 
 
 Naffine has also explored the construction of the legal subject specifically in 
the context of the criminal law, suggesting that the subject of the criminal law is the 
rational man.132 She notes that the criminal law is primarily concerned with the 
policing of the heterosexual male body and therefore any other bodies are viewed as 
deviant and unnatural.133 Consequently, the legal construction of the criminal subject 
is also male. More specifically the criminal legal subject is the body of the 
heterosexual man. The heterosexual male body as the legal subject in criminal law 
‘[i]s defined by its intactness, its wholeness, its completeness ...’134 This can be 
contrasted with the female body which ‘[i]s defined by its gaps, its openings, its 
incompleteness.’135 This so-called incompleteness of women’s bodies further 
confirms their status and construction as the “Other” and as a result, women are 
denied, amongst other things, bodily integrity. A similar fate awaits the homosexual 
man when he ‘[o]pens his body boundaries in a manner which is seen to resemble or 
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mimic the female mode of opening ...’136 and consequently does not conform to 
appropriate masculine behaviour. 
 
 Finally, the work of Smart also makes a significant contribution to the 
discourse surrounding the legal subject. In her publication Feminism and the Power 
of Law,137 Smart makes a number of observations regarding law’s construction of the 
legal subject, particularly the legal construction of the female subject. The basis of 
Smart’s arguments stem from the observation that law does not exist as its own 
separate entity but rather that it is ‘[g]rounded in patriarchy, as well as in class and 
ethnic divisions.’138 She also highlights that ‘[i]n order to have any impact on law one 
has to talk law’s language, use legal methods, and accept legal procedures. All of 
these are fundamentally anti-feminist ...’139 The patriarchal nature of the law means 
that women are constructed in relation to men in a binary system. The existence of 
this binary system means that the concepts of masculinity and femininity can only be 
understood by reference to one another. Within such references is the underlying 
knowledge that femininity is inferior to masculinity.140 For example, in this binary 
logic, rationality is associated with men and emotionality with women. Female 
bodies signify ‘[t]he negative side of the polarity between good/bad, noble/savage, 
sanity/madness, order/chaos.’141 
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In her subsequent work, Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism,142 
Smart both develops and discards some of the arguments made in Feminism and the 
Power of Law143 in relation to the construction of the female legal subject. She 
differentiates between the legal discursive construction of woman, which, as noted 
above, constructs woman oppositionally and differentially to man, with the legal 
discursive construction of a type of woman. The latter might refer to for example, the 
female criminal, who can both be differentiated from the construction of woman 
generally (because women should not partake in deviant criminal behaviour), but 
also simultaneously differentiated from the construction of woman as always 
opposed to man. 144 ‘Thus [the female criminal] may be an abnormal woman because 
of her distance from other women, yet simultaneously she celebrates the natural 
difference between Woman and Man.’145 Thus the constructions of both woman and 
a type of woman are symbiotic. Woman ‘[h]as always been both ... virtuous and evil 
... not either virtuous or evil. Woman therefore represents a dualism, as well as being 
one side of a prior binary distinction.’146 Using the example of the female prostitute, 
she is constructed within legal discourse as the bad woman. However, she also 
‘[e]pitomises the Woman in contradistinction to Man because she is what any 
woman could be ... while the man remains innocuous.’147 
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In Law, Crime and Sexuality148 Smart’s closing remarks focus on specific types 
of female subjects that are continuously constructed by legal discourse. They include, 
‘the criminal woman ... the sexed woman, the unruly mother.’149 When law 
addresses the female subject it is often in one of these forms, which law has itself 
constructed. A standout remark made by Smart in these concluding remarks provides 
a vivid illustration of law’s construction of the female legal subject: ‘The law is like 
this room full of men. When it notices women, it inevitably simultaneously sexes 
them and embodies them ...’150 Having deconstructed the legal construction of the 
female subject, Smart then concludes by arguing that it is not only legal discourse 
that constructs women but also that ‘[w]omen discursively construct themselves.’151 
If this ability of women to construct themselves is forgotten, ‘[w]e risk 
disempowering ‘women’ and overinflating the power of more organised 
discourses.’152 
 
 Reflecting on the construction of the legal subject, it is apparent that women 
are constructed as the “Other” and thus lack subjecthood. As noted by Davies, ‘[t]he 
assumption of heterosexual masculine subjectivity is materially related to the 
position of men and women under the law.’153 As women are constructed in relation 
to men, that is to say that they are “the Other” of men, they are not considered to be 
true subjects of law. The limitation and denial of female legal subjecthood is evident 
even in instances where legislation has been enacted in an attempt to eliminate 
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discrimination based on sex or gender.154 Indeed, ‘[t]he ironic consequence is that 
the law is framed either in male language, or cast in terms which ignore the effect of 
such practices on women by introducing legal standards which deny women’s 
subjectivities.’155 It is suggested that this denial of female legal subjecthood has the 
consequence of also ensuring the continued denial of female agency. For if woman is 
not considered to be a true subject of the law then she cannot have the attributes 
that come as a consequence of having this subjecthood recognised.  
 
This link between the denial of female subjecthood and denial of female 
agency was illustrated succinctly by Susan Edwards in her discussion on the gender 
politics of homicide; 
The quintessence of homicide law is “male”, the authoritative definitions of 
the legal rules that define it and interpretation of these principles have been 
prescribed by men and have addressed what men do. In consequence the law 
exonerates men absolutely and eclipses the predicament and experience of 
women. Struggles in and around the law on this issue alone have resulted in 
lawyers trying to match women's accounts to the immutable and unyielding 
masculinist legal categories. In the short term such negotiations have been 
expedient, in the long term in efforts to conform to law's standard universal 
subject, women's accounts are distorted.156  
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Edwards then goes further, explaining that women’s agency is also denied through 
the belief by some judges and academics that ‘augmenting and extending the ... rules 
of provocation and self-defence so as to accommodate women’s reactive response is 
... legitimating a woman’s license to kill.’157 I suggest that the real reason for such 
wariness in this context is rather the possibility that should these agentic defences be 
extended too far in the direction of female offenders, the agency of these women 
and thus their status as legal subjects will have to be recognised.  
 
The works of the feminist scholars mentioned in this chapter are of particular 
use within the context of my thesis and the ultimate creation of an agency based 
approach for women who kill. Naffine notes how ‘[w]oman’s role as “other” is 
integral to man’s construction as “one” ...’158 This affirmation of woman’s active -
passive role in the construction of the legal subject highlights that there is the 
possibility of creating a discursive space within which women’s agency over their 
actions is recognised. It must be noted here that any agency-based model, centred 
around Naffine’s work would give women a more passive role, as according to 
Naffine ‘women’s domestic labours sustain the paradox of the man of law.’159 
However, it is essential to take note of the space that Naffine is potentially creating 
in allowing an agency-based model to be created because her work has the potential 
to form a partial basis for the beginnings of such an approach.  
Smart’s work on the construction of the legal subject is also of particular 
interest within the context of my thesis. Similarly to Naffine, Smart suggests that 
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women have a role to play in both their legal and social construction, arguing that 
‘[w]omen discursively construct themselves.’160 This suggests that women have more 
power than has previously been acknowledged, even within feminist literature. 
When discussing the issue of power it is necessary to acknowledge, albeit briefly, the 
seminal work of Foucault. In the first volume of The History of Sexuality,161 Foucault 
analyses power, suggesting that ‘[t]here is an implicit conjunction between the will to 
knowledge and power, and that although knowledge and power are not the same 
thing, each incites the production of the other.’162 Put simply, knowledge produces 
power and vice versa. According to Foucault; ‘[p]ower is not an institution, and not a 
structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that 
one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.’163 For 
Foucault then, power is important because it is through the exercise of power that 
knowledge is produced and it is power that ultimately allows the construction of the 
subject in relation to that knowledge.164 Foucault also posits the notion that power is 
mobile, meaning that individuals who previously lacked power were not forever 
condemned to this position, and could in fact utilise knowledge and power in order 
to change their (powerless) circumstances.165 Indeed, in his later work Foucault 
explains that ‘individuals are no longer conceived as docile bodies in the grip of an 
                                                          
160 Smart, 1995, p.231 
161 Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1 An Introduction (London: Penguin Books, 1976) 
162 Barker, Philip, Michel Foucault: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998) 
pp.24-25  
163 Foucault, 1976, p.93 
164 Barker, 1998, p.27  
165 Barker, 1998, p.32  
 68 
inexorable disciplinary power, but as self-determining agents who are capable of 
challenging and resisting the structures of domination in modern society.’166  
By analysing the work of Naffine, Smart and Foucault, it can be seen that if 
women are genuinely considered to have the power and ability to construct 
themselves then this may arguably have positive implications for the development of 
a theory based on recognising the agency of women who kill. Indeed, as highlighted 
by Barnett:  
In order for the woman to become a Subject (as opposed to the Other, or 
object), to have a voice, she must learn to speak (as) woman; develop her 
own language which can then be admitted to, accommodated within, the 
male-dominant language. Only when women's different voices are heard, will 
women be recognised as having subjectivity and thus become, as Irigaray 
puts it, 'the other of the other', rather than the 'Other of the same'.167  
 
2.5 Judith Butler and “Performativity” 
2.5.1 Luce Irigaray 
 Another key theoretical underpinning of this thesis is that of “performativity” 
as elucidated by Butler. However, before a critical engagement with Butler’s work 
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can be undertaken it is first necessary to contextualise the ensuing discussions by 
briefly exploring the work of Irigaray, which much of Butler’s work is in response to.  
Much of Irigaray’s work focuses on the construction of the female subject. As 
explained by Butler, Irigaray argues that women; ‘[c]onstitute a paradox, if not a 
contradiction, within the discourse of identity itself. Women are the “sex” which is 
not “one”. Within a language pervasively masculinist, a phallogocentric language, 
women constitute the unrepresentable.168 Unlike de Beauvoir who suggests that the 
female subject is constructed as “the Other”,169 ‘[I]rigaray argues that both the 
subject and the Other are masculine mainstays of a closed phallogocentric signifying 
economy that achieves its totalising goal through the exclusion of the feminine 
altogether.’170 This exclusion of the feminine occurs through the operation of the 
binary opposition of masculine and feminine. Within this binary opposition the 
feminine is constructed as the excluded. In other words, according to Irigaray, ‘[t]he 
masculine occupies both terms of binary opposition, and the feminine cannot be said 
to be an intelligible term at all.’171 This has the consequence that the female body is 
ultimately insignifiable,172 that it is unrepresentable because woman does not 
occupy either side of the binary gender distinction.173 Butler summarises Irigaray’s 
position well: 
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[I]rigaray’s theory of sexual difference suggests that women can never be 
understood on the model of “subject” within the conventional 
representational systems of Western culture precisely because they 
constitute the fetish of representation and, hence, the unrepresentable as 
such. Women can never “be”, according to this ontology of substances 
precisely because they are the relation of difference, the excluded by which 
that domain marks itself off. Women are also a “difference” that cannot be 
understood as the simple negation or “other” of the always-already-
masculine subject ... but a difference from the economy of binary opposition, 
itself a ruse for a monologic elaboration of the masculine.174 
A major criticism to be made of Irigaray’s work is her assertion that the 
feminine is unrepresentable because she exists outside of the gender binary. Logic 
and common sense tells us that this is not the case. Woman exists as both matter 
and a subject in the most basic physical sense, that is to say that she exists in three-
dimensional form as a living, breathing human being. Moreover, the feminine subject 
also exists, at least within societal discourse, as demonstrated through the earlier 
discussions on labelling theory, construction theory and ultimately Butler’s theory of 
gender performativity. Woman may be the subordinate within the binary opposition 
of masculine and feminine, but it is suggested that this does not automatically 
preclude her non-existence as a subject within societal discourse at least.175 Rather, 
the incompleteness that comes with such subordination for woman ‘[p]ermits that 
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category to serve as a permanently available site of contested meanings. The 
definitional incompleteness of the category might then serve as a normative ideal 
relieved of coercive force.’176 
Linked into the criticism surrounding the current non-existence of woman as 
a subject is Irigaray’s suggestion that woman will become a subject when her voice is 
heard and she ‘[d]evelop(s) her own language ...’177 By doing this Irigaray appears to 
leap from the position that woman does not exist as a subject, to the suggestion that 
she has the power to develop her own language and be accommodated within the 
male-dominated language. Such assertions raise a number of issues; firstly, if woman 
does not exist as a subject, how will she ultimately be able to develop a language 
which is accommodated by man? Secondly, if woman does not currently exist as a 
subject this must equate to a lack of power for woman. Therefore, the question must 
be posed as to how women ‘[l]earn to speak (as) woman ...’178 without the power 
which must be required to enable them to do so? I would suggest that more detailed 
answers are required to these pertinent questions than Irigaray provides and 
consequently much of her work taken in its own context is of limited use within this 
thesis. However, Irigaray’s work provides the basis for much of Judith Butler’s work 
and it is in this context that it is most useful.  
 
                                                          
176 Butler, 2006, p.21  
177 Barnett, 1998, p.195  
178 Barnett, 1998, p.195  
 72 
2.5.2 Judith Butler 
Judith Butler is an American post-structuralist philosopher. ‘Her work has 
exerted great influence in a variety of academic and extra-academic environments 
...’179 particularly in the fields of feminism and queer theory. Butler is arguably most 
known for her work on the theory of gender performativity, which argues that 
‘[g]ender is a process, and not some essence that pre-exists a subject’s formation.’180 
Drawing upon Austinian linguistic philosophy,181 Butler argues that performativity is:  
[n]ot a singular “act”, for it is always a reiteration of a norm or a set of norms, 
and to the extent that it acquires an act-like-status in the present, it conceals 
or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition. Moreover, this act 
is not primarily theatrical; indeed its apparent theatricality is produced to the 
extent that its historicity remains dissimulated (and, conversely, its 
theatricality gains a certain inevitability given the impossibility of a full 
disclosure of its historicity).182 
According to Butler, gender is performative in nature, that is to say that; ‘gender is 
the repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of 
a natural sort of being.’183 This reflects the notion that gender is socially constructed 
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and is thus reflective of societal norms. The pervasiveness of gender within the lives 
of individuals is, I would argue, both reflective of and symbiotic to the concept of 
gender performativity. Societal norms simultaneously allow and constrain a 
particular “performance” of gender that individuals must adhere to, with the 
consequence that it becomes so normalised over time that it reinforces the social 
norms that dictated the performance initially.       
There are some similarities and differences between performativity and 
gender performativity. According to Butler, ‘[p]erformativity is a practice of 
citationality by “which discourse produces the effects it names.”’184 Although gender 
performativity is also a practice of citationality, instead gender discourse specifically 
‘[p]roduces bodies “as already sexed”, that is as having a sex prior to naming.’185 
Although Butler is most renowned for her work on the understanding of gender 
formation through this theory of gender performativity, in the context of this 
literature review it is necessary to focus more specifically on her work on 
performativity largely outside the context of gender construction.186  
Butler’s work is undoubtedly useful to the methodology within this thesis. 
Indeed, her development of the theory of performativity is particularly relevant in 
the context of discussions on the labelling of women who kill within socio-legal 
discourse. The nature of performativity, that is that it is ‘[n]ot a singular act, but a 
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repetition and a ritual, which achieves its effects through its naturalisation ...’187 
reflects the legal and social responses to female killers. Indeed it is the performativity 
of law, the reiteration of legal norms, which continuously labels and constructs 
female killers as mad, bad, or victims and denies the agency of these women. 
Similarly, the performative nature of societal norms offers an explanation for the 
social ostracisation and non-agentic constructions surrounding women who kill. 
Consequently this section of the chapter will focus on Butler’s theory of 
performativity in the context of non-performance of societal norms, the construction 
of the subject, the creation of agency and the labelling of individuals.  
At the heart of Butler’s work is her concern that normative gender 
presumptions have the ability to determine the liveability and viability of certain 
lives. She observes that ‘the norms188 that govern idealised human anatomy ... work 
to produce a differential sense of who is human and who is not, which lives are 
liveable, and which are not.’189 According to Butler, ‘[w]hen we defy ... norms, it is 
unclear whether we are still living, or ought to be, whether our lives are valuable, or 
can be made to be, whether our genders are real, or ever can be regarded as 
such.’190 The concept of performativity and its citational practice calls into question 
and reiterates these norms that govern what is considered to be real and thus 
intelligible.191 As Butler highlights ‘[t]hrough the practice of gender performativity, 
we not only see how the norms that govern reality are cited but grasp one of the 
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mechanisms by which reality is reproduced and altered in the course of that 
reproduction.’192 Although it may appear here that Butler is calling for the abolition 
of gender norms within society this is not strictly accurate. Indeed, as she makes 
clear in Gender Trouble193 gender norms form a substantive part of an individual’s 
identity and therefore abolishing them would have the effect of destabilising 
identity.194 Rather Butler is attempting to highlight that a ‘[n]orm only persists as a 
norm to the extent that it is acted out in social practice and re-idealised and 
reinstituted in and through the daily rituals of bodily life.’195 Consequently, society 
has the ability to alter or indeed abolish certain norms through changing 
performative behaviours.  
In Bodies That Matter196 Butler focuses on the construction of the subject. 
She argues that through the concept of performativity it becomes clear that a 
foreclosed subject forms the foundations of society, that is: ‘[a] subject that 
animates the socio-symbolic order, one that exists, lives and engages in practices, 
which are not normative, but counter-normative.’197 Those who do not conform to 
societal norms (gender or otherwise) and are considered to be foreclosed subjects 
are ‘[p]roduced as “abject beings”, beings that are not yet subjects ...’198 However, 
according to Butler in order for a subject to be created, the ‘exclusionary matrix ... 
requires the simultaneous production of a domain of abject beings, those who are 
not yet “subjects”, but who form the constitutive outside to the domain of the 
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subject.’199 Butler notes that abject beings operate within the ‘“[u]nliveable” and 
“uninhabitable” zones of social life ....’200 However, for Butler this does not mean 
that the abject exists separately to the subject, but rather that the abject actually 
forms the foundations upon which the subject can be identified.201 Therefore, 
according to Butler even those who are considered to be abject can be identified as 
subjects, because the abject itself forms part of the subject.  
Butler’s focus on the creation of conditions for liveable and viable lives is of 
particular use in the context of this thesis. As noted above, she acknowledges the 
existence of a foreclosed, or abject, subject, an Other, within society. Butler’s work 
enables ‘[s]o called “abjected” subjects to become culturally intelligible’202 through 
the suggestion that these “abjected” subjects are in fact subjects, as they actually 
form the foundation of the subject. This allows those who may not have previously 
been considered subjects, such as women and deviants, to be considered as such. 
Indeed as Lacey explains; ‘[w]omen’s role as “other” is integral to man’s constitution 
as “one”; the woman as other acts as the support which gives back to man, in a 
mirror image, his sense of the integrity of his own identity.’203  
  Finally, Butler’s work also explores the potentially injurious labelling (or as 
she refers to it as naming) of individuals who deviate from societal norms, gender or 
otherwise. Her theory of performativity enables us to see more clearly how labelling 
occurs, demonstrating the role of both historical ideologies and existing cultural and 
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societal norms. ‘To be named a woman, for example, means that there is a historical 
understanding of who is a woman, but to become one, to re-appropriate that naming 
or to resist the historical way in which that naming is uttered, produces us as 
subjects of a contemporary culture.’204 This theorisation is arguably somewhat of a 
reiteration and development of the work of labelling theorists as discussed earlier in 
the chapter.205 However, Butler’s concept of performativity deviates somewhat from 
the basis of labelling theory through the suggestion that the individual who is named 
or labelled has the ability to answer back and can resist and reverse the labelling, as 
well as resist ‘[t]he authority of the one that names ...’206 Butler’s performativity 
based theory accredits more power to the individual than in labelling theory, which 
suggests that the deviant label has the effect of encouraging them to participate in 
future deviance as they struggle to resist their deviant label.  
Indeed Butler’s suggestion that the labelled individual has the ability to resist 
that labelling is useful in the context of Smart’s theory of double deviance. Smart’s 
theory proposes that women are labelled as doubly deviant when they commit 
crime, as they have not only offended against society, but also against their gender, 
that is the norms of appropriate femininity. If Butler’s theory is correct then women 
potentially have the ability to resist the doubly deviant label. Therefore, it is 
submitted that Butler is saying that although the discourse of “woman” is itself 
constituted by discourse, women are not determined by it. That is to say that it is 
possible for women to “rebel” against the constituted category, which in the case of 
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criminal women is often that they are doubly deviant. This potential for “rebellion” 
was highlighted by Loizidou: ‘women are not any more to be viewed as passive, 
repressed by power and waiting for the regime of power to alter, recognise and 
“represent” them in order to be able to transform their conditions of liveability.’207 
The power that comes with resisting the label arguably has the potential to create 
the space required to produce an agency-based model for female killers. 
Despite aspects of Butler’s work undoubtedly being useful in the context of 
this thesis, there are also several criticisms of her work that can be made.  Arguably 
the most important criticism of Butler’s work is found in its intellectual inaccessibility 
to both academics and non-academics alike. Nussbaum describes Butler’s written 
style ‘[a]s ponderous and obscure.’208 Butler’s writing style ‘[i]s notoriously difficult, 
filled as it is with allusions, reversals, ellipses, neologisms, and complex sentences 
with multiple clauses, to say nothing of occupatio, litotes, irony and hyperbole.’209 
Indeed, in 1998, Butler won first prize in The Philosophy and Literature Bad Writing 
Contest.210 The obscurity of Butler’s work is even more prevalent for non-academics, 
thus arguably having direct implications on the potential effectiveness of any of the 
theories suggested by Butler outside the realms of academia. Indeed, as noted above 
she suggests that people have the power to resist the labels which are given to them. 
However, the inaccessible nature of Butler’s work raises the question as to whether 
it is really possible for women to resist labelling in the way that Butler suggests if 
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they cannot understand her work? For example, women labelled as criminals or 
murderers, unless academics, are extremely unlikely to understand the points Butler 
is trying to make about the resisting of such labels.  
Linked in with this issue of inaccessibility, is Butler’s use of parody which, 
according to Loizidou, ‘[o]bscures the real needs of women ...’211 As Nussbaum 
explains: 
For women who are hungry, illiterate, disenfranchised, beaten, raped, it is not 
sexy or liberating to re-enact, however paradoxically, the conditions of 
hunger, illiteracy, disenfranchisement, beating and rape. Such women prefer 
food, schools, votes and the integrity of their bodies.212 
Thus, one significant issue with Butler’s work is her failure to acknowledge ‘[t]he 
material conditions of life that constrain our formation as subjects.’213 Indeed 
Butler’s use of parody means that the women to whom her work is the most 
valuable, such as criminal women, are in fact the most likely to be unable to 
understand her work and implement her theories in the context of their lives. 
Consequently these women will be unable to reconstruct themselves along the lines 
that Butler suggests if they cannot understand the arguments that she is making. 
Another major criticism of Butler’s work is that it is difficult to see how her 
theories exist outside their theoretical foundations and thus how they can actually 
be used in a practical context. That is to say that there is little sense of practicality 
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about her work. Indeed, Nussbaum’s primary complaint with Butler’s work is ‘[t]hat 
feminism should primarily be a practical and political matter, with a definite program 
of action, and that Judith Butler’s feminism fails this practical test.’214 This is a feeling 
echoed by Staal who explains how ‘[s]he became frustrated with Butler’s reliance on 
theory and didn’t find a way to connect her ideas with her actual life...’215 Again 
taking Butler’s work on labelling theory, she does not include any practical direction 
on how best to resist the labels bestowed upon women. Even when discussing her 
much cited theory of performativity and using the example of “drag queens”, Butler 
does not provide what would be considered to be a workable framework for its 
practical implementation that would help to understand the reality of the female 
gender.  
 
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has critically engaged with the theoretical and terminological 
underpinnings of this thesis, examining existing academic literature on agency, 
labelling theory, the construction of the female subject and the concept of 
performativity. It has become clear that what is missing within the existing literature 
is a cohesive approach which allows women as legal subjects to be recognised as well 
as acknowledging their agency. However, the discussions in this chapter have 
highlighted that through an engagement with the existing literature a space exists 
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which would allow for an agency-based model to be created and thus provides a 
solid foundation for such a model to be formulated. Before the structure of such a 
model can be discussed in any significant detail, a more comprehensive critical 
analysis of the concept of agency must be undertaken, which will occur in chapters 
four and five. 
From the analysis undertaken within this chapter it has also become clear 
that there is a significant gendered dimension to labelling and construction theory as 
well as within performativity. Consequently, the critical discussions that have taken 
place throughout this chapter lead to a number of questions which must be 
answered. These include; what is gender, specifically female gender, and how is this 
constructed? What is the role of gender norms in the labelling and construction of 
women? How does the law and society currently label and construct women who 
kill? What will need to be included in an agentic-based model for women who kill in 
order for it to potentially successfully be implemented within the legal system? The 
next chapter of my thesis aims to begin addressing these questions by exploring the 
concepts of gender and appropriate femininity with the intention of contextualising 
the discourse and constraints within which the current agency denial of women who 
kill occurs. The focus in the next chapter on the gender discourse surrounding 
appropriate femininity further develops the gendered analysis conducted in this 
chapter on the key concepts within this thesis, as well as laying the groundwork for 
the critical analysis of agency which will take place in chapters four and five.  
The following chapter will begin by exploring the sex/gender distinction 
before moving on to critically engage with “sex” and “gender” as two distinct 
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concepts. It will explore the construction of gender in the law before finally moving 









Chapter Three – Gender and Appropriate Femininity 
 
3.1 The Sex/Gender Distinction 
This chapter will begin by engaging with the sex/gender distinction. The 
importance of this initial engagement can be found in helping to answer the question 
of “what is gender?” by distinguishing and differentiating it from sex. Thus this initial 
discussion on the sex/gender distinction, focusing on academic literature and 
scholarly opinion, provides some pre-contextualisation for the following discussions 
on the approach taken by legal discourse. 
 
The terms sex and gender are often used interchangeably when talking about 
an individual, for example in casual conversation and in questions collecting data on 
application forms. Academics also use the terms interchangeably, for example 
MacKinnon who admits ‘I use sex and gender relatively interchangeably.’1 However, 
it has been argued by many feminist scholars, dating back to the work of de 
Beauvoir,2 that these terms actually have very different meanings. Traditionally sex is 
used to describe primary biological characteristics, such as chromosomes, which 
cannot be altered, whereas gender is usually understood to describe secondary 
cultural characteristics that can be interrogated and altered.3 The terms 
man/woman, male/female are therefore traditionally used to describe a person’s 
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sex, whereas the terms masculine/feminine, masculinity/femininity are traditionally 
used to describe a person’s gender. The distinction between sex and gender can be 
traced back, at least, to the work of Freud. He developed his psychoanalytic theories 
with a ‘[c]entral focus on issues of gender and sexuality.’4 His work ‘[r]ejects notions 
of pure masculinity and femininity and highlights the complexity that many men and 
women experience in living their gender and sexual identities.’ 5 Thus: ‘[i]n Freud’s 
theory, what culture calls “masculinity” and “femininity” emerge as forms of identity 
which refuse to be confined inside the boundaries of male and female bodies leaving 
men and women as inherently bisexual mixtures of gender.’6   
 
The contemporary sociological distinction between the terms of sex and 
gender can be attributed to the American psychoanalyst, Stoller. He prescribed 
particular definitions to the concepts of sex, gender, gender identity and gender role. 
According to Stoller sex should be restricted to what he terms as ‘[a] biological 
connotation’,7 whereas gender may be independent of sex and has psychological, 
cultural and social connotations. 8 For Stoller:  
gender identity starts with the knowledge and awareness … that one belongs 
to one sex and not to the other, though as one develops, gender identity 
becomes much more complicated, so that, for example, one may sense 
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himself as not only a male but a masculine man or an effeminate man or even 
a man who fantasies being a woman.9  
Finally, an individual’s gender role is the gendered behaviour that they display in 
society which establishes their position with regard to their gender.10 Perhaps most 
importantly in the context of gender analysis as Collier acknowledged, Stoller argued 
‘[t]hat biological sex augmented, but did not determine, the appropriate gender 
“identity” for each sex.’11 Stoller’s work on the sex/gender distinction has been 
extremely influential and has subsequently been adopted by many other scholars. 
For example Gayle Rubin who ‘appropriated Stoller’s categories for her own feminist 
purposes … [taking] sex to mean biological sexual differences and gender to mean 
the oppressive social norms brought to bear on these differences.’12 
  
It is clear that Stoller’s model treats sex and gender as being conceptually 
different, with the subsequent possibility of men who identify as feminine and 
women who identify as masculine. However, it is important to acknowledge that 
within both societal and legal discourse there is often a correspondence between the 
two terms. The traditional presumption is that an individual’s gender is inherently 
intertwined with their sex, and that therefore men should always identify as 
masculine and demonstrate traits associated with hegemonic masculinity, and 
similarly that women should always identity as feminine and thus demonstrate traits 
associated with appropriate femininity. Delphy succinctly explains the development 
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of this presumed correspondence between sex and gender; ‘[t]he hierarchical 
division of humanity into two sexes transforms an anatomical difference (which is 
itself devoid of social implications) into a relevant distinction for social practice.’13 
Essentially, the assumed correspondence between gender and sex has developed as 
a result of attempting to attach significance to the concept of sex. Put another way, 
‘[t]he “biological fact” of sex is only a “fact” of any interest because of the cultural 
importance attached to it.’14 That cultural importance takes the form of gender.  
 
Since the 1960s many English-speaking feminists have routinely utilised this 
sex/gender distinction, where sex is about biological characteristics and gender is a 
distinct social or cultural category, as a basis for their theoretical work.15 The 
sex/gender distinction was particularly embraced by second-wave feminists who 
used it to explore the cultural construction of femininity as separate from being 
biologically female, as well as an ‘[a]pparatus to explore the gendered nature of 
social institutions and practices.’16 Second wave feminism can be divided into two 
quite distinct sub-groups: Cultural feminists and Radical feminists. Second wave 
Cultural feminists utilise the sex/gender distinction to attempt to eliminate 
essentialist views of gender.17 They seek ‘[t]o disarticulate patriarchal gender norms 
from the understanding of biological sex. This disarticulation would bring to the fore 
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the positive aspects of biological sex and “true” biological femaleness.’18 
Consequently, Cultural feminists use the sex/gender distinction to embrace sex by 
highlighting that gender is a cultural construct and thereby separating ‘[w]omen’s 
“natural sex” from culturally drawn negative characteristics traditionally associated 
with women.’19  
Second-wave Radical feminism also ‘[c]onsiders sex to be the primary division 
in society and primary identity category.’20 However, unlike Cultural feminism, it sees 
both sex and gender as socially constructed. Radical feminism ‘[r]ejects the … view 
that sexual difference is irrelevant, and emphasises women’s sex as fundamentally 
different.’21 MacKinnon is a prominent second wave Radical feminist. She suggests 
that the fundamental difference in women’s sex is its construction, that it to say that 
it ‘[i]s socially constructed by a patriarchal dominance/submission structure.’22 
Therefore, according to MacKinnon, in a male-dominated society women are 
constructed ‘[a]s sexual objects for the use of men.’23 
Unlike second wave feminists, third wave feminists are ‘[c]ritical of the 
sex/gender distinction.’24 They question whether the distinction should be accepted 
at all because by doing so there is an implicit acceptance of the natural relationship 
‘[b]etween sexed bodies (male/female) and culturally constructed genders 
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(masculinity/femininity).’25 Third wave feminists are also critical of the second wave 
construction of sex as being fixed, instead arguing that sex is a socially constructed 
category and thus open to alteration and interpretation. More specifically for 
poststructuralist third wave feminists, sex is ‘[a] historical and cultural concept 
subject … articulated by language and its meaning changes over time and cultures.’26 
Therefore, they consider the discourse surrounding sex as never being fixed and thus 
it is open to interpretation and is ‘[a]n open site of contested meaning.’27  
The post-structural feminist, Butler challenges the sex/gender distinction. She 
argues that, like gender, sex is a socio-political construct, suggesting that if sex, like 
gender, is culturally constructed then perhaps the sex/gender distinction does not 
actually exist at all.28 Eliminating the distinction would ‘[a]void the discourse of 
biological determinism, which restricts the meaning of gender (and sex) to received 
notions of masculinity and femininity.’29 Indeed, in the introduction to her book 
Bodies That Matter30  Butler suggests that; 
“[s]ex” is an ideal construct which is forcibly materialised through time. It is 
not a simple fact or static condition of the body, but a process whereby 
regulatory norms materialise “sex” and achieve this materialisation through a 
forcible reiteration of these norms … “Sex” is, thus, not simply not what one 
has, or a static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which 
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the “one” becomes viable at all, that which qualifies a body for life within the 
domain of cultural intelligibility.31    
From this analogy Butler is arguing that sex, or the body, is ‘[p]roduced by gendered 
ideas and gendered actors.’32 Those who do not conform to social gendered norms, 
either because they simply cannot or choose not to do so, are viewed as so-called 
“gender outlaws” and often labelled pejoratively as a consequence.33  
 
In the context of the current gendered construction of femininity it is 
submitted that Butler’s assertion regarding the ability to depart from social norms is 
correct. However, some criticisms can be made with regard to her attempts to 
collapse the sex/gender distinction. Firstly, Butler’s failure to acknowledge the 
inherent physical nature of the human body means that ‘[g]ender becomes 
completely disembodied, and the body itself is divorced from all meaning.’34 
Secondly, as Moi observes, Butler’s attempts to collapse the distinction are shown to 
be flawed because key aspects of her work actually rely on the continued existence 
of the distinction: 
In Gender Trouble Butler considers male drag shows to be subversive of social 
gender norms. But, as she herself stresses, any politically or socially 
subversive effects of male drag shows depend on the contrast (“gender 
dissonance”) between male bodies (sex) and feminine clothes and behaviour 
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(gender). It appears that the original 1960s sex/gender distinction is, after all, 
quite essential to Butler’s political case.35 
Thirdly, in the context of this thesis it is the current construction of gender, 
not sex as suggested by Butler, that limits women’s agency and forces them to 
adhere to social norms. If we take the point that sex is biologically determined, that 
is to say that it is based on chromosomes and genetic makeup and therefore an 
individual cannot change from one sex to another, by distinguishing gender from the 
rigidity of biological sex and viewing gender as something that is culturally 
constructed, allows for a contestation and critique of the current gender norms and 
meanings associated with femininity. Moreover gender as a fluid, ever-changing 
construct suggests that there is opportunity to create a discursive space within which 
to alter the current constructions of femininity that deny women’s agency within 
criminal legal discourse. Finally, maintaining the sex/gender distinction means that 
attributes typically associated with masculinity, such as agency, can also be 
attributed to women, as the distinction does not require an individual’s sex and 
gender to correspond. 
 
3.2 Sex and Gender 
Having critically engaged with academic discourse surrounding the 
sex/gender distinction it is now necessary to explore the concepts of sex and gender 
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An individual’s sex is, at its simplest, defined by biological and often physical 
characteristics that indicate the physical differences between the sexes, male and 
female. An individual’s sex is determined ‘[t]hrough the application of socially agreed 
upon biological criteria [which can include] … genitalia at birth or chromosomal 
typing before birth, and they do not necessarily agree with one another.36 Indeed, as 
noted by O’Donovan: ‘seven variables affecting sex determination have been 
identified. These are chromosomal sex; gonadal sex; hormonal sex; the internal 
accessory organs – the uterus in the female and the prostate gland in the male; the 
external genitals; assigned sex; gender role.’37 
 
English Law has taken an essentially biological approach to issues of sex, 
highlighted in the controversial case of Corbett v Corbett.38 This case concerned the 
validity of a marriage between a man and a post-operative male to female 
transsexual. In the case ‘the court went on to distinguish sex as a biological concept 
from gender.’39 It should perhaps be noted at the outset that the judge, Ormrod J, 
was also qualified as a doctor and therefore his judgment in this case may have been 
influenced by his medical training and knowledge. Indeed, in his obituary specific 
                                                          
36 West, Candace and Zimmerman, Don, “Doing Gender” Gender and Society, 1(2), 1987, 125, p.127 
37 O’Donovan, Katherine, “Transsexual Troubles: The Discrepancy between Legal and Social 
Categories” in Edwards, Susan (ed)., Gender, Sex and the Law (London: Croom Helm, 1985) p.10 
38 [1971] P. 83 
39 O’Donovan, 1985, p.15 
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reference to his ‘[w]elcome grasp of complicated medical evidence’40 was made. 
Ormrod J held that ‘the biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth 
at the latest and cannot be changed …’41 He went on to explain that there were 
several criteria for assessing and determining an individual’s sex, including the use of 
‘[c]hromosomal, gonadal, and genital tests, if all three are congruent, determine the 
sex … accordingly ...’42 Any operative intervention should be ignored.43 Consequently 
in Corbett the marriage was held to be void.  
 
This case demonstrates that within legal discourse sex is not considered to be 
‘[a] matter of choice … rather it is an essential biological characteristic.’44 Certainly 
the legal position on this issue was confirmed in the later appeal case of Bellinger v 
Bellinger45 where the House of Lords refused to acknowledge Mrs Bellinger’s post-
operative sex in order to allow her marriage to be declared valid. The House of Lords 
held that a person’s sex could be determined by seven factors; chromosomes, 
gonads, internal sex organs, external genitalia, hormonal patterns and secondary 
sexual characteristics, style of upbringing and living and self-perception,46 thus 
reaffirming that within legal discourse sex is viewed as largely biological.  
 
                                                          
40 --- ‘Obituaries – Sir Roger Ormrod’ at http://www.jsasoc.com/Family_archive/Arc 
hive/Roger%20Ormrod/roger%20ormrod%20obit%20times.pdf 
41 Corbett v Corbett [1971] P. 83 at p.84 
42 Corbett, 1971, p.106 
43 Corbett, 1971, p.106 
44 Cowan, Sharon, ““Gender is no substitute for sex”: A comparative Human Rights analysis of the 
Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity” Feminist Legal Studies, 13, (2005), 67, p.74 
45 [2003] 2 A.C. 467 
46 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 A.C. 467 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead at p.472 
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3.2.2 Gender 
In the 1990s many scholars, particularly feminists, claimed the term “gender” 
to describe and replace that of “sex roles”.47 Gender is a socially constructed 
identity, the performance of which reflects the societal and gender norms associated 
with hegemonic masculinity for men and appropriate femininity for women. That is 
to say that, ‘[g]ender is the cultural meanings that the sexed body assumes.’48 It is 
‘[t]he mechanism by which notions of masculine and feminine are produced and 
naturalised.’49  
 
Gender, and more specifically an individual’s gendered identity, is 
constructed by the environment in which an individual lives through ‘[l]arge scale 
institutions ... interpersonal relations ... power structures and economic 
relationships.’50 From this it therefore becomes apparent that gender and power are 
inexorably interlinked. Indeed, as explained by Detmold: ‘gendering is wholly a 
function of power …’51 This notion is reiterated by McNay who states: ‘gender is 
understood as an effect of dominant power relations which is imposed upon the 
inert bodies of individuals.’52 This relationship between power and gender has the 
consequence that masculinity is constructed as being dominant and privileged over 
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femininity within societal discourse, a construction which is more widely reflected 
within patriarchal societal discourse and the associated patriarchal societal 
institutions such as the law.  
 
3.2.3 Gender Theorists 
There are a number of eminent gender scholars, all of whom undoubtedly 
deserve recognition for their contributions to the field. In both this chapter and 
throughout my thesis I have made reference to the work of many of them including 
but not limited to Naffine, O’Donovan, Edwards and Smart. Although this thesis has 
also previously critically evaluated the work of Butler in chapter two,53 her theory of 
gender performativity must be explored in further detail as it is a continuing theme 
and undertone that runs throughout discussions on both the legal and social 
construction of gender. Indeed, aspects of Butler’s theory of gender performativity 
both inform and reflect the legal and societal constructions of gender. The theory of 
gender performativity is invaluable in both its most basic form, that is to say that an 
individual quite literally “performs” the behaviour associated with and expected of 
their gender, and in its more complicated scholarly form. Consequently, a 
comprehensive analysis of Butler’s work on gender performativity will now be 
undertaken. 
 
Butler’s theory of gender performativity is arguably the most influential in 
contemporary gender theory. Butler argues that gender should not be envisaged as a 
noun, but rather, as a verb.  In other words, she regards gender as something that an 
                                                          
53 See chapter two, section 2.5.2 
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individual does, in a similar way in which an individual runs, walks, talks, writes and 
so forth. She therefore envisages gender as something that is produced by the 
performance of the individual; it is ‘performatively produced and compelled by the 
regulatory practices of gender coherence.’54 Moreover, as noted earlier in the thesis, 
in chapter two,55 in Bodies That Matter,56 Butler suggests that this performance of 
gender is not a singular act, rather it is a series of acts which are repeated or re-
iterated to such an extent that they appear “natural”. It is within these repeated 
performances that the set of circumstances that give rise to the performances 
actually conceal the notion that there is a performance going on at all.57  
 
More specifically, if gender is performative then according to Butler, gender is 
‘[t]he repeated stylisation of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance.’58 
Indeed, to be successful when performing gender: 
[m]arking or displaying gender must be finely fitted to situations and 
modified or transformed as the occasion demands. Doing gender consists of 
managing such occasions so that, whatever the particulars, the outcome is 
seen and seeable in context as gender-appropriate or, as the case may be, 
gender inappropriate, that is, accountable.59    
 
                                                          
54 Butler, 2006, p.34 
55 See chapter two, section 2.5.2 at pp. 72-75  
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In her later work, Undoing Gender,60 Butler expands on the theory of gender 
performativity, noting how gender is ‘[a]n incessant activity performed, in part, 
without one’s knowing and without one’s willing …’61 However, she makes clear that 
this does not mean that gender performativity is automatic, but rather that ‘[i]t is a 
practice of improvisation within a scene of constraint.’62 It is suggested that Butler is 
reinforcing the notion that an individual’s gendered performance must be 
appropriate to the particular social situation that they are in. It is the social situation 
itself that constrains the gendered performance. Moreover, even when an individual 
repeatedly finds themselves in remarkably similar situations they will constantly have 
to amend their gendered behaviour depending on how the situation develops and 
alters.  
 
Butler also highlights the power structures or relationships that are at play 
when an individual performs their gender; ‘[o]ne does not “do” one’s gender alone … 
the terms that make up one’s own gender are, from the start, outside oneself, 
beyond oneself in a sociality that has no single author …’63 That is to say that it is the 
powerful within society that construct appropriate gender behaviour through the 
enforcement of gender norms. These power structures are found throughout society, 
between individuals, state entities and corporations. Whichever form these power 
relationships take, they are constantly influencing how an individual performs their 
gender. Often their influence may be so inconspicuous that individuals do not realise 
that their gendered performance is being altered by them at all. The result is that 
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individuals often feel that they ‘own’ their gendered performance, when in fact this 
can never be the case as the existence of the performance itself is as a result of these 
power structures. The issues surrounding the “doing” or performance of gender are 
succinctly summarised by West and Zimmerman.64 They explain that although it is 
obviously individuals themselves who are “doing” gender, ‘[i]t is a situated doing, 
carried out in the virtual or real presence of others who are presumed to be oriented 
to its production.’65 
 
3.2.4 Gender Socialisation  
So far in this chapter it has become clear that the general consensus in the 
academy is that we are born a particular sex, but that our gender is learned and 
acquired through our social, cultural and institutional relationships. An individual is 
socialised to be a particular gender, either masculine or feminine, depending on their 
sex and as a consequence of the power relations within society which construct 
gender. As explained by Bolich, people are ‘“gendered” – made into a gendered 
being … [through] constant contact with the attributions based on our gender 
assignment and under the force of social processes meant to make us the gender we 
were assigned.’66 Gender socialisation is defined by Bolich as: 
[t]he ongoing process starting from gender assignment that aims to construct 
our gender identity and our gender role. The process entails utilisation of 
fundamental social institutions and structures, such as the family, religion, 
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education and the state, all of which promote, support, and defend the 
cultural ideas about how each gender should look, talk and act, as well as 
think, feel and be. Socialisation, as the word suggests, guides our socialisation 
with others, informing us as to what is expected of us, in how we should 
experience ourselves and how we ought to perceive others. Socialisation 
provides boundaries for self-formation and rules for interaction with others. 
It begins at birth, largely accomplishes its work in childhood, and remains a 
force the rest of life.67 
 
Indeed, the process of gender socialisation reflects the fact that gender is a 
cultural and social construct that is pervasive in an individual’s life from birth. Various 
groups within society, the complete list of which is too long to include here, 
undertake the process of gender socialisation through the utilisation of gender 
stereotypes. It is clear that the influence exerted by certain groups and processes is 
of particular importance in the process of gender socialisation, particularly the role of 
parents, peers, school and the media.68 
 
Gender socialisation exerts a significant force not only on the individuals 
being socialised but also on those in society who are actually doing the socialising, 
for example, parents. When it comes to gender socialisation parents can face difficult 
decisions, often reflecting difficulties associated with the performance of gender 
appropriate behaviour. On one hand, many parents ‘[d]isagree with gender 
inequalities accompanying the gender hierarchy, conclude that gender stereotypes 
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limit rather than liberate, and determine that at least some modest effort to 
ameliorate gender pressures on our children is a good thing.’69 Consequently, 
parents may try to raise their children as “gender neutral” rather than according to 
gender stereotypes. On the other hand, many parents want their children to “fit in”, 
to feel accepted and not to be labelled as deviant, and in order for that to happen 
they must adhere to gender stereotypes and norms. Indeed, even for those parents 
who try to avoid the gender socialisation of their children, the power of such 
socialisation means that they may subconsciously treat their children differently 
depending on their sex.70  
 
3.2.5 Gender Stereotypes 
As noted above, gender socialisation involves the utilisation of gender 
stereotypes. Gender requires individuals to manage their conduct in the context of 
‘[s]ociety’s view of appropriate behaviour for women and for men.’71 These views of 
appropriate gender behaviour are based on gender stereotypes, which often take 
the form of ‘[g]ender roles … through which persons conform to their assigned sex 
and to society’s conventions.’72 “Gender norms” is another term used to describe 
appropriate gendered behaviour. Indeed, scholars often use the two terms, gender 
stereotypes and gender norms, interchangeably. Similarly to gender stereotypes, 
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gender norms dictate the behaviours associated with appropriate masculinity and 
femininity and thus ‘[w]hich bodies may be given legitimate expression.’73  
 
The invocation and pervasiveness of gender stereotypes exaggerates gender 
distinctions and constructs the gender categories of masculine and feminine at 
opposing sides of a dichotomy. As Beal explains; ‘[w]e think of being male or female 
as an either-or proposition, even though in actuality there is considerable flexibility 
and overlap in male and female behaviour.’74 Gender stereotypes and norms 
unsurprisingly therefore differ greatly for men and women. At this point it must be 
noted that this thesis is focusing on the construction of femininity specifically within 
England and Wales and therefore when discussing gender norms and stereotypes it 
will refer to those used within Western culture. Some of the basic gender norms 
associated with both masculinity and femininity have been highlighted by Crawford 
and Unger who note that: 
being feminine … involves a combination of having a socially approved 
attractive appearance and a high number of expressive traits. Masculinity … 
involves a combination of low expressiveness, sports interest, more male 
friendships, sitting with knees far apart, and conservative attitudes towards 
feminism. These characteristics are associated with social dominance as well 
as masculinity.75  
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Gender stereotypes also revolve around occupations and physical characteristics, 
with femininity for example being more readily associated with less physically 
demanding jobs and masculinity with those that are more physically demanding.76  
 
Individuals who transgress from appropriate gender behaviour are often 
labelled as deviant or as unintelligible. Indeed, as Butler remarks ‘“intelligible” 
genders are those which in some sense institute and maintain relations of coherence 
and continuity among sex, gender, sexual practice, and desire.’77 Conversely, 
unintelligible genders are those in which ‘[g]ender does not follow from sex and 
those in which the practices of desire do not “follow” from either sex or gender.’78 
The consequences for those who do not adhere to gender stereotypes vary 
depending on the seriousness of their deviance but it is clear that the degree of 
social ostracisation reflects the degree of deviance, so the more an individual 
deviates from appropriate gender behaviour, the more they will be ostracised and 
vice versa.79 Labelling those who do not conform to normalised gender behaviour as 
deviant produces ‘[a] differential sense of who is human and who is not, which lives 
are liveable and which are not.’80 This is a sentiment reflected by McNay who 
remarks: ‘obviously, the social constraints on gender compliance and the taboos 
connected to deviance are so powerful that it is difficult to exist to a socially 
meaningful extent outside of gender norms.’81 
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3.3 Constructing Gender in Law – The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
As noted in the earlier discussion on sex, the closest thing to a common law 
definition of gender was provided by Ormrod J in Corbett v Corbett82 and approved 
by the House of Lords in Bellinger v Bellinger,83 with sex being distinguished as a 
biological concept from gender. The introduction of the Gender Recognition Act into 
law in April 2005, although not actually defining gender, arguably goes one step 
closer to providing a legal definition of gender. Although the Act deals specifically 
with transgendered individuals, a detailed discussion about who is outside the 
parameters of this thesis, the Act also has wider implications in the context of gender 
construction in law. Indeed, at the very least, as the following discussion will 
establish, the Act demonstrates the requirements for acceptable gendered behaviour 
for all under the law.   
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 was introduced after the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (ECtHR) decisions in Goodwin v UK84 and I v UK.85 In these cases the 
ECtHR ‘[d]eclared UK law on transsexuality to be discriminatory and in need of 
review’86, finding the UK in breach of Articles 8 (the right to respect for privacy) and 
12 (the right to marry) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In these 
cases the Court ‘[h]eld that the legal sex of post-operative transgender persons was 
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the sex to which they had been medically reassigned.’87 Therefore the aim of the 
Gender Recognition Act, as explained in the preamble to the Act, is to ‘[m]ake 
provision for and in connection with a change of gender.’88 The Act allows a person 
who wishes to live and be legally recognised as a different “adopted” gender to do so 
by applying for a Gender Recognition Certificate. If successful in the application 
process, their new gendered identity is recognised in a reissued birth certificate.89 
The Gender Recognition Certificate will be granted if several conditions laid 
down in the Act are met. To be considered as a candidate for a Gender Recognition 
Certificate, under section one of the Act the applicant must be at least 18 years of 
age90 and ‘living in the other gender …’,91 also known as ‘“the acquired gender”’92. 
The use of the term “acquired gender” refers to: 
[t]he gender in which a person identifies and presents, as distinct from the 
gender that they were … recognised at birth. Such a distinction is 
considerable. This reflects the separation of gender and biological “sex” as 
articulated by strands of social and cultural theory.93 
In order to successfully apply for a Gender Recognition Certificate, the 
applicant must appear before a Gender Recognition Panel. ‘Section 1(4) and 
Schedule 1 provide that such panels must comprise “legal members” and “medical 
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members”, to be appointed by the Lord Chancellor.’94 The Gender Recognition Panel 
must be satisfied that the applicant: 
(a) has or has had gender dysphoria, (b), has lived in the acquired gender 
throughout the period of two years ending with the date on which the 
application is made [and] (c) intends to continue to live in the acquired 
gender until death …95 
Considering these requirements, although it is apparent that the Gender 
Recognition Act does not explicitly define the concept of gender, I would suggest that 
there are two distinct themes that emerge and underpin the law’s construction of 
gender. The first of these is the requirement in section 2(1)(a) that the applicant 
must have or have had gender dysphoria which highlights the law’s labelling of those 
who do not adhere to appropriate gender behaviour. The requirement that an 
applicant must either have or have had gender dysphoria96 is elaborated on in 
section three of the Gender Recognition Act which states that medical or 
psychologist reports must be provided as evidence.97 Gender dysphoria was 
historically and more commonly known as gender identity disorder.98 However, with 
the introduction and implementation of the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), gender identity disorder has been 
replaced with the new diagnostic class of gender dysphoria, which is intended to 
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better reflect the lived experiences of those diagnosed.99 For an individual to be 
diagnosed with gender dysphoria under the new criteria in DSM-5 they must 
demonstrate a strong and persistent identification with the other gender, through 
for example a strong desire to live or be treated as the other gender, or to remove 
identifying sexual physiognomies.100  More specifically, ‘[t]here must be a marked 
difference between the individual’s expressed/experienced gender and the gender 
others would assign to [them], and it must continue for at least six months.’101  
The requirement of a diagnosis of gender dysphoria in the Gender 
Recognition Act highlights how the law labels those who do not conform to gender 
norms. As explained in chapter two when discussing labelling theory,102 the basic 
concept of labelling is the ‘[p]rocess of the application and receipt of deviant 
labels.’103 In the context of the Gender Recognition Act, it is those who make an 
application for a gender recognition certificate under the Act who are labelled 
deviant. Applicants are deviant in their “madness”, when they are forcibly diagnosed 
with gender dysphoria. It is submitted that the law labels transgendered individuals 
as deviant, and more specifically as mad because their behaviour does not conform 
to the appropriate gender behaviour associated with their biological sex. Indeed, the 
diagnosis makes many assumptions about the applicant, including ‘[t]hat the 
diagnosed person is affected by forces he or she does not understand … It assumes 
that certain gender norms have not been properly embodied, and that an error and a 
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failure have taken place.’104 Such assumptions result in the applicant being 
considered as ‘[i]ll, sick, wrong, out of order, abnormal …’105 and labels them as such. 
As Collier explains, the labelling of transgender individuals as mad by the law is the 
result of ‘[a] male/female polarity and the establishment of a rigidity in sex roles at 
birth.’106  
Butler succinctly highlights the effect of the law’s labelling in the Gender 
Recognition Act. She observes that a diagnosis of gender dysphoria assumes that 
because an individual expresses a desire to live as another gender, and thus displays 
attributes associated with that gender, they must be psychologically disordered. 
Despite a clear process of pathologisation occurring for individuals who wish to have 
their change in gender status legally recognised, it is one which they must tolerate.107 
This observation reflects one of the key schools of thought within labelling theory as 
explained by Becker. That is, ‘the person who is ... labelled an outsider may have a 
different view of the matter. He may not accept the rule by which he is being judged 
and ... may feel his judges are outsiders.’108 However, it is clear that transgender 
individuals who are labelled as mad by the law are unable to do anything about their 
labelling if they want to acquire a gender recognition certificate. 
The second requirement of the gender recognition panel relates to section 
2(1)(b); that the applicant has lived in their acquired gender for two years. This 
highlights the law’s expectation that the applicant will adhere to gender norms as 
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dictated by social discourse. It also contributes to demonstrating that the law’s 
construction of gender is something that is performative in nature. The requirement 
in section 2(1)(b) is also known as the “real-life test”, the passing of which is judged 
by the gender recognition panel. The use of the real-life test ‘[p]oints to gendered 
rites of passage, issues of passing and the negotiation of … gatekeepers.’109 When 
adjudicating on whether an applicant has passed the real-life test, Jeffreys suggests 
that preconceptions of appropriate gender behaviour as well as the evidence of 
medical specialists will be used in the adjudication process.110 These behavioural 
preconceptions derive from a process of normalisation of appropriate gender 
behaviour. As explained by Butler; 
Normativity refers to the process of normalisation, the way that certain 
norms, ideas and ideals hold sway over embodied life, providing coercive 
criteria for normal “men” and “women”. And in this second sense, we see 
that norms are what govern “intelligible” life, “real” men and “real” women. 
And that when we defy these norms, it is unclear whether we are still living, 
or ought to be, whether our lives are valuable, or can be made to be, whether 
our genders are real, or ever can be regarded as such.’111 
Therefore, I would suggest that it is reasonable to assume that those 
attempting to “pass” the real life test have to prove their adherence to the gender 
norms associated with their acquired gender to the panel. Such adherence will be 
proven through the continued performance of appropriate gender norms, reflecting 
                                                          
109 Sharpe, Andrew, “Endless Sex- The Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the persistence of a legal 
category” Feminist Legal Studies, 15, 2007, 57, p.71 
110 Jeffreys, 2008, p.332  
111 Butler, 2004, p.206 
 108 
Butler’s theory of the performative nature of gender. Although the Act does not 
require the applicant to alter their physical appearance in the sense of undergoing 
reconstructive surgery or hormone treatment, it does require the individual to 
present themselves in their acquired gender through the continued performance of 
the appropriate gender behaviour associated with their acquired gender. In the case 
of male to female transgender individuals, they are compelled to adhere to the 
performance of appropriate femininity by imitating, amongst other things, female 
facial expressions, clothing and make-up.112 In contrast, for female to male 
transgender individuals, the appropriate performance of masculinity is one of 
hegemonic masculinity. This is despite the fact that ‘large numbers of men and boys 
have a divided, tense or oppositional relationship to hegemonic masculinity.’113 
Regardless of the acquired gender that the applicant is transitioning into, it is 
clear that the law, acting through the gender recognition panel, has gendered 
standards and criteria which must be adhered to when applying the real-life test. 
These criteria reflect gender norms as dictated by social discourse. Therefore, in 
order to succeed in their legal recognition, transgendered individuals need to 
understand and adhere to these standards and present themselves as a plausible 
candidate.114 Indeed, as noted by Hines, ‘[t]he law affords rights to a specific … 
population – people who … conform to normative gendered appearance, and who 
permanently identity as male or female.’115  
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Critiquing the provisions of the Gender Recognition Act has highlighted that 
currently there is no clear definition of gender, masculinity, or femininity in English 
law. However the rigid societal understanding of what it means to be feminine and 
masculine is reflected in legal discourse and is an underlying theme of the Act, which 
requires adherence to socially constructed gender norms and behaviours. 
Transgression of these unwritten “lore’s” results in ostracisation from society and the 
law. Consequently any mention of gender within legislation, and more specifically 
within the Gender Recognition Act, is based upon, and is a reflection of, socially 
constructed acceptable behaviours in relation to masculinity and femininity. Indeed, 
it has become clear that the law appropriates society’s views on gender norms and 
utilises them when making decisions on the merits of a case, in this context on cases 
under the Gender Recognition Act.  
It is suggested however, that it is not only within the context of the Gender 
Recognition Act that societal gender norms are utilised by law, but rather in all areas 
of the law in cases where gender is considered to be a key issue. As explained by 
Barnett: 
Society - or those with power in society - constructs gender by adopting the 
physical and psychological distinctions between men and women. Law, being 
largely the reflection of society, adopts the social construction of gender and 
translates it into legal norms.116 
This relationship between law, gender, and society outside of the context of The 
Gender Recognition Act will be explored in detail in chapters four and five. These 
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chapters examine passive and active agency denials of women who kill, focusing 
specifically on how the legal and social construction of gender has the consequence 
of denying the agency of women who kill. 
 
3.4 The Construction of “Woman” and Appropriate Femininity 
 Having established that the law does not have a clear definition of gender but 
rather bases its construction of gender, that is masculinity and femininity, on 
society’s views of appropriate gender behaviour, it is now necessary to critically 
engage with the societal construction of “woman” and establish the parameters of 
appropriate femininity. Establishing these parameters will form the basis for further 
discussions in this thesis on how the law adopts, implements and responds to 
transgressions from appropriate femininity in the context of women who kill.   
The concept of “woman” has been, and continues to be, a contested site. 
Some authors have argued that woman has only ever been defined in relation to 
what man is not.  Perhaps the most famous proponent of this was de Beauvoir who 
suggested in The Second Sex117 that a woman ‘defines and differentiates herself in 
relation to man, and he does not in relation to her…’118 In suggesting this, she asked 
‘what is a woman?’119 De Beauvoir’s answer to this question was to suggest that ‘He 
is the Subject; he is the Absolute – she is the Other’120, meaning that ‘[t]he standard 
by which all matters are judged is that of the male gender. If maleness is the 
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automatic reference point for the assessment of societal status, it follows that 
woman “being different” is the “other” sex.’121  
Woman is socially constructed in relation and opposition to the man. The 
man has societal status, he is powerful and superior, and therefore woman is 
constructed as an inferior, weaker being, subordinate to his power.122 Indeed 
according to de Beauvoir it is society, or more specifically those with power in 
society, that is men, who construct gender by choosing to adopt the physical and 
psychological differences between men and women. That is to say that it is ‘[s]ociety 
rather than biology [that] determines the meaning attached to the category 
woman.’123 This is reflected in her now infamous statement; ‘One is not born, but 
rather one becomes a woman.’124 Of relevance to this thesis, is that this is illustrative 
of the way that the subsequent labelling of women as the “Other” has ingrained the 
traditional and continuing gender stereotypes surrounding women, of which there 
are a number. These include women as the carers of children and family and as the 
homemakers.125 Appropriate femininity is mediated by women’s ‘[b]odies, their 
minds and their social interaction.’126 According to Anne Worrall femininity is 
constructed around a dichotomy of dependence. Although women are expected to 
be caring and sacrifice their own self-interests to ensure the needs of others are met, 
                                                          
121 Barnett, 1998, p.16  
122 Barnett, 1998, p.15  
123 Edwards, 1985, p.9  
124 Beauvoir, 2010, p.xxii 
125 Barnett, 1998, p.16  
126 Worrall, Anne, Offending Women: Female Lawbreakers and the Criminal Justice System (London: 
Routledge, 1990) p.33 
 112 
they are simultaneously expected to be incompetent and vulnerable and thus need 
protection.127  
It is clear then that the gender stereotypes and norms surrounding women 
and femininity are extensive and although an in-depth engagement with all of these 
norms is outside the parameters of this thesis, there are some key aspects of 
appropriate femininity which are of particular relevance to this thesis. These are 
motherhood, physical appearance, sexuality and emotions; all of which appear as 
recurring topics in later chapters of this thesis when exploring the socio-legal 
response to women who kill.  
 
3.4.1 Motherhood 
‘Western society has strong beliefs about motherhood.’128 As explained by 
Crawford and Unger: ‘mother is one of the most fundamental archetypes of woman 
… In most societies, motherhood is viewed as central to a woman’s identity and 
fulfilment.’129 The ideology of motherhood is also known as the “motherhood 
mandate” or the “motherhood mystique” and comprises a number of myths 
including the notion that women who do not want to be mothers are psychologically 
disturbed and those that cannot have children are fundamentally deprived. Good 
mothers enjoy caregiving and self-sacrificing to the needs of their children; those 
that do not are bad mothers. Mothers should devote themselves full-time to their 
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children and those who work are inferior.130 Therefore, when women have children it 
is not enough for them to be “just” mothers, they must also be “good mothers” and 
conform to the consequent stereotypes associated with, and symbiotic to, the label.  
This so-called ‘motherhood mandate’ refers to ‘[t]he culturally proscribed 
belief that to be complete and successful in the female role, a woman must have 
children and must spend her time with them.’131 Russo goes on to explain that the 
motherhood mandate dictates that: ‘[a]ll women should be mothers and that the 
“good mother” is measured by the number of her children and the quantity of time 
she spends with them.’132 Therefore, the stereotypical good mother is the one who is 
the homemaker, who devotes her life to her children and her family and puts their 
needs before her own. When women undertake paid work and as a consequence 
spend less time with their children the issue of whether they are being a good 
mother is often raised. As noted by Mottarella et al. ‘women who work outside the 
home are perceived as less nurturing and less competent in the role of mother 
compared to their counterparts who choose to stay home to raise their children.’133 
The prevalence of the good mother stereotype is also apparent in media articles that 
are regularly published on the issue of working mothers. For example one headline in 
The Guardian read; ‘“Working mothers do no harm to their young children, research 
finds”’.134  
                                                          
130 Crawford and Unger, 2004, pp.318-319 
131 Mottarella, Karen; Fritzsche, Barbara; Whitten, Shannon; and Bedsole, Davina, “Exploration of 
‘Good Mother’ Stereotypes in the College Environment” Sex Roles 60, (2009) 223, p.223 
132 Russo, N.F., “The Motherhood Mandate” Journal of the Social Sciences 32, (1976), 143, p.148 
133 Mottarella, Fritzsche, Whitten and Bedsole, 2009, p.224 
134 The Guardian, “Working mothers do no harm to their children, research finds” (22nd July, 2011) 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/22/working-mothers-no-harm-children  
 114 
Moreover, the motherhood mandate potentially has the effect of making 
many women feel guilty about going back to work after having children. This was 
reflected in a 2011 report “The Changing Face of Motherhood”, prepared by the 
Social Issues Research Centre.135 The report highlighted the feelings of guilt that 
mothers have about balancing work commitments with the amount of time they 
spend with their children: ‘in the context of work/life balance participants said that 
they felt guilty for going back to work, guilty for spending so much time there, and 
even guilty for enjoying it or finding it fulfilling.136 It is therefore clear that despite 
the ‘[s]ignificant social, economic and cultural changes that have impacted on 
practices of mothering in Western societies …’137 the traditional stereotypes 
associated with the motherhood mandate continue to exist and exert significant 
influence on societal views of motherhood.  
At the opposite end of the spectrum to this good mother stereotype is 
women who choose not to be mothers and who are consequently viewed as 
inherently abnormal. The media has a significant role to play in this construction of 
voluntarily childless women by continuously publishing articles on the subject. A 
prime example of such an article was published in The Mirror; ‘”We aren’t freaks: 
Women who don’t want children should not be made outcasts.”’138 The derogatory 
language used in this headline to describe deliberately childless women is typical of 
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the labels attached to them. As explained by Gillespie, voluntarily childless women 
‘[h]ave been understood in ways that emphasise their selfishness and their deviance, 
as aberrant, immature, and unfeminine.’139  
In a study conducted by Gillespie, participants discussed the various 
responses that they had received when explaining that they did not want to have 
children. Some women ‘[d]escribed the ways others frequently disbelieved that they 
had chosen childlessness. They described how their choice was often re-cast by 
others as different more “legitimate” explanations were superimposed.’140 Others 
explained that people ‘[d]isregarded their accounts of voluntary childlessness. Often 
this was by inferring they would “change their mind”.’141 Finally, some women 
experienced their voluntary childlessness being perceived as deviance; ‘lack of a 
desire to mother was conceptualised in terms of deviance and abnormality, as it 
transgressed cultural images of femininity; of nurturing and self-sacrifice, associated 
with motherhood.’142 Gillespie’s findings were not isolated and have been 
reproduced in later studies.  Maher and Saugeres for example found that women 
who did not have children engaged in ‘[a] process of self-reflection and 
justification’,143 but perhaps more importantly that it led the women to ‘[q]uestion 
and reject some dominant cultural constructions of femininity and mothering.’144 The 
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findings from such studies on voluntarily childless women serve to reinforce the 
continuing significance of motherhood in the construction of femininity.  
The socially constructed norms surrounding motherhood for women are also 
reflected in, and thus arguably reinforced by, legal discourse in the offence/defence 
of Infanticide.145 Infanticide is a defence only available to women who are suffering 
from puerperal psychosis and who kill their children who are less than one year 
old.146 The fact that this is a female only defence reflects the expectation that all 
women should be the carers of children and be good mothers. A more detailed 
discussion on the offence/defence of infanticide takes place in chapter five.147 It is 
not only motherhood that importance is attached to for women, physical 
appearance also plays a significant role when adhering to appropriate femininity.  
 
3.4.2 Physical Appearance 
From an early age appearance plays a significant role in the social 
construction of gender. Although having an appropriate and often physically 
attractive appearance is expected of both men and women, particular weight is 
attached to beauty and concern with one’s appearance for women.148 Indeed, ‘in an 
exploration of the concept of femininity, Susan Brownmiller … illustrated the 
powerful role played by physical appearance in cultural definitions of femininity.’149 
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The importance of appearance within the ideal of femininity occurred in the 
eighteenth century with the association of upper and middle class women’s 
respectability with appearance and conduct.150 Physical appearance has continued to 
play a central role in the contemporary construction of femininity. As explained by 
Crawford and Unger, it is still apparent that part of being feminine ‘[i]nvolves … 
having a socially approved attractive appearance.’151  
The weight attached to physical appearance in appropriate femininity has 
resulted in many women defining their identity, at least in part, by their beauty.152 
The importance of physical appearance to the construction of femininity and to the 
identity to those performing femininity was highlighted in research conducted by 
Schrock, Reid and Boyd. They conducted interviews with male to female transsexuals 
about their embodiment of womanhood, with ‘interviewee’s … suggest[ing] that 
wearing women’s clothing and makeup shaped their bodies into feminine 
conformity, which … helped feminine gestures feel authentic.’153  
Maintaining an appropriate feminine appearance requires a great deal of 
work. Women are expected to take pride in their appearance and present 
themselves as effeminate. As explained by Reynaud there are multiple expectations 
associated with an appropriate feminine appearance: 
[s]he must be beautiful: it is out of the question for her to be natural … She 
must wear makeup, be deodorised, perfumed, shave her legs and armpits, 
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put on stockings, high heels, show her legs, emphasise her breasts, pull in her 
stomach, paint her nails, dye her hair, tame her hairstyle, pierce her ears, 
reduce her appetite …154 
These appearance requirements demonstrate the performative nature of 
constructing a feminine appearance.  
Indeed femininity itself is a carefully constructed public performance, of 
which appearance plays a significant part, particularly in the context of the value 
women attach to themselves, as well as for their validation by others.155 Therefore 
this performance of a feminine appearance must be finely tuned and altered 
depending on the context within which women find themselves. This was reflected in 
a study conducted by Skeggs who noted:  ‘spending obvious amounts of time with 
make-up just to go to work or college was seen to be embarrassing and 
inappropriate, but spending the same amount of time preparing to go out is 
expected.’156 It is therefore clear that women do not only have to work hard at 
maintaining their appearance, but that they have to tread a fine line at ensuring their 
appearance matches the social situation which they find themselves in.  
 One aspect of feminine appearance that receives a great deal of attention, 
particularly in the media, is how women dress themselves. This is as a result of 
clothes’ close associations with appropriate female sexuality. The importance of 
clothes in constructing an appropriate feminine appearance cannot be 
underestimated. As explained by Tseëlon: ‘[c]lothes, through their proximity to the 
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body encode the game of modesty and sexual explicitness, denial and celebration of 
pleasure. Clothes veil the body.’157 Historically for women clothes and fashion 
‘[w]ere regulated along lines of gender and sexuality rather than lines of social 
distinction … The major distinction in female dress was between the noblewoman 
and the prostitute.’158 This is arguably still very much the case for women in 
contemporary society, with the notion that non-conformity in the context of clothes 
has a sexual undertone. Many third wave feminists have argued otherwise, 
suggesting that women should be able to dress in the way that they wish and that 
expressing their feminine sexuality through their appearance is actually a challenge 
to male objectification.159 However, I would suggest that it is still the case that if a 
woman is perceived as dressing in a way which lacks modesty there is the very real 
threat of her being labelled as a prostitute160 or given a similar sexually deviant and 
pejorative label. Therefore when dressing in an appropriately feminine manner, 
women must not be overtly sexual.  
Indeed in research cited by Tseëlon, women made clear that they did not 
want their clothes to convey some sort of sexually available image, make them look 
tarty or lead men on.161 This ‘[c]oncern with sexual overtones echoes the absent 
presence of “the prostitute in every woman.”’162 At the same time as not wanting to 
present themselves as overtly sexual, the women in the study did not want to 
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present a totally desexualised image or appear as boring or unfeminine.163  From this 
it is apparent that in order to conform to an appropriate feminine appearance, 
women must toe the line between being overtly sexual and being totally 
desexualised. Agreement with Tseëlon is expressed here, particularly when he 
explains that for women attempting to dress appropriately ‘the permissible territory 
… borders on impossibility: signaling desire while denying it – being suggestive, but 
understated enough so as not to be blatantly seductive.’164 In order to perform an 
appropriate feminine appearance, women must get ‘[t]he right balance between 
appearing coy and enticing’165 when choosing their clothes.  
The continuing preoccupation with women’s appropriate appearance is 
perhaps most aptly reflected on The Daily Mail website, where articles are published 
on a daily basis either praising or deriding what women wear and publishing the 
results from regular surveys conducted on the topic. For example, an article 
published online in March 2014 titled “Working Women dress to impress in power 
suits on Mondays – but by Friday they’re in jeans”166 suggests that successful and 
professional women are those who dress “appropriately”. In contrast, in a separate 
article they cited statistics on men’s opinions regarding the clothes that women 
wear; with more than half of men claiming they respected women more if they 
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dressed in a reserved way.167 The article suggested that those women who wear 
revealing clothing are not perceived as “classy” or “respectful” women by men, thus 
reflecting the notion that women must conform to an appropriate appearance and 
toe the line of dressing appropriately.   
 When women do not conform to the appropriate feminine appearance for 
the social situation they are in, I would argue and indeed will demonstrate that 
others often judge them harshly. This is especially the case when the “perpetrating” 
women are in the public eye, with the media often publishing scathing articles on the 
aspects of their appearance that do not adhere to appropriate femininity. For 
example, when former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton appeared without makeup in 
Bangladesh she made headlines around the world.168 Furthermore, in the United 
Kingdom, when former News International CEO Rebekah Brooks testified before the 
Leveson Inquiry she was berated in the media for her appearance. She drew angry 
comments for her curly red hair,169 and her outfit was ‘[c]ompared to the clothes 
worn by 17th-century witches …’170 If the breach of appropriate feminine appearance 
is considered to be a serious one, the woman in question is often considered to be 
deviant and is consequently labelled as such.  This was touched on briefly above 
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when discussing how sexually overt women are labelled as prostitutes.171 This 
labelling of women who do not conform to a feminine standard of appearance is a 
theme that is evident throughout history. For example, the seminal criminological 
theory advanced by Lombroso on criminal women, which was first published in 1885 
in Italy, argued that the appearance of criminal women was more masculine and 
physically flawed.172  
Similarly, when the physical appearance of women is perceived as masculine 
or “butch” these women are labelled as deviant, more specifically often as lesbians, 
reflecting the historical association of a masculine appearance in women with 
homosexuality.173 As explained by Lips: 
According to the dubious logic of stereotypes, a really feminine woman would 
not be sexually attracted to other women; a “real” man would not be sexually 
attracted to other men. Thus, in a reversal of genders stereotypes, lesbians 
are often characterised as masculine, and gay men are described as feminine 
… [f]acial and other features and other physical features that are stereotyped 
as feminine are linked, when found in males, with attributions of 
homosexuality, as are masculine features when found in females.174 
This cultural labelling of so-called “butch”, masculine women as lesbians was 
reflected in a study conducted by Viss and Burn.175 As Lips succinctly summarises, the 
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study highlighted that ‘[h]eterosexual college students rated lesbians as significantly 
less attractive, more insecure, more masculine … than a sample of lesbians rated 
themselves.’176 
Finally, arguably one of the most serious consequences of the stereotypes 
surrounding women’s appearance comes when women are raped. If a woman wears 
overtly sexual or revealing clothing and is raped, there is a significant proportion of 
society who believe that she is responsible in some way for being raped. ‘An 
Amnesty International poll found that 26 per cent of those asked said that they 
thought a woman was partially or totally responsible for being raped if she was 
wearing sexy or revealing clothing.’177 Moreover, a BBC News article from 2010 
highlighted the results of a survey which found that ‘a majority of women believe 
some rape victims should take responsibility for what happened …’178 The fact that 
stereotypes such as these surround the appearance of women who are raped 




The term sexuality does not traditionally have one fixed meaning, rather it is 
a combination of various aspects of an individual’s life, including, but not limited to, 
gender, sexual behaviour, sexual orientation, and beliefs and attitudes towards 
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others. However, in the context of this thesis which explores the socio-legal 
response(s) to women who kill, the term sexuality will be used to denote women’s 
sexual preferences or orientations and sexual behaviours. Historically, sexuality has 
been shaped and governed by essentialist perspectives. Indeed, during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the religious response to perceived deviant 
sexual behaviour was replaced by a medico-pathological one.179 Essentialist 
approaches to sexuality hold the view that: 
[h]uman sexuality is rooted in biology, and a normal sex drive is a 
heterosexual drive intended for the production of children and the 
perpetration of the species. Deviation is considered to be pathological … 
Heterosexuality is the norm in this model for both women and men, and sex 
is properly expressed in stable, monogamous, ideally marital relationships.180 
This essentialist perspective was challenged by Foucault who argued that an 
individual’s sexuality was shaped by powerful discourses, rather than simply being a 
biological entity.181  For Foucault, ‘[d]iscourses are not merely linguistic phenomena, 
but are always shot through with power and are institutionalised as practices’182 and 
therefore discourses alter depending on culture, social structures and historical 
context.  
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More recently, Weeks has also argued that sexuality is ‘[h]istorically and 
socially shaped.’183 He suggests that reducing complex sexual relations to biological 
factors is too simplistic an approach and instead ‘[i]t is important to study the history 
of sexuality in order to understand the range of possible identities, based on class, 
ethnicity, gender and sexual preference.’184 Feminist scholars, such as Abbott, 
MacKinnon and Jeffreys have also challenged the essentialist view of sexuality, 
focusing particularly on the fact that sexuality is embedded in power relations which 
are themselves shaped by identity factors such as gender, race and age.185 This 
continued and extensive critique of the essentialist view of sexuality suggests that it 
has largely been replaced by the view that sexuality is socially and culturally 
constructed, being influenced by law, religion, medical and psychological theories, 
social norms and the media.186 
 Within the context of sexuality, heterosexuality has been and indeed arguably 
still is, considered to be the norm for both men and women. Heterosexuality is taken 
for granted, it is understood by many in society to be natural and consequently 
homosexuality is considered to be unnatural and abnormal.187 Societal 
understandings of heterosexuality as the norm are reflected in the fact that 
‘heterosexuality and heterosexual relationships are still sanctioned in law and social 
policy in a way that homosexuality and homosexual relationships are not …’188 For 
example, in many countries same-sex unions are still not legally recognised, whereas 
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heterosexual couples’ are.189 Even in England and Wales, where same-sex marriage 
has been legalised,190 the grounds for divorce still differ for homosexual couples who 
cannot, unlike heterosexual couples, use adultery as a ground for divorce,191 or non-
consummation as a ground for annulment.192   
For women appropriate feminine sexuality is largely defined by active 
heterosexuality.193 This is reflected in law, where lesbianism, unlike being gay, has 
never been completely recognised under English law,194 nor has it been declared a 
criminal offence.195 Indeed in 1921, when Frederick Macquisten MP put forward a 
proposal to criminalise lesbianism, it was rejected by the House of Lords. ‘[D]uring 
the debate, Lord Birkenhead, then Lord Chancellor argued that 999 women out of a 
thousand had “never even heard a whisper of these practices.”’196  
The hegemonic nature of heterosexuality is not the only stereotype that 
surrounds appropriate feminine sexuality. These stereotypes can also be found 
under the sexual double standard. This refers to two standards of sexual behaviour 
which differ according to whether the individual is a man or a woman.197 Over time 
and with alterations in cultural and societal discourse, the sexual double standard 
has evolved somewhat. The pioneer researcher of the double standard, Reiss, 
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‘[d]efined the orthodox double standard as prohibiting premarital sexual intercourse 
for women but allowing it for men.’198 Over time, this evolved into the conditional 
double standard, which instead of focusing on sex within marriage only being 
permissible for women, concentrated on women’s engagement in sexual relations 
only within a committed relationship. In contrast, the conditional double standard 
permitted men to have as many sexual partners as they wished.199 In contemporary 
society, I would suggest that the more developed social learning theory model of the 
sexual double standard is most applicable. According to this model: 
[w]omen are punished for behaving in sexually permissive ways by being 
stigmatised or isolated, whereas men are rewarded by achieving popularity or 
admiration for the identical behaviours … [s]exual script theory has emerged 
to explain patterns of sexual behaviour. In following traditional scripts, men 
are socialised to desire and engage in frequent casual sexual activity with 
multiple partners, whereas women are encouraged to limit their sexual 
experiences to encounters within committed, monogamous relationships.200 
A number of stereotypes exist under the umbrella of the sexual double 
standard. A study published in The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality found, 
amongst other outcomes, that men were expected to be more interested in sexuality 
and sexual matters than women and men were not to be sexually submissive.201 As 
                                                          
198 Milhausen, Robin and Herold, Edward, “Does the Sexual Double Standard Still Exist? Perceptions of 
University Women” The Journal of Sex Research, 36, 4, (Nov.,1999), 361, p.361 
199 Milhausen and Herold, 1999, p.361  
200 Milhausen and Herold, 1999, p.361 
201 Morrison, Todd; Ryan, Travis; Fox, Lisa; McDermott, Daragh; and Morrison, Melanie, “Canadian 
university students’ perceptions of the practices that constitute ‘normal’ sexuality for men and 
women” The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, 17(4), 2008, 161, p.168 
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succinctly reported by Fox News, the research found the continuing existence of 
some of the stereotypes that underpin the sexual double standard. They include: 
He’s to be on the prowl. She’s not … She’s a “dirty girl.” Men are 
“experienced” … He’s sex savvy. She isn’t … She was asking for it. He can’t get 
raped … She’s supposed to be virginal. He isn’t …202 
Other stereotypes that underpin the double standard include the normative 
positions that women are not as interested in, and do not enjoy sex as much as men 
and therefore most women do not attach much importance to sex.203  
The existence of the sexual double standard has a continuing effect and 
influence on the sexuality of women. In research conducted by Milhausen and Herold 
the women questioned almost unanimously agreed on the continuing pervasive 
influence on the double standard.204 When commenting on the effect of the double 
standard on women, respondents explained that ‘“[w]omen have to be careful not to 
ruin their reputations,” and “there is more gossip about women.”’205 These 
sentiments have been reflected in work by Lips who explains that the stereotypes 
surrounding appropriate feminine sexuality, including the sexual double standard, 
have:  
[e]normous implications for the sexual behaviour and experience of women 
and men and for the power relationship between them. It trivialises women’s 
sexual feelings, refusing to allow for the possibility that female sexual desire 
                                                          
202 Fox News, “FOXSexpert: Sexual Double Standards” (August 10, 2009) available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,538795,00.html  
203 Milhausen and Herold, 1999, p.363   
204 Milhausen and Herold, 1999, p.364  
205 Milhausen and Herold, 1999, p.364  
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is important in its own right. It trivialises men’s capacity for self-control, 
suggesting that men are helpless before their sexual impulses. It means that 
women more than men risk ruined reputations by becoming known as 
sexually active, and that women who have been sexually assaulted, harassed, 
or raped are often blamed for their own victimisation.206 
 As was touched upon above, there are a number of consequences for women 
who do not adhere to hegemonic feminine sexuality.  Lesbians are often labelled as 
“butch” and considered to be less feminine and more masculine than their 
heterosexual counterparts.207 As noted by Lips: ‘in one study, the predominant 
stereotypes of lesbian women included an aura of masculinity and the idea that 
lesbians would try to seduce heterosexual women.’208 Moreover, lesbian 
relationships are often considered to be abnormal and therefore attempts are often 
made to normalise them by stereotyping them in such a way that they mimic 
heterosexual relationships, with one member of the couple representing the “butch” 
male and the other the “femme” female.209 The lesbian relationship cannot be 
viewed in any other way through the heterosexual and patriarchal prism. Lesbians 
may also be subjected to various forms of verbal abuse including being labelled as a 
“dyke”, a “lesbo” or a “carpet muncher”.210 Women who are considered to be 
promiscuous are also often pejoratively labelled. For example typing “promiscuous 
                                                          
206 Lips, 2007, p.257  
207 See section 3.4.2 above at pp. 122-123 for a more detailed discussion on the constructions of 
“masculinity” surrounding lesbians  
208 Lips, 2007, p.37  
209 Lips, 2007, p.38  
210 Wiktionary, “Wikisaurus: homosexual woman” available at 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Wikisaurus:female_homosexual  
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woman” into “wikisaurus” on the “wiktionary” webpage brings up a long list of 
abusive and pejorative synonyms including: “cock tease”, “slag”, “slapper”, “slut”, 
“tramp”, “trollop” and “whore”.211 
 
3.4.4 Emotions 
 Before beginning this discussion, it should be noted that there is relatively 
little original discussion on the emotional nature of women, with many of the 
resources largely being reproductions of each other. Much of the more recent 
research is based in the field of psychology and not in that of socio-legal studies or 
gender. One explanation for the limited research on feminine emotion stereotypes 
may be that other stereotypes associated with femininity are viewed as more 
important to admonish. For example, it is suggested here that there has been much 
critical discussion on appropriate feminine sexuality due to the implications that the 
performance of appropriate sexuality has for women in every aspect of their lives. 
Moreover, the critique of appropriate feminine appearance plays a significant part in 
the ongoing discussion on rape in both society and the law. Despite this, the 
association of women with emotions is still commonly found in research exploring 
gender stereotypes. Indeed, according to Shields one of the ways that ‘[w]omen … 
present themselves as feminine … is through the use of gender appropriate 
emotional displays.’212 As explained by Hales: 
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Starting very young, women may be “schooled” in emotional expressivity. As 
infants, girls are more likely to clap and smile in response to a human face, 
look into caregivers’ eyes for longer times and babble more in the singsong 
pidgin of preverbal conversation.213 
Just as gender socialisation takes place at a young age214 so too does the 
learning of gender stereotypes, including those surrounding displays of emotion. 
Indeed, in research highlighted by Kelly and Hutson-Comeaux, it was found that pre-
school children held emotion-specific stereotypes similar to adults.215 Once a child 
ascertains the gender-emotion stereotypes associated with their gender, they begin 
to develop and practice them as they get older, thus reinforcing such stereotypes. So 
although both women and men may experience the emotion of happiness, ‘[w]omen 
have been taught that they can strongly express the emotion … whereas men have 
been taught to control it. The impact of socialisation practices accumulate over time 
… 216 
Stereotypically, women are considered to be more emotional than men, not 
only experiencing more emotion more frequently, but also having less emotional 
control.217 This is a sentiment reflected by many women themselves with ‘women 
self-report[ing] that their own emotional experiences are more frequent and more 
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intense than men report.’218 Women are also viewed as being better at expressing 
their feelings and offering emotional support than their male counterparts.219 
However, not all expressions of emotion are automatically associated with 
femininity. Research has shown that particular emotions are stereotypically 
associated with each gender, with happiness, sadness and fear being more 
commonly associated with femininity, in contrast to anger being more readily 
associated with masculinity.220 Moreover different emotional contexts are associated 
with different genders: with women, the interpersonal context, and men, the 
achievement domain.221 This means that ‘[w]hile stereotypes of women tend to 
centre around clusters of communal or expressive traits, stereotypes of men tend to 
cluster around agentic or instrumental traits.’222 
It is suggested that the emotional stereotypes traditionally associated with 
femininity strongly interact with, and are reflections of, other stereotypes of 
femininity. For example, feminine emotions associated with the interpersonal 
context reflect the stereotype of women as nurturers, caregivers and mothers. When 
women do not adhere to appropriate emotional performances they are often 
considered to be abnormal or deviant, being viewed as masculine,223 and labelled as 
“callous”, “cold”, “heartless”, or “insensitive”.224  
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3.5 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has explored both the societal and legal constructions of gender. 
It has become apparent that gendered expectations, stereotypes and norms within 
legal discourse interact with, and are reflective of, those held within society more 
widely. Although there is no absolute definition of gender within legal discourse in 
the form of the Gender Recognition Act, it is apparent that for the purposes of the 
law gender is viewed as performative. As such women are expected to “perform” the 
norms associated with appropriate femininity, particularly those discussed in detail in 
this chapter; those of motherhood, physical appearance, sexuality and emotions. 
This chapter has provided a further gendered contextualisation of the earlier 
discussions on the key theories explored in chapter two. The importance of this 
chapter can be found in its demonstration of the gendered norms associated with 
appropriate femininity, thus providing a contextualisation for later discussions on 
women who kill and their deviations from gender norms. Moreover, it forms a basis 
for the following chapter (four) which critically analyses the concept of agency, 
exploring the relationship between femininity within gender discourse, criminal legal 
discourse and the concept of agency. 
The exploration of the concept of agency that will take place in the next 
chapter is integral to this thesis because it will provide some contextualisation when 
answering my three related research questions. Firstly, what are the constructions of 
“woman” and “femininity” within criminal legal discourse?; secondly; is there a 
relationship between these constructions and the agency of women, with the 
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consequence that women who kill currently have their agency denied within criminal 
legal discourse?; and finally, if so, how might their agency be recognised?  
The analysis of agency in the next chapter will build upon some of the 
concepts discussed in chapter two such as the construction of the legal subject, in 
more detail. Utilising some of the analysis in this chapter on gender, it will also 
question the role of gender discourse and the consequent norms and stereotypes 
surrounding appropriate femininity. This will enable a critical evaluation of the 
relationship between women and agency to be undertaken, exploring how women’s 
agency is passively denied. Exploring the concept of agency, as it exists in both 
society and the law, at this point in the thesis, lays some of the important 
groundwork for the subsequent exploration of the particular relationship between 
women who kill and agency to be undertaken subsequently in chapter five which 
explores how the agency of women who kill is actively denied.  
 The first substantive section of the next chapter will question whether agency 
has a gendered dimension within societal discourse; and if so, is agency a concept 
which is associated with women and femininity? If agency as a general concept can 
indeed be argued to have a gendered dimension, what are some of the implications 
and ramifications of this specifically within the context of the criminal law?  In 
attempting to draw out some answers to these questions, the second substantive 
section of the chapter will move on to explore the concept of agency in the context 
of the criminal law, as found in the principle of individual responsibility which 
underlies much of the theoretical framework of this area of law. It will also 
interrogate some of the more specific aspects of the criminal law in relation to the 
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concept of agency, including questioning whether the construction of the legal 
subject and criminal defences are gendered; and if so, how do these constructions 
passively deny the agency of women killers? 
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As briefly discussed in chapter two the invocation of agency requires an 
agent.1  That is to say that ‘without an agent, it is argued that there can be no agency 
…’2 As agency is considered to be something that is inherently possessed by all 
human beings, it is arguable therefore that all humans are agents. However, Eduards 
has argued that this is too simplistic a view to take and that rather than being the 
property of all humans, ‘agency is regarded as the property of subjects …’3 Thus it is 
only those individuals who are constructed as subjects who can be regarded as 
agents.  As Sewell explains:  
To be an agent means to be capable of exerting some degree of control over 
the social relations in which one is enmeshed, which in turn implies the ability 
to transform those social relations to some degree … agents are empowered 
to act with and against others by structures: they have knowledge of the 
schemas that inform social life and have access to some measure of human 
and nonhuman resources.4 
                                                          
1 See section 2.2 
2 Butler, 2006, p.34  
3 Eduards, 1994, p.182  
4 Sewell, 1992, p.20  
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Agents then, are individuals who are autonomous, rational and free actors5 
with the capacity to transform social relations. Re-engaging with the work of 
Descartes and Kant, discussed earlier,6 it is apparent that rationality is considered to 
be an integral part in their conceptions of agency. Rationality and the mind are 
concepts that are consistently ascribed to men and masculinity, with their ability to 
make choices and act according to their own semi-autonomous7 will. This is a point 
illustrated by Rollinson who notes that the man is ‘[p]rincipally construed as a free 
willing agent …’8 In contrast, women are considered to be ‘[c]ontrolled by their 
bodies, passions and emotions [and consequently] they are seen to be acted upon 
rather than acting.’9 Although women are acted upon, their ability to re-act as 
women is denied10 and therefore they are constructed as objects rather than 
subjects. This construction of women which objectifies them, focusing upon them as 
‘[o]bjectified irrational beings that merely attract proprietary rights …’,11 is supported 
by statements such as the following, made by Nietzsche: ‘‘[a] woman wants to be 
taken and accepted as a possession, wants to be absorbed into the concept of 
possession, possessed …’’12 Consequently men are subjects, they are rational beings, 
they are able to make choices with regards to their behaviours and therefore are the 
individuals doing the acting: the agents. This is as opposed to women who are 
                                                          
5 Reznek, Lawrie, Evil or ill? Justifying the insanity defence (London: Routledge, 1997) p.9 
6 See chapter two, section 2.2 at pp.30-33 
7 The term semi-autonomous is used here to reflect the influence and role of societal structures and 
schemas on an individual’s decision making process. It is submitted that an individual’s choices can 
never be truly autonomous because of the pervasive influence of societal and gendered norms.  
8 Rollinson, 2000, p.110   
9 Rollinson, 2000, p.109  
10 Eduards, 1994, p.183   
11 Rollinson, 2000, p.110  
12 Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science (translated by Kaufmann) (New York: Random House, 1974) 
p.24  
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objects, they are irrational, emotional individuals, being acted upon, rather than 
acting themselves. According to Eduard’s theory then, women as objects, rather than 
subjects, are not imbued with agency and are consequently not agents. As explained 
by Rollinson:  ‘[w]omen, as man’s “Other”, are … perceived to lack agency …’13  
An individual’s ability to act as an agent and exercise their agency is also 
dependent upon social structures, with the consequence that not everyone is 
positioned equally when exercising agency; ‘[a]gency varies with access to and 
control over resources and schemas because “structures, and the human agencies 
they endow, are laden with differences in power.”’14 As a result some individuals are 
in a better position to utilise their agency than others because of, for example, their 
sex, gender and class, amongst other factors.15 Most importantly in the context of 
this thesis, is the role that gender plays on the ability of women to both have their 
agency acknowledged as well as their ability to utilise their agency to any degree. 
Indeed, it is clear that the differences in power in the context of successfully 
exercising agency, mentioned above, are particularly prevalent in gender discourse. 
As was explained in the previous chapter,16 gender and power are inextricably 
interlinked. It is arguable then that the role of social norms and discourse, noted 
above and the prevalence of feminine gender norms, as discussed in chapter three17 
have obvious implications for both the acknowledgment of women’s agency, as well 
as their ability to exercise agency.  
                                                          
13 Rollinson, 2000, p.109  
14 Sewell, 1992, p.21 
15 Eduards, 1994, p.182 
16 See chapter three, section 3.2.2 at pp. 93-97 and section 3.4 at p.111 
17 See chapter three, section 3.4 
 139 
 
4.2 Agency and Women within Societal Discourse 
Eduards has suggested that there are two positions that have been taken 
with regards to women’s agency. The first suggests that women do not have agency 
at all because of their gendered characteristics of passivity and irrationality. The 
other position suggests that if women’s agency is acknowledged it is limited to a 
female-specific agency, again reflecting women’s gendered characteristics of caring 
and nurturing.18 ‘Both views deny women the possibility to challenge and change 
their condition as women. Agency is regarded as a property of subjects and 
consequently a male prerogative.’19 It is clear then that women’s agency can either 
be completely denied, or in instances where it has the potential to exist, it is arguably 
not utilised for the benefit of women, but simply as a tool to reflect and reiterate 
existing feminine gender norms. Eduards’ arguments also highlight the prevalent role 
that gender discourse plays in both the denials, and unsuccessful utilisations, of 
agency by women. Indeed, it has been argued that in the dichotomy of agency and 
victimisation, all human beings are expected to be agents, rather than passive 
victims.20 However, I would argue that gender discourse suggests otherwise, with 
norms surrounding appropriate femininity21 stereotyping women as being inherently 
                                                          
18 Eduards, 1994, p.182  
19 Eduards, 1994, p.182  
20 Eduards, 1994, p.181  
21 See chapter three, section 3.4 for a more detailed discussion on these norms  
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passive beings. Women are ‘[d]ependent, prone to illness and subject to the control 
of their raging hormones.’22  
Women’s supposed frailness and vulnerability has resulted in them often 
being perceived, and consequently being constructed, as victims. This portrayal of 
women as victims is something that has historically been advocated by some 
feminists, particularly in the academic literature on rape, domestic violence and 
sexual harassment.23 Moreover, women arguably fit into Christie’s model of the ideal 
victim: that is to say that women are ‘[m]ost readily given the complete and 
legitimate status of being a victim.’24 Reflecting Christie’s model, women are weak, 
they have to put energy into protecting themselves25 and although they may voice 
their opinions, their lack of power within societal structures means they do not pose 
a threat to the interests of the powerful within society.26 The passive woman is 
therefore seen to be a victim of her circumstances, ‘[l]acking independence and 
status, subject to control at the hands of [her] partner and a patriarchal society.’27 
This portrayal of women either as victims, or certainly as ideal victims, does 
not sit comfortably alongside the concept of agency. Indeed, as noted by Mahoney: 
                                                          
22 Nicolson, Donald, “Criminal Law and Feminism” in Nicolson, Donald and Bibbings, Lois (Eds), 
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In our society, agency and victimisation are each known by the absence of the 
other: you are an agent if you are not a victim, and you are a victim if you are 
in no way an agent. In this concept, agency does not mean acting for oneself 
under conditions of oppression; it means being without oppression, either 
having ended oppression or never having experienced it at all.28 
Victimisation and oppression of women both involve an inequality in power relations 
within society and existing social structures. This relationship between women and 
power is reflected in Foucault’s work. For Foucault power is relational, that is to say 
that it is not something to be exercised from the top-down within social structures 
and hierarchies, but rather something that works in capillaries. Foucault explained 
his theory of capillary power succinctly; 
[I]n thinking of the mechanisms power, I am thinking of its capillary form of 
existence, the point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, 
touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their 
discourse learning processes and everyday lives.29 
Living in a patriarchal society, in which all the structures are male dominated 
or act in the interests of males, ensures the continued prevalence of gendered power 
relations in which men dominate women. For women then, who live their daily lives 
within unequal power structures, demonstrating victimisation or oppression and 
therefore having their agency denied, is hardly an arduous task. Accordingly this is 
                                                          
28 Mahoney, 1994, p.64 
29 Foucault, Michel, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-77 (Brighton: 
Harvester Press, 1980) p.39 
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one potential explanation for both the denials of women agency as well as their 
perceived lack of agency or inability to utilise any gendered agency that they may be 
afforded.  
Linked in with the earlier discussions on the role of social structures is the 
role that societal norms30 play in the denials of women’s agency as well as the 
(un)successful exercise of agency by women. Societal norms influence individuals’ 
own behaviour as well as their expectations with regards to the behaviour of 
others.31 They permeate every aspect of a society in ‘[m]acro level structures such as 
economy and politics, as well as meso level and micro level structures such as family 
and interpersonal relations.’32 Individuals are expected to respect and adhere to the 
societal norms within their particular society and culture. Indeed, as noted by Hitlin 
et al., these societal ‘[n]orms guide us as we … strive to internalise and live up to 
these norms and guidelines.’33  
Focusing more specifically on Western societies, societal norms are 
constructed and enforced before the backdrop of the patriarchal society that exists 
within them. That is to say that the societal norms which exist within Western society 
represent and are created by the patriarchal social structure. In its most basic form a 
patriarchal society is one in which the positions of power and influence within 
society are predominantly taken by men, and where the existing societal norms are 
                                                          
30 The use of the term societal norms here will be as an umbrella term that incorporates the cultural, 
social and gender norms that simultaneously guide the behaviour expected of particular classes of 
individuals within society. 
31 The World Bank, 2011, p.168 
32 Charrad, Mounira, “Women’s agency across cultures: Conceptualising strengths and boundaries” 
Women’s Studies International Forum, 33, (2010), 517, p.519 
33 Hitlin and Elder, 2007, p.180 
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seen to favour and benefit men. 34 Therefore, a patriarchal society is ‘[c]haracterised 
by current and unequal power relations between women and men whereby women 
are systemically disadvantaged and oppressed.’35 Indeed, within a patriarchal society 
there is a clear disparity in power between men and women. This has the 
consequence that women are more readily controlled by informal societal norms. 
Moreover, this imbalance in power relations means that adherence to patriarchal 
societal norms is particularly important for women, not least because of some of the 
negative consequences that are attached to deviance from these socially proscribed 
norms. As a result, the capacity for women to be acknowledged as, and thus act as 
agents must be viewed within the prism of these existing social structures of a 
patriarchal society.36  
It is clear then that women are only able to exercise any limited gendered 
agency which they are afforded within existing societal norms and structures. 
Indeed, ‘women take into consideration social values, meanings and norms when 
they act …’37 This point was reiterated by The World Bank in their World 
Development Report 2012. They acknowledge the role that social norms play in 
women’s agency and how they simultaneously define and constrain the space within 
which their agency can be exercised.38 It is evident then that women’s ability to 
exercise any (limited) agency that they are afforded, is severely constrained by the 
                                                          
34 Oxford English Dictionary, “patriarchy, n” available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/138873?redirectedFrom=patriarchy#eid (OED, Third Edition, June 
2005)  
35 London Feminist Network, “What is patriarchy?” available at 
http://londonfeministnetwork.org.uk/home/patriarchy 
36 Charrad, 2010, p.517  
37 Charrad, 2010, p.519 
38 The World Bank, 2011, p.169  
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patriarchal societal norms which are entrenched in key institutions such as ‘[f]amily, 
state, religion, courts and labour markets.’39 When women deviate from these norms 
they are often labelled as deviant and treated punitively. This can be contrasted with 
the position of men within a patriarchal society, whose agency is expounded by their 
dominance within these institutions,40 as well as within society more generally. 
From the above discussions it is clear that women’s agency is generally 
denied and therefore women struggle to exercise any gendered agency which they 
are afforded because of the pervasive influence of the societal norms existing within 
a patriarchal society. However, as explained by The World Bank in their World 
Development Report 2012: 
Women’s agency matters at three levels. It has intrinsic relevance for 
women’s well-being and quality of life. It has instrumental relevance for 
actions that improve the well-being of women and their families. And it is 
required if women are to play an active role in shaping institutions, social 
norms and the well-being of their communities.41 
Some feminists have acknowledged the importance of focusing on the denials 
of women’s agency.42 They have recognised that ‘[w]omen need [agency] as women 
… [o]nly women organised as women and acting on behalf of women, will work for a 
change of women’s conditions in a way that challenges the sexual power relations, 
                                                          
39 Charrad, 2010, p.519 
40 Sewell, 1992, p.21  
41 The World Bank, 2011, p.151 
42 See for example, Murphy and Whitty,2006; and Dahlerup, Drude, The New Women’s Movement: 
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that is, male dominance.’43 This expunction of women’s collective agency was 
highlighted by the World Bank who noted that women acting as a group for a 
particular cause can exert more pressure and encourage change more effectively 
than a woman acting alone: 
[w]hile an individual woman’s greater ability to exercise agency might help 
her reach better outcomes for herself within her environment and 
constraints, it rarely is sufficient to promote structural changes that will 
reform the environment for other women.44 
Thus by collectively exercising their agency, it is suggested that women could 
encourage changes in social norms and structures that would arguably have an 
impact on allowing women to exercise their individual agency.45 On the other hand, 
Eduards argues that women are still unable to ‘[t]ranslate [their] individual 
experience … into collective action ...’46 This is not least because of the largely gender 
specific hurdles women face, such as a lack of financial autonomy, issues of domestic 
and sexual violence and lack of representation in government.47   
This discussion on women’s agency highlights that their agency is not readily 
acknowledged and therefore they are unable to exercise any individual agency that 
they are afforded within societal discourse. As a result any successful and 
transformative48 exercise of agency must be collective in nature. However, as 
evidenced above, even the impact of women’s collective agency is limited. I suggest 
                                                          
43 Eduards, 1994, p.182  
44 Oxford English Dictionary, 2005 
45 The World Bank, 2011, p.152 
46 Eduards, 1994, p.183 
47 The World Bank, 2011, p.152 
48 In this context a transformative exercise of agency is the ability to influence a marked positive 
change to a situation within the context of existing social structures.  
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therefore that whilst there is a limited acknowledgment that women’s agency is 
important, more emphasis needs to be placed on the value attached to the personal 
agency of women.49  Such an acknowledgement has the potential to have the effect 
of increasing the value attached to women’s collective agency. One key way in which 
women’s agency is either denied or limited through patriarchal institutions is by the 
operation of law and the criminal justice system, which both enforce, and reiterate, 
denials of women’s agency. Indeed, as noted by the World Bank in their 2012 World 
Development Report, ‘formal institutions – law and services – can impose or ease 
constraints on the exercise of agency.’50  Therefore this chapter will now move on to 
explore the relationship between the criminal law and the concept of agency, 
particularly focusing on the criminal law’s regulation and denial of the agency of 
women accused of committing serious crimes.  
 
4.3 Agency and the Criminal Law 
The concept of agency is one of the fundamental underlying principles of the 
criminal law, reflecting the notion that individuals should be held criminally 
responsible for their own behaviour.51 This move towards criminal responsibility 
began following the 19th century reform movement. The concern shifted towards 
‘[e]nsuring that only those who voluntarily and intentionally or, at least, recklessly 
commit[ted] wrongful acts or cause[d] prohibited consequences [were] held to be 
                                                          
49 This will be drawn upon and developed further in chapter five, section 5.5 and chapter 6, section 6.1  
50 The World Bank, 2011, p.157 
51 Ashworth, Andrew, and Horder, Jeremy, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
seventh ed, 2013) pp.23-24 
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criminally responsible.’52 At the core of this concept of responsibility is voluntariness 
of action and agency: that only those who choose to behave illegally should be held 
criminally liable.53 Criminal law then, encapsulates this idea of agency by 
acknowledging that ‘[i]ndividuals should be respected and treated as agents capable 
of choosing their actions and omissions …’54  
This idea has been expanded upon in some detail by Reznek, who argues that 
our criminal legal system adopts Folk Psychology, which makes two key assumptions: 
firstly that an agent will act according to their desires and beliefs, and secondly that 
agents are rational.55 Applying these assumptions specifically to the criminal law 
Reznek observes that agents are rational individuals who must be held responsible 
for their actions if they break the law, unless they have been compelled to do so or 
suffer from exculpatory ignorance. If they are found to be responsible for their illegal 
behaviour they should be punished.56 Therefore it is generally assumed that ‘[s]ane 
adults may properly be held liable for their conduct and for matters within their 
control, except in so far as they can point to some excuse for their conduct – for 
example, duress, mistake or even social deprivation …’57 These underlying themes 
within the criminal law are immortalised through the requirements of actus reus (a 
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wrongful act) and mens rea (a wrongful intent) for a criminal offence.58 Therefore for 
an individual to be held criminally liable they must satisfy both the actus reus and 
mens rea of the particular offence they have been charged with, without an 
applicable defence.   
 
4.4 The Criminal Law – A Gendered Construct? 
4.4.1 The Gendered Criminal Legal Subject 
As agency is considered to be a key concept underlying the criminal law, 
criminal legal discourse requires ‘a definitive … subject, as the responsible author of 
the crime’59 in much the same way that exercise of agency requires an agent. As 
iterated by Duncan, ‘traditional conceptions of the legal subject place that subject as 
a clear, certain, fixed, pre-existing identity at the core of the law.’60 As observed 
above, implicit within the criminal law is the notion of the criminal subject as a 
rational agent to whom full responsibility for their actions is ascribed. It is also 
assumed that ‘in accordance with the precept of formal equality before the law, the 
legal subject is constructed as a gender-less, race-less, class-less individual abstracted 
from its social situation.’61 However, as has already been acknowledged in chapter 
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two,62 the legal subject is not gender-neutral, rather it is gendered: it is masculine in 
construction and operation. This male subject is the universal legal subject and is 
thus also applicable in the context of the criminal law. The female subject does not 
exist within the criminal law or criminal legal discourse: ‘the woman appears only as 
the mirror to male subjectivity.’63 
The gendered aspect of the criminal legal subject is most evident in the 
historical notion of the “reasonable man”, perhaps most clearly seen in the 
development of the old common law defence of provocation. Indeed, the 
“reasonable man” standard was first introduced when judging the adequacy of 
provocation in 1869 in the case of R v Welsh64 where it was held: ‘[t]here must exist 
such amount of provocation as would be excited by the circumstances in the mind of 
the reasonable man, and so as to lead the jury to ascribe the act to the influence of 
that passion.’65 This concept of the “reasonable man” was affirmed and developed 
for many years in the subsequent case law on provocation.66  
However, there was a move from the “reasonable man” to the “reasonable 
person” in D.P.P. v Camplin,67 with the now infamous statement by Lord Diplock that 
the reasonable person is: 
[a] person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary 
person of the sex and age of the accused, but on other respects sharing such 
                                                          
62 See chapter two, section 2.4.1 
63 Duncan, 1996, pp.177-178 
64 (1869) 11 Cox Crim. C. 336 
65 R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox Crim. C. 336, p.338 
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of the accused’s characteristics as they would think would affect the gravity 
of the provocation to him.68  
In Camplin, Lord Diplock stated that ‘[f]or the purposes of the law of provocation the 
“reasonable man” has never been confined to the adult male. It means an ordinary 
person of either sex …’69 Therefore for the purposes of the old common law defence 
of provocation, when exploring the defendant’s capacity to exercise self-control their 
sex and age may be relevant characteristics to be considered.70 With the 
introduction of The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the common law defence of 
provocation was abolished and replaced with a new statutory defence of loss of 
control.71 Consequently, the historic “reasonable person” test has been replaced by 
the test found in section 54(1)(c) of the Act: ‘a person of D’s sex and age, with a 
normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might 
have reacted in the same or a similar way to D.’72  
It is submitted that despite Lord Diplock’s assertions in Camplin,73 the 
concept of the “reasonable person” in use today is still attributed with the 
characteristics of the “reasonable man” and therefore remains gendered male. This 
point was reiterated by Allen who, as Lacey notes: 
[r]evealed the way in which the gender-neutral person is nonetheless fleshed 
out in judicial discourse in highly (and often stereotypically) sex-specific 
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terms. The construct of the reasonable person cannot entirely conceal the 
fact the judges themselves find it difficult to conceive of a legal standard of 
reasonable behaviour applicable across the sexes.74 
Indeed, Allen notes how the use of the term reasonable person ‘[k]eeps alive the 
illusion of a universal and unitary subject of the law, but … legal discourse has found 
itself unable to sustain such a construct.’75 As result the standard that has been 
invoked is ‘[a]nything but universal or ungendered or androgynous: on the contrary it 
is variable, differentiated, and very firmly gendered.’76  
In the light of this, I would submit that despite the suggested gender 
neutrality of the reasonable person test, it is still ‘[a] profoundly gender-based and 
sex-specific standard’77 which exists. Indeed, Edwards makes the point that: 
[w]e are told, that the reasonable man means the reasonable woman, just 
simply by saying so, even though the experiences of women are otherwise 
immaterial, otherwise irrelevant, and unlike the male experience are rarely 
authenticated or given law’s divine blessing.78  
Thus the notion that the reasonable person is gender neutral and thus incorporates 
the voice and experiences of women is a questionable claim, especially I would 
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argue, when explicit reference is made to the issue of sex79 in its current 
construction.  
Utilising the examples of the historic defence of provocation and the issues of 
battered women, Edwards argues that the normative is always male:  
How, for example, can the partial defence of provocation [now loss of 
control] founded on what reasonable men do in the face of adversity truly 
absorb reasonable women and their reaction to adversity? Thus, what men 
do when wives take lovers, is what any reasonable man would do if presented 
with the same circumstances and is common knowledge and experience. Yet, 
what battered women do when abused and threatened by violent husbands, 
is not within the ken of the reasonable man concept; it is instead 
“distinguished” it is within a specialised domain of knowledge and calls for 
experts to speak to it. Subjectivity, which lies at the heart of the reasonable 
man, is constituted as universal and rests on particular and highly selective 
facts. The normative is male.80 
This is an idea reiterated by MacKinnon, who explains: ‘when [the state] is most 
ruthlessly neutral, it will be most male; when it is most sex blind, it will be most blind 
to the sex of the standard being applied.’81 Therefore, despite pertaining to be a 
gender-neutral concept, the reasonable person standard is, I suggest still normatively 
gendered male.   
                                                          
79 As noted above, the reasonable person test can now be found in section 54(1)(c) of the Coroners 
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Within this context, it becomes clear then that the concept of the 
“reasonable woman” is not one that has ever been adopted by the criminal law. 
Arguably this is understandable when considering both the legal and societal status 
of women when the concept of the reasonable man was introduced in the 
nineteenth century, ‘[w]hen English law still treated femininity as an unquestioned 
legal disability, akin to infancy; women were not yet even constituted as legal 
persons.’82 However, the continued omission of this concept from the law, despite 
progress in women’s legal standing and rights, adds further weight to the argument 
that the reasonable person remains gendered masculine, rather than neutral, in 
nature. As explained by Taylor: ‘rather than developing a separate standard for 
women, criminal law has held and continues to hold female defendants to a male 
standard of reasonableness.’83  
Some academics have argued that the concept of the reasonable woman is 
not one that is required within the criminal law.  For example, Kennedy has 
suggested that the comparatively small number of female to male criminals has 
meant that introducing the concept of the reasonable woman has been 
unnecessary.84 The pervasiveness of gender discourse,85 which constructs women as 
unreasonable, emotional, irrational and irresponsible, particularly when they interact 
with the criminal law, has meant that the concept of reasonableness is constructed 
in dichotomy with that of the criminal woman. Indeed the concept of reasonableness 
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‘[h]as long been regarded as favouring men – maleness characteristically being 
associated with attributes such as rationality, forethought and strength, while 
femininity has traditionally been associated with irrationally, impulsiveness and 
weakness.’86 Therefore if the criminal law were to acknowledge the concept of a 
“reasonable woman” by conjoining the terms ‘“reasonable” and “woman” … [it 
would create] … a contradiction in terms.’87  
This failure to acknowledge the concept of the reasonable woman and the 
continued prevalence and use of the concept of the reasonable man, both within, 
and rather than, the reasonable person, combines to ensure the continued existence 
of the male criminal legal subject. In turn this rejects the neutral or female legal 
subject, thus ensuring the maintenance of women as the “Other”. As explained by 
Morrissey: 
[w]estern philosophy and legal discourse have generally tended to predicate 
concepts of the human on masculine ideals. According to these discourses’ 
narratives of masculinity and femininity, men are considered to possess the 
autonomy, independence and reason of all human subjects … In legal 
discourse, this translates into the idea of the “reasonable man”, which tacitly 
elides narratives of femininity. The “reasonable man” is narrated as 
responsible for his actions … in this tale he retains his agency at all times … 
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For the “reasonable man” is considered, by definition, to be reasonable, and 
to act as any other man would in the same situation.88 
Therefore, the continued prevalence of the concept of the reasonable man and the 
construction of the criminal legal subject as male ensures the retention of the agency 
of men, whilst simultaneously passively denying the agency of women.  
This failure to acknowledge the female criminal legal subject disqualifies 
women from legal subjecthood. As explained by Nicolson: ‘male legal subjecthood is 
further enhanced by the denial of that of women … Thus, criminal law tends to 
portray women as passive victims, whose agency and autonomy is effaced by the 
focus on the perspective of male defendants.’89 It is undeniable then that there is a 
well-defined link between subjecthood and agency and that without clear, 
unequivocal acknowledgment as a subject of the criminal law, an individual cannot 
be recognised as an agent under the law. Agency resides in the subject; without a 
subject, agency cannot exist. Therefore it is suggested that agency is a significant 
characteristic of the reasonable man, thus reflecting his legal subjecthood. This is a 
point reiterated by Abrams, who notes that law’s current assumption of the subject 
is one ‘[c]apable of uncompromised agentic self-determination, to whom legal 
authorities ascribe full responsibility for actions taken …’90  This has resulted in the 
portrayal of the woman in law as an individual who lacks any self-determination and 
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thus must be relieved of responsibility associated with her actions,91 rather than as a 
reasonable criminal subject whose agency is acknowledged.   
Following on from this and of particular importance to this thesis therefore is 
the notion that the criminal law is passively denying the agency of women killers who 
both come before, and seek to rely on it, through the masculine gendering of the 
“reasonable person” as the legal subject and thus a failure to acknowledge women as 
legal subjects with agency. The term passive agency denial is used here because as 
has been demonstrated in the above analysis the masculine gendering of the legal 
subject within criminal legal discourse is a continuing pre-existing state of affairs.   
Indeed, the construction of women as legal objects who are acted upon, rather than 
as legal subjects within criminal legal discourse, is a pre-existing state of affairs, 
reflecting a given in patriarchal society.  
 
4.4.2 The Gendered Nature of Defences to Murder 
As well as the gendered construction of the criminal legal subject, I would 
argue that when exploring the criminal law as a whole it becomes apparent that it 
has a gendered dimension more generally that serves to reinforce passive agency 
denial for women. This is an argument shared by many feminist scholars92 who have 
argued that the criminal law does not exist in its own vacuum, but rather that it is a 
reflection and reproduction of societal discourse. Therefore, the criminal law and its 
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associated processes need to be contextualised and thus understood within the 
social structures and ideologies of a patriarchal society.93  
The gendered dimension of criminal law is reflected in the defences available, 
which, it will be argued, are themselves gendered. The defences available in criminal 
law can be broken down into two categories, those that are justifications and those 
that are excuses.94 Justification defences, although accepting responsibility for the 
individual’s actions, acknowledge the rightfulness of the defendant’s behaviour. In 
contrast, excuse defences accept the wrongfulness of the individual’s actions, but 
mitigate the responsibility attached to the defendant.95 The use of a justification 
defence then ‘[p]resents the act as appropriate and reasonable, while an excuse 
defence presents the actor as inherently irrational and the act as not to be publicly 
encouraged or defended.’96 
In differentiating between the defences and deciding which are categorised 
as justifications and which are excuses, Reznek has suggested two tests that must be 
conducted:  
The first … [is] the Mental Test: If the mental state of the defendant is critical 
in determining whether the defence succeeds, it is an excuse. This is because 
the judgment as to whether someone is responsible depends on features of 
his mental state … The second is the Moral Test: If the moral circumstances 
surrounding the offence are critical in determining whether the defence 
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succeeds, it is a justification. Justifications depend on producing beneficial 
consequences that outweigh the harms.97  
Applying this test to the current defences to murder available under the criminal law, 
it is apparent that the majority of them can be easily divided into one of the two 
categories. Self-defence is undoubtedly a justification defence, whereas diminished 
responsibility and insanity are both excuse defences. The now historical defence of 
provocation allowed evidence of Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) to be adduced 
under it,98 and therefore could have been classified as either an excuse (if BWS 
evidence was introduced) or a justification. The replacement defence of loss of 
control, under which it is as yet unknown whether BWS evidence can be utilised,99 is 
I would suggest likely to be categorised as a justification defence.   
The categorisation of defences as excuses or justifications reflects the 
gendered nature of the defences in question. That is to say that justification 
defences, such as self-defence and loss of control, are masculine, whereas excuse 
defences, such as insanity and diminished responsibility are feminine. As explained 
by Lacey: ‘the female gendering of particular defences such as mental incapacity 
defences like diminished responsibility (as opposed to “masculine” defences like … 
self-defence) has … been widely noted.’100 The gendering of justification defences as 
masculine and excuse defences as feminine reflects gender discourse. Consequently, 
self-defence, as a justification defence is based upon the ‘[m]ale realities on which 
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the defence was [founded and which] have become entrenched …’101 Similarly, loss 
of control (historically provocation) is a masculine construction and thus defence,102 
reflected in the notions of rage and anger typically associated with losing control.103 
Moreover, the defence ‘[r]ests on a notion of the normality of the mental response 
that underlies the offence … any reasonable subject might have responded in this 
way, and what is explicitly excluded is recourse to the defence by anyone whose 
response falls outside this norm.’104 In contrast, diminished responsibility and 
insanity, as excuse defences, are based upon ideas of inherent irrationality, 
normatively associated with femininity.105 Indeed, when these defences are invoked, 
‘[i]t is the abnormality of the response that grounds the exculpation: the defendant 
is to be excused in precisely those cases where no reasonable person would have 
responded in such a way.’106 
The gendered nature of defences is also reflected in statistics, which 
demonstrate that proportionately more women successfully plead one of the excuse 
defences to homicide, whereas a proportionality higher number of men successfully 
plead a justification defence.  Indeed as Edwards notes:  
Throughout all common law jurisdictions, writers, lawyers and critics have 
expressed concern that women are more likely to be convicted of murder or 
manslaughter (diminished responsibility) and less likely to be convicted of 
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manslaughter (provocation [now loss of control]) when compared with their 
male counterparts …107 
This is reflected in statistics: between 2002/03 and 2012/13, more men than women 
were both indicted for homicide and found not guilty by reason of insanity. However, 
as a proportion of the number of indictments, proportionately more women were 
found not guilty by reason of insanity. Statistics published by the Office for National 
Statistics show that of the 6,927 men indicted for homicide between 2002/03 and 
2012/13, 10 of the defendants, that is 0.14%, were found not guilty by reason of 
insanity. This can be contrasted with the 747 women indicted for homicide in the 
same time period, of whom 2, that is 0.27%, successfully pleaded insanity.108   
It is also important to note that ‘[d]espite the general principle of English law, 
that all … should be treated the same irrespective of their gender, law-makers have 
always reserved the right to establish exceptions to this … for example, in the 
sexually differentiated legislation concerning homosexuality, rape, [and] infanticide 
…’109 Indeed, the defence of infanticide is gender specific, being solely available to 
women defendants who kill their children, and women can also exclusively use 
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gendered evidence of pre-menstrual syndrome (PMS) and BWS110 to support the 
defence of diminished responsibility. As Allen explains, such examples jettison as 
inconsistent the legal subject constructed as being the neutral, genderless 
reasonable person.111 Nicolson has argued that the provision of such gendered 
evidence and defences is the law’s attempt to provide ‘[e]xceptions to the male 
oriented notions of criminal liability …’112 When the defence of infanticide is invoked 
or evidence of PMS or BWS introduced, they all focus on the female defendants 
personality and psychology, reflecting the Victorian ideology of ‘[f]emale biology as a 
disease.’113 This ideology utilises ‘[d]isturbances arising from women’s reproductive 
cycle – along with those deviations from gender role that have come to be defined as 
“personality disorders” (sexual deviance, violence, rejection of family relationships) 
…’114  
The female specific defence of infanticide,115 the legal basis for which is the 
mental disorder puerperal psychosis, highlights the pathologised nature of mothers 
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who kill their children.116 The utilisation of evidence of PMS to support a plea of 
diminished responsibility ‘[m]aintains that many (most?) women are physiologically, 
emotionally and behaviourally abnormal for between a quarter and a half of their 
productive lives …’117  Finally, evidence of BWS, which is most successfully adduced 
in relation to the defence of diminished responsibility reflects the inherent 
helplessness and pathological nature of women.118 The obvious pathological element 
associated with Infanticide, PMS and BWS satisfies Reznek’s mental test119 and 
therefore all three can be categorised within the realm of excuse defences. This is 
not unremarkable as excuse defences are usually gendered feminine, as 
acknowledged above.   
 The continued use of female-specific defences and gendered evidence 
provides female-specific excuses for women’s violent criminality. Indeed, it is 
submitted that the use of such defences and evidence to support them, ensures the 
continuance of a difference approach to women’s violent criminality, thus reinforcing 
the existence of the male gendered criminal legal subject and the non-existence of 
the female subject. In turn this underlines and enforces women’s position as the 
“Other” within criminal legal discourse. The use of female-specific defences also 
further entrenches feminine gender stereotypes in the context of violent criminality, 
particularly the notions of women as inherently pathological and irrational beings. 
Indeed, although a difference approach may assist individual women with reducing 
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or altogether avoiding liability for their violent criminality, the use of gendered 
evidence and defences both reflects and reinforces the pejorative gender 
stereotypes surrounding women: for example, the construction of women as passive, 
helpless, pathological and controlled by emotions. ‘In other words, a difference 
approach tends to reinforce the sort of gender constructions which harm women as 
a group and which feminists have sought so hard to challenge.’120 
The gendering of excuse defences as feminine, combined with the female-
specific defences and the use of gendered evidence, ensures the continued passive 
denial of agency of women who come before the criminal law, as well as reinforcing 
the gendered construction of the criminal legal subject. It is clear that the excuse 
defences, which are feminine in gender, ‘[d]eny responsibility by denying intentional 
agency.’121 Taking the excuse defence of insanity as an example, this passively denies 
agency by rebutting the associated characteristic of rational competence.122 So 
whilst insanity acknowledges the commission of the act, as an excuse defence, it 
does so whilst removing the agency of the actor.123  
The argument that women are more likely to successfully plead an excuse 
defence124 reflects the presumption within gender discourse that women are 
inherently irrational beings who lack agency. Indeed, as Morrissey explains: 
Women who lack agency also lack the chance to argue in defence of their 
actions: if they cannot claim that they acted of their own volition in the first 
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place, then they are denied the opportunity to claim that their acts were 
reasonable and justifiable.125 
This is reflected in the gendered nature of defences, which results in women being 
unlikely to utilise male justification defences that would acknowledge their agency. 
This is particularly evident in the use (or lack thereof) of self-defence, a 
masculine justification defence, as a defence to murder by battered women who kill 
their abusive partners. Research published by Noonan in 1996 highlighted that there 
had never been a case where a battered woman had successfully pleaded self-
defence.126  This is despite the fact that arguably self-defence is a more accurate 
reflection of the woman’s actions in many cases. The consequences of using self-
defence are explained by Duff: 
A plea of self-defence rebuts a charge of wounding … by claiming that the 
wounding was rendered right or permissible by the fact that it was the only 
way to ward off a serious attack by its “victim” against its agent. One who 
justifies her action is prepared to answer for it, by showing it to be right: the 
possibility of avoiding blame or criminal liability by justifying our intended or 
intentional actions, therefore does not undermine the claim … of responsible 
agency.127 
So battered women, who are unlikely to successfully use a plea of self-defence to the 
murder of their abusive partner, have their agency passively denied. Similarly, 
                                                          
125 Morrissey, 2003, p.170  
126 Noonan, Sheila, “Battered Woman Syndrome: Shifting the Parameters of Criminal Law Defences 
(Or (Re)inscribing The Familiar?)” in Bottomley, Anne (Ed), Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational 
Subjects of Law (London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1996) p.198 
127 Duff, 1990, p.100 
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women continuing to use feminine gendered excuse defences, rather than any 
masculine gendered justification defences, have their agency passively denied.   
 The continued existence and use of the female specific defence of infanticide 
and gendered evidence of PMS and BWS further assert the passive denials of the 
agency of women. The defence of infanticide and use of gendered evidence all rely 
specifically on the discourse of pathology that is readily associated with femininity. 
This continuous reference to syndromes and psychiatric and psychological 
deficiencies prevents a detailed examination of the extent to which the actions of 
violent female defendants ‘[f]it the available categories of culpability, justification 
and excuse.’128 Instead, by using the female specific defences, which reflect and 
entrench feminine gender discourse, women have excuses made for their actions, 
they have their culpability limited and consequently their agency is passively denied. 
Therefore, for women the automatic position is one of their agency being passively 
denied within criminal legal discourse. 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
The analysis within this chapter has questioned and explored the concept of 
agency within the context of societal discourse. It has demonstrated that women’s 
agency is only acknowledged within limited circumstances, mainly through collective 
performances, and that therefore it is extremely difficult for women to successfully 
exercise their agency because of existing gender norms and social structures within a 
                                                          
128 Nicolson, 2000a, p.172 
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patriarchal society. The analysis then moved on to explore the passive denial of 
women’s agency within criminal legal discourse. It has demonstrated that men have 
their agency constantly (re)asserted, whereas women have their agency denied.  
Women’s agency is passively denied initially because they are constructed as 
objects rather than subjects. Agency is the tenure of rational, acting subjects and is 
therefore not associated with women as objectified, passive and irrational beings 
who are acted upon, rather than acting themselves. Indeed, drawing upon some of 
the gender stereotypes surrounding women discussed in the previous chapter,129 
including the notions of women as victims and as being controlled by their biological 
functions and their emotions, are in direct opposition to the concept of agency. 
Therefore, it is submitted that these stereotypes, as dictated by gender discourse, 
work to ensure that women’s agency is passively denied.  
Similarly and specifically in the context of the criminal law, it is submitted that 
women’s agency is also passively denied. It is evident from the above discussions 
that ‘[w]here women resort to law, their status is always already imbued with 
specific meaning arising out of their gender.’130 As explained by Smart: 
[Women] go to law as mothers, wives, sexual objects, pregnant women, 
deserted mothers, single mothers and so on … In going to law women carry 
with them cultural meanings about pregnancy, heterosexuality, sexual bodies 
                                                          
129 See chapter three, section 3.4 
130 Smart, Carol, “Law’s Truth/ Women’s Experience” in Graycar, Regina, (Ed), Dissenting Opinions: 
Feminist Explorations in Law and Society (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990) p.7 
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… [L]aws that deal with the private sphere operate on fully gendered subjects 
…’131  
Consequently when women come to the criminal law they are constructed as the 
“Other” and treated as such, with the automatic designation of feminine gender 
behaviour and attributes, such as passivity, emotionality and irrationality, which as 
has already been demonstrated, are contrary to the concept of agency. Moreover, 
the criminal legal subject, the “reasonable person” is gendered male, and therefore 
women constructed as legal objects have their agency passively denied. 
Furthermore, the gendered nature of defences, with excuse defences gendered as 
feminine and justification defences gendered as masculine, also work to passively 
deny women’s agency within criminal legal discourse. 
 Although it has become apparent that women’s agency is passively denied in 
criminal legal discourse, more attention needs to be paid to the specific relationship 
between the criminal law and women who kill. Indeed, although the agency of these 
women is passively denied in the same way it is for all women, further questions 
must be asked of additional agency denials which may take place in the context of 
women who kill. Therefore, the next chapter explores the socio-legal response(s) to 
women who kill, drawing upon the analysis of labelling and construction theory 
discussed in chapter two132 and arguing that these women are labelled as mad, bad, 
or victims, depending on their degree of deviance from gender appropriate 
behaviour (outside of committing homicide), as well as the specifics of their crime. 
These particular labels have been used in the context of this thesis because they are 
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132 See chapter two, sections 2.3 and 2.4  
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the ones most commonly used in the existing literature that explores women who 
kill.133 Moreover, these three labels are general terms that broadly cover most of the 
more specific labels that have occasionally been mentioned within the literature. For 
example the typology of the “masculine woman” suggested by Seal134 sits within the 
label of bad, rather than requiring a separate heading.  
This next chapter will explore each of the labels, mad, bad and victim 
individually. When analysing each label it will explore related relevant defences and 
offences such as BWS and infanticide, as well as including relevant case studies.  The 
next chapter argues that attaching these labels to women who kill results in their 
agency being actively denied, reflecting the symbiotic relationship between labelling 
and active agency denial. The term active agency denial will be used here, in contrast 
to the passive agency denial discussed in this chapter, to refer to the creation of a 
new identity for women who kill through labelling. So not only do the labels attached 
to women who kill reflect the deviance and gendered constructions of these women, 
but the labelling also creates a new all-consuming identity for them. As such this is, I 
would argue, a positive act of doing, and is reflected in the use of the term active. 
Active agency denial occurs as a result of passive agency denial. That is to say that it 
is the construction of women as legal objects whose agency is passively denied 
within criminal legal discourse, that allows women who kill to be labelled and for 
these labels to become their new exclusive identities, thus actively denying their 
agency.  
                                                          
133 See for example: Morrissey, 2003 and Seal, 2010 
134 Seal, 2010, p.24 
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Chapter Five – “The Mad”, “The Bad”, “The Victim” – Labelling Women 
Who Kill and Active Denials of Agency 
 
5.1 Battered Women Who Kill—the Mad Woman and the Victim 
Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS) was developed by Lenore Walker, an 
American psychologist, in an attempt to try to dispel the myths and misconceptions 
surrounding domestic violence as well as to help establish the reasonableness of 
killing their abusive partner by battered women.1  As originally conceived by Walker, 
the syndrome consists of two elements. The first element is known as “the cycle 
theory”. This suggests that characteristically male violence against their partners has 
three phases:  
The first involves a period of heightening tension caused by the man’s 
argumentativeness, during which the woman attempts various unsuccessful 
pacifying strategies. This “tension-building” phase ends when the man erupts 
into a rage at some small trigger and acutely batters the woman. This is 
followed by the “loving-contrite” or “honeymoon” phase, in which the guilt-
ridden batterer pleads for forgiveness, is affectionate and swears off violence. 
But he breaks his promise and the cycle is repeated.2 
The second element of BWS involves “learned helplessness.” Repeated, 
unpredictable and seemingly unavoidable abuse by their partner results in battered 
women becoming increasingly passive and developing a number of characteristics 
                                                          
1 Sanghvi, Rohit and Nicolson, Donald “Battered women and provocation: The implications of R v 
Ahluwalia.” Criminal Law Review, (October 1993), 728, p.733 
2 Sanghvi and Nicolson, 1993, p.733  
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including low self-esteem, anxiety and depression as well as blaming themselves for 
the violence they suffer. This sense of helplessness traps battered women ‘[i]nto a 
situation from which [they are] psychologically and hence physically unable to 
escape.’3 
Before the introduction of The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, case law 
demonstrated that the inclusion of BWS evidence in cases of women who killed their 
abusive partner was recognised in relation to the defences of provocation4 or 
diminished responsibility.5 With the introduction of the 2009 Act, BWS is now 
primarily a matter for the amended defence of diminished responsibility,6 with there 
being some contention as to whether they will still be able to adduce evidence of 
BWS under the new defence of loss of control.7 It is suggested however that women 
who plead loss of control will be able to present themselves as battered, even if not 
as suffering from BWS. As a result of this shift in the law, women who plead loss of 
control will likely be labelled as victims, whereas women who utilise evidence of BWS 
to support a plea of diminished responsibility will be labelled as mad.  
 
5.1.1 Loss of Control—Battered Women Who Kill As Victims  
The new partial defence to a charge of murder of loss of control is found in 
sections 54-56 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Section 54 states:  
                                                          
3 Barnett, 1998, p.271 
4 R v Ahluwalia [1993] 96 Cr. App. R. 133  
5 R v Thornton [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1174 
6 The Homicide Act 1957, section 2 as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s52(1) 
7 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, sections 54-56 
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Where a person (‘D’) kills or is party to a killing they are not to be convicted of 
murder but of manslaughter if: 
(a) D’s acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing 
resulted in D’s loss of self-control; 
(b) The loss of control had a qualifying trigger; and 
(c) A person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and 
self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in 
the same or in a similar way to D.8 
For there to be such a loss of control there must be a “qualifying trigger” as noted in 
section 54(1)(b) above. The meaning of these words is defined in section 55 of the 
Act which states: 
(3) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to D’s 
fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person. 
(4) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a thing 
or things done or said (or both) which – 
 (a) constituted circumstances of extremely grave character, and 
 (b) caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. 
(5) This subsection applies if D’s loss of self-control was attributable to a 
combination of the matters mentioned in subsections (3) and (4).9 
The effect of the defence of loss of control in practice in cases of battered 
women who kill their husbands is still unknown as there is yet to be a reported case 
involving a battered woman pleading the new defence of loss of control. Therefore 
                                                          
8 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s54(1) 
9 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s55 
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there is some debate as to whether women will be able to invoke BWS evidence to 
support this new defence. Under section 54(3), which refers to s54(1)(c) and the 
‘circumstances of D’, this is ‘[a] reference to all of D's circumstances other than those 
whose only relevance to D's conduct is that they bear on D's general capacity for 
tolerance or self-restraint.’10 Edwards suggests that under s54(3) ‘[a] consideration 
of circumstances that go to the capacity for self-control provided that they also go to 
the trigger’11 should be permitted. Therefore, women may be able to introduce 
evidence of suffering from BWS, as a psychological condition, ‘[t]o plead a lowered 
capacity for self-control provided the factor of relevance to capacity is the very same 
factor that forms part of the qualifying trigger.’12 However, if women are not able to 
link the BWS factor to the qualifying trigger as Edwards suggests, then it is submitted 
that in theory women will not be able to use evidence of BWS to support the new 
defence of loss of control.  
Alan Norrie has suggested that the amendments to the law, particularly the 
defence ground concerning the defendant having a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged,13 may encourage a change in how battered women are portrayed 
within the legal system should their defence utilise loss of control. He argues that 
rather than focusing on the medico-legal category of BWS, the new law will 
encourage female defendants ‘[t]o portray themselves as ordinary people grievously 
                                                          
10 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s55(4)(b)  
11 Edwards, Susan, “Loss of self-control: when his anger is worth more than her fear” in Reed, Alan, 
and Bohlander, Michael, (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative 
and International Perspectives (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013) p.85 
12 Edwards, 2013, p.85 
13 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s55(4)(b) 
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harmed and acting out of a legitimate sense of anger at what has been done to 
them.’14  
There is therefore some contention as to whether battered women will still 
be able to adduce evidence of BWS to support a defence of loss of control. However, 
I would suggest that despite the changes introduced by the new defence, women will 
still be able to use evidence that they were battered women, even if not evidence 
that they were specifically suffering from BWS. Section 55(3) of the Coroners and 
Justice Act, the qualifying trigger of fear of serious violence, attempts to reflect the 
situation faced by battered women. Moreover, with the introduction of the new 
defence it seeks to accommodate the “slow-burn” reaction of many battered 
women, otherwise known as cumulative provocation, where a series of separate 
incidents have built up over time, ultimately culminating in the defendant losing 
control and killing. As such, it is argued that battered women who plead loss of 
control will likely be labelled as victims through an acknowledgment of the violence 
they have suffered at the hands of the deceased.  
Historically, the issue of women as victims of domestic violence was a private 
matter, reflected in the now oft quoted phrase ‘scream quietly or the neighbours will 
hear.’15 However, the rise of radical feminism during the 1970s and demands to 
make such violence a public matter meant that the construction of women as victims 
                                                          
14 Norrie, Alan “The Coroners and Justice Act 2009—Partial Defences to Murder (1) Loss of Control.” 
Criminal Law Review 4, (2010), 275, p.286  
15 This was the title of a book written by Erin Pizzay on her experience when setting up the first 
women’s refuge for battered women in 1971. 
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of violence began to emerge.16 The theory of women as victims of crime, particularly 
within their own home, but also more generally, was developed by many academics. 
As summarised by Carrington:  
Significant and influential works include Dobash and Dobash’s (1979) study of 
family violence; Russell’s (1975) exposé of rape, including rape in marriage, 
and Brownmiller’s (1975) provocative analysis of rape to name only a few. 
These were followed by Stanko’s (1990) work on everyday violence and 
Walklate’s (1991, 2007) major and ongoing contribution to the field of 
victimology.17 
As is clear, traditionally much of the academic research surrounding women 
and violence has focused on women solely as victims of domestic violence, rather 
than as occupying the space of both perpetrator and victim of violence. This is 
arguably partly because women as perpetrators of violence are considered to be a 
relatively rare phenomenon.18 It is important to note here that whilst an important 
body of research exists on female perpetrators of violence, it is still a relatively small 
area of research in the vast body of research which has been conducted on violence 
and homicide. Historically, much of what was written on female criminals focused on 
pathological and irrational discourses to explain their involvement within the criminal 
justice system. However, with the development of the theory of BWS and the 
introduction of the new partial defence to murder of loss of control the idea of 
                                                          
16 Carrington, Kerry, “Critical Reflections on Feminist Criminologies” in Anthony, Thalia, and Cunneen, 
Chris (Eds), The Critical Criminology Companion (Sydney: Hawkins Press, 2008) p.86 
17 Carrington, 2008, p.86 
18 Morrissey, 2003, p.169  
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women as both victims and perpetrators was reconciled. In other words, women 
became perpetrators because they were victims.  
Although battered women who kill their abusive partners cannot necessarily 
use evidence of BWS to support a defence of loss of control, the fact that these 
women can still present themselves as battered means that they are also labelled as 
victims. The image of helplessness associated with a battered woman has promoted 
‘[a] collective understanding of the battered woman as a person whose identity is 
predominantly that of a victim.’19 Indeed, the labelling of these women as victims sits 
well with gender discourse, particularly the idea that women are ‘[s]ubject to control 
at the hands of their partners and a patriarchal society.’20 Therefore it is submitted 
that in order for a woman to present herself as battered, even if not suffering from 
BWS, requires her to conform to gender discourse surrounding appropriate 
femininity.  
Indeed, it is clear that a woman’s gendered behaviour is still on trial both 
when she commits a crime generally, and more specifically, when she murders her 
husband.21 Therefore, a battered woman must present herself as a faithful and 
devoted wife and mother and must react passively and pathologically to violence 
from her partner.22 Women who conform to such appropriate gendered behaviour 
are viewed as “true” victims of domestic violence within legal and societal discourse. 
Women who do not conform are not really battered and are therefore ‘[u]ndeserving 
                                                          
19 Noh et al., 2010, p.113 
20 Shaw, Margaret “Conceptualising Violence by Women,” in Dobash, R Emerson, Dobash, Russell P, 
Noaks, Lesley (Eds), Gender and Crime (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995) p.120  
21 Norrie, 2010, p.277  
22 Sanghvi and Nicolson, 1993, p.735  
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viragos.’23 This therefore suggests that not only do battered women have to conform 
to appropriate feminine behaviour generally, but they must also conform to the 
appropriate behaviour expected of a battered woman.  
The appropriate behaviour expected of a battered woman is often linked to 
the concept of learned helplessness, the ‘[m]ost prominent component’24 of BWS. 
Indeed, as was noted by Ferraro, this concept of learned helplessness established the 
notion that certain characteristics, such as strength and assertiveness, were 
inconsistent with battered women.25 Based on this analogy viragos are not really 
battered because they ‘[f]ight back’,26 thus reflecting the label of victim used to 
describe battered women.  
This suggestion that women must conform both to appropriate standards of 
femininity as well as the behaviour expected of a battered woman is supported in 
case law. The cases of Ahluwalia,27 Thornton and Humphreys demonstrate the 
dichotomy existing in constructions of battered women who kill depending on the 
perceptions of their behaviours. Although all three of these cases were decided 
under the old common law defence of provocation and before the introduction of 
the defence of loss of control, they nevertheless continue to successfully illustrate 
the requirement that battered women must be present themselves as victims or 
                                                          
23 Radford, 1993, p.195 
24 Ferraro, Kathleen, “The Words Change, But the Melody Lingers: The Persistence of the Battered 
Woman Syndrome in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women” Violence against Women 9, 1, (2003), 
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25 Ferraro, 2003, p.115   
26 Radford, 1993, p.195  
27 R v Ahluwalia [1993] 96 Cr. App. R. 133 
 177 
alternatively face being viewed as undeserving viragos. Indeed, in each of these cases 
the women are constructed differentially within judicial and criminal legal discourse. 
In R v Ahluwalia28 the appellant, Kiranjit Ahluwalia, had suffered years of 
abuse and humiliation at the hands of her husband. One evening after he threatened 
to beat her if she did not give him money to pay a telephone bill and threatened to 
burn her face with a hot iron if she did not leave him alone, Ahluwalia threw petrol 
on her husband’s bedding whilst he was asleep and set it alight.  He suffered severe 
burns and died several days later. At trial, Ahluwalia was convicted of murder and 
given a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. She appealed on numerous 
grounds relating to the issue of provocation. The judgment handed down by the 
Court of Appeal clearly constructed Ahluwalia as a victimised, meek and abused 
woman. This is demonstrated by the fact that ‘[4]1 out of 100 lines describing Kiranjit 
Ahluwalia’s story were devoted to her “many years of violence and humiliation.’29 
The judgment utilised a victim-based narrative throughout as well as constructing 
her actions in relation to appropriate femininity. Lord Taylor CJ, giving judgment for 
the Court, referred to the case as being a ‘tragic’ one30, noting that Ahluwalia had 
‘[s]uffered violence and abuse from the deceased from the outset of the marriage’,31 
and focusing in some detail on some of the injuries, both physical and psychological, 
which she had sustained over the course of the marriage.32 He also made particular 
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31 Ahluwalia, 1993, p.135 
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bones and being knocked unconscious, as well as the fact that she attempted suicide on several 
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reference to the difference in physical build between Ahluwalia and her deceased 
husband; ‘he was a big man; she is slight’,33 thus reinforcing the construction of 
Ahluwalia as vulnerable and meek. Her construction and thus status as a ‘true’ 
battered woman and victim was re-affirmed and thus cemented in the following 
paragraph taken from Lord Taylor CJ’s judgment: 
The state of humiliation and loss of self-esteem to which the deceased’s 
behaviour over the 10 years of the marriage had reduced her, is evidence by a 
letter she wrote him after he left her for three days about April 1989 … In the 
course of begging him to come back to her and to grant her 10 minutes to talk 
it over, she made a number of self-denying promises of the most abject kind: 
“Deepak, if you come back I promise you – I won’t touch black coffee again, I 
won’t go to town every week, I won’t eat green chilli, I’m  ready to leave 
Chandikah and all my friends, I won’t go near Der Goodie Mohan’s house 
again, even I am not going to attend Bully’s wedding, I eat too much or all the 
time so I can get fat, I won’t laugh if you don’t like, I won’t dye my hair even, I 
don’t go to my neighbour’s house, I won’t ask you for any help.”34 
Although a lengthy paragraph to quote, this clearly highlights the acceptance and re-
construction by the Court of Ahluwalia’s victim status. By quoting from this letter 
sent by Ahluwalia it also illustrates her ‘[c]onformity with the attributes of passive 
                                                          
33 Ahluwalia, 1993, p.135 
34 Ahluwalia, 1993, p.135 
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femininity … Until the night she killed him, [Ahluwalia] is shown as reacting passively 
and pathologically to Deepak’s violence …’35 
 In the case of R v Humphreys,36 Emma Humphreys was, much like Ahluwalia 
constructed as a battered and abused victim. Humphreys was 17 and living with her 
partner, a 33-year-old man. He had been abusive and beaten her on numerous 
occasions and used some of her earnings from prostitution to fund his lifestyle. On 
the night of the homicide, Humphreys cut her wrists out of fear that her drunken 
partner would force her to engage in sexual activity with him and some of his 
acquaintances. He taunted her about her failure to cut her wrists effectively and 
Humphreys then stabbed and killed him. She was convicted of murder at trial and 
appealed her conviction.  
In the Court of Appeal the judgment delivered by Hirst LJ utilised a narrative 
that constructed Humphreys not just as a battered woman who had been victimised 
by her partner, but also as a woman who was a victim of her life circumstances. 
Indeed, although the abuse she suffered from her partner was acknowledged, this 
formed a very small part of the judgment delivered by the Court. Instead there was a 
focus on Humphreys’ ‘[m]iserable history’37 as it was termed by Hirst LJ. He noted 
how ‘She [had] a very unhappy family background … [and that] both her mother and 
stepfather were alcoholics’,38 thus providing some explanation for her own overuse 
of alcohol and drugs. When she was 16 and left home to work as a prostitute, it was 
noted that she was ‘[p]icked up by  ... Trevor Armitage. He had a predilection for girls 
                                                          
35 Nicolson, 1995, p.193 
36 [1995] 4 All ER 1008 
37 R v Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008, p.1012 
38 Humphreys, 1995, p.1012 
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much younger than himself, had previous convictions for violence, was a drug addict 
and was known to the vice squad …’39 Finally, Hirst LJ noted that ‘[a]nother very 
important and unhappy aspect of her personal history … [was] that she had a strong 
tendency to seek attention …’40 Although these issues could have been utilised to 
demonstrate Humphreys’ deviance from appropriate femininity, they were instead 
used to construct a narrative which reflected her life experiences as a vulnerable and 
victimised young woman.  
 In contrast, in the case of R v Thornton,41 Sara Thornton is constructed as an 
undeserving virago and her status as a battered woman and a victim is called into 
question, before being ultimately denied. Thornton suffered abuse at the hands of 
violent, alcoholic husband. On the evening in question, Thornton’s husband told her 
he wanted her out of the house, called her a whore and threatened to kill her several 
times. She went into the kitchen to calm down and decided she needed some 
protection in case he got violent. Unable to find the truncheon she wanted, she 
picked up a large kitchen knife and went back to speak with her husband. He again 
threatened to kill her and called her a whore. She stabbed him once, deeply, just 
below the ribs, resulting in his death. At trial, Thornton was found guilty of murder 
by the jury, with both the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation 
failing. She appealed on three grounds relating to the defences of diminished 
responsibility and provocation.  
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In the judgment delivered by Beldam LJ in the Court of Appeal, Thornton was 
not constructed as a battered woman or a victim but rather was portrayed as 
behaving just as badly as her abusive husband. Indeed as Nicolson notes, ‘[w]hereas, 
a total of 161 lines were devoted to describing “the facts which led to the deceased’s 
death”, only five dealt directly with his violence and abusive behaviour.’42 Similarly to 
Ahluwalia, there is an acknowledgment that Thornton attempted suicide on several 
occasions, however this is dismissed as a serious issue with the suggestion that ‘[i]t is 
questionable whether she actually intended to take her own life.’43 
Instead, throughout the judgment there was a focus on Thornton’s actions 
and the ways in which she actively reacted to the violence and abuse she suffered, 
thus demonstrating her deviance from the passivity and submissiveness associated 
with appropriate feminine behaviour. Beldam LJ noted how during a row between 
Thornton and her husband she picked up a knife, threatened him with it and said 
‘“You touch my daughter, you bastard and I’ll kill you.”44 He also noted how on the 
evening of the homicide before Thornton went out for a drink she wrote on the 
bedroom mirror in lipstick “Bastard Thornton. I hate you.”45 By focusing on these 
incidents, amongst others, Beldam was able to construct Thornton as an 
underserving virago, as a woman who gave as good as she got and who rejected 
‘[s]ubmissive domesticity [and was instead] aggressive, fickle and devious.’46 The 
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Court ultimately reflected her construction as a deviant woman and undeserving 
virago in the dismissal of her appeal.47 
 The importance of women conforming both to appropriate standards of 
femininity, as well as the behaviour expected of a battered woman, is not only 
relevant in the context of judicial narrative, but also arguably in the context of jury 
decision-making. This is reflected in a study carried out in the United States by 
Russell and Melillo.48 The study involved six hundred and eighteen undergraduate 
students from two St Louis Universities who were presented with actual case 
summaries ‘[t]hat included standard forms of expert testimony modelled after BWS 
evidence.’49 The results support arguments made by Edwards who suggests: 
‘[w]omen are more likely to fit the model of battered woman syndrome where they 
are non-assertive and passive and conform to the legitimate victim stereotype.’50 
Thus battered women who killed and met this model and the associated stereotypes 
were deemed to be more credible in Russell and Melillo’s study and therefore were 
most likely to receive not-guilty verdicts for the charge of homicide. Conversely, 
women who were atypical and actively responded to their partner’s violence were 
viewed as less credible and consequently received more guilty verdicts.51 Labelling 
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The fresh appeal was based on new medical evidence regarding BWS. Counsel for Sara argued that 
her personality disorder and BWS were relevant characteristics to be considered by a jury when 
deciding whether she had been provoked. The Court of Appeal allowed this appeal and ordered a re-
trial where her murder conviction was quashed. 
48 Russell, Brenda L., and Melillo, Linda S., “Attitudes towards battered women who kill: Defendant 
typicality and judgments of culpability” Criminal Justice and Behaviour 33, (2006), 219, p.219  
49 Russell and Melillo, 2006, p.223  
50 Edwards, 1996, p.252  
51 Although this study was carried out in the United States and is more applicable to workings of the 
American Legal System the study is relevant to the discussion in this chapter and the results provide 
further evidence to support the arguments being made. 
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battered women who kill as victims presumes that they are so oppressed that they 
are powerless and as a result they will be non-violent. However when battered 
women do become violent, resulting in the death of their abusive partner, the label 
of victim offers an explanation for their actions.  
 
5.1.2 Diminished Responsibility—Battered Women Who Kill As Mad 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 also amended the defence of diminished 
responsibility. The wording of the current definition of diminished responsibility 
differs considerably from that which was found in the Homicide Act 1957. In short, 
“abnormality of the mind” has been replaced with “abnormality of mental 
functioning”, there is a requirement that the abnormality “arose from a recognised 
medical condition”, the abnormality must have substantially impaired the abilities of 
the defendant as listed in Section 1(1A)52 and the abnormality must have been a 
significant causal factor in the defendants’ actions.53 Despite these changes, the 
Ministry of Justice in its Impact Assessment of the 2009 Act noted that they did not 
think there would be any impact on the type of cases able to use diminished 
responsibility, on the Courts or on the prison population.54 Despite the government’s 
assertions that the 2009 Act will have little impact, it is suggested that there is 
                                                          
52 The Coroners and Justice Act, 2009 section 52(1)(1A) states: those things are – (a) to understand the 
nature of D’s conduct; (b) to form a rational judgment; (c) to exercise self-control  
53 For a discussion on the reasoning behind these changes see; The Law Commission, “Murder, 
Manslaughter and Infanticide,” Law Com No 304, 2006, available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc304_Murder_Manslaughter_and_Infanticide_Report.pdf ; 
and Mackay, Ronnie, “The Coroners and Justice Act 2009—Partial Defences to Murder (2): The new 
Diminished Responsibility Plea” Criminal Law Review 4, (2010), 290  
54 Mackay, 2010, p.301  
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potential for impact in cases where BWS is adduced to support the plea of 
diminished responsibility.  
The main impact of the change in the law of diminished responsibility on 
battered women who kill their abusive partners is the requirement that the 
abnormality of mental functioning must arise from ‘[a] recognised medical 
condition.’55 The Ministry of Justice have made it clear that this phrase will cover 
both psychological and physical conditions and therefore is not just ‘[l]imited to 
recognised mental disorders.’56 Consequently this concept covers more than was 
previously covered in the un-amended Homicide Act 1957. Although there is yet to 
be a reported case of BWS being used to support the amended defence of 
diminished responsibility, it is submitted that evidence of BWS can now be more 
easily used to satisfy this particular requirement within the amended defence. As 
long as the jury is satisfied that the woman suffering from BWS and the killing of her 
abusive partner are sufficiently connected, the defence should succeed. When 
discussing the requirement of a connection, the Attorney General explained that the 
abnormality of mental functioning does not need to be the most significant cause of 
the behaviour but that it must be more than a trivial factor.57 
The use of BWS evidence to support a plea of diminished responsibility 
simultaneously reflects and reinforces some of the gender stereotypes surrounding 
women. Indeed, a study on cases of diminished responsibility highlighted that: 
‘reports written for male defendants in which this plea was possible indicate the 
                                                          
55 The Homicide Act 1957 section 2(1)(a), as amended by The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
56 Mackay, 2010, p.294   
57 Mackay, 2010, p.298 
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readiness with which they were created as “monsters” or “madmen”, yet 
simultaneously capable of intending their behaviour, since men are to be understood 
in terms of what they do.’58 This could be contrasted with the treatment received by 
female defendants, who were ‘[m]ore readily constructed as “normal women”’59 and 
therefore they were more likely to experience diminished responsibility than their 
male counterparts. The explanation put forward for this discrepancy in the treatment 
of men and women when pleading diminished responsibility was based on gender 
stereotypes, that is to say that women are acted upon; they do not act themselves or 
make their own choices.60 The overwhelming conclusion of the study, as noted by 
Walklate, was that: ‘[w]hen psychiatry and the law interact, the resultant effect is 
that men are, for the most part, attributed with a sense of agency and responsibility 
for their actions, whereas women defendants are denied this.’61  
This labelling of battered women who kill as mad when using evidence of 
BWS to support a plea of diminished responsibility is also reflected in the theory of 
BWS itself. The use of the term “syndrome” within the name BWS is indicative of a 
psychological disorder. As Edwards explains the term battered woman syndrome 
suggests ‘[s]omething more akin to an intrinsic condition of mental illness or 
disorder, rather than an acquired response, the result of the long term consequences 
of violent abuse, on the perceptions and judgment of the victim.’62 Consequently the 
utilisation of BWS evidence when pleading diminished responsibility pathologises the 
                                                          
58 Walklate, Sandra, Gender, Crime and Criminal Justice (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, second ed, 
2004) p.180 
59 Walklate, 2004, p.180  
60 Walklate, 2004, p.180   
61 Walklate, 2004, p.180  
62 Edwards, 1996, pp.227-228   
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actions of battered women who kill and reinforces the construction of women as 
irrational beings, as well as reflecting what Edwards refers to as ‘[l]aw’s typification 
of women who kill.’63  
Moreover utilising evidence of BWS in cases of women who kill requires the 
introduction of medical professionals, such as psychiatrists, into the courtroom, thus 
further reinforcing the medicalisation and pathologisation of BWS and the women 
who make use of it.64 It is clear then that by adopting syndrome language it 
contributes ‘[t]o an image of battered women as psychologically defective or 
pathological.’65 Adopting such language in the context of battered women who kill 
their abusive partners also sits nicely with the construction of femininity where 
women are represented in terms of their bodies and its perceived shortcomings. 
Many commentators have correctly noted that the inclusion of evidence of 
BWS in a plea of diminished responsibility can result in women being sentenced 
more leniently. Rather than being imprisoned, if a female defendant successfully 
pleads diminished responsibility she may receive long-term psychiatric treatment.66 
Consequently, although BWS may be of benefit to some women offenders by 
offering an explanation for their actions, ‘[B]WS obviously works within the 
stereotype of women as “crazy.”’67 It is possible of course, that many female 
defendants will not care how they are stereotyped, as long as the result is a more 
lenient sentence. However others will care and ‘[w]ill undoubtedly perceive it to be 
                                                          
63 Edwards, 1996, p.231  
64 Edwards, 1996, p.231  
65 Ferraro, 2003, p.112  
66 Radford, 1993, p.192 
67 Naylor, Bronwyn, “Women’s Crime and Media Coverage,” in Dobash, R Emerson, Dobash, Russell P, 
Noaks, Lesley (Eds), Gender and Crime (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995) p.87  
 187 
deeply insulting to be told that, unless they accept a label of psychological 
abnormality, they run the risk of escaping the prison of domestic violence only to 
spend a long time in a less metaphorical prison.’68 Moreover, although such 
gendered stereotyping can work for individual battered women to ensure short-term 
advantages such as more lenient sentences, ‘[c]enturies of experiences should have 
taught us that the overall outcome … is invariably the reinforcement of inequality, 
inferiority, and disadvantage’69, largely reflected in the reinforcement of pervasive 
feminine gender stereotypes.  
Therefore, although introducing evidence of BWS to support a plea of 
diminished responsibility may result in sentencing benefits for women who kill, it 
also ensures that gender stereotypes surrounding women’s mental health remain 
firmly entrenched. Moreover, introducing evidence of BWS does not aid the 
successful use of the justification defence of self-defence, which is arguably the most 
appropriate defence for women who kill their abusive partners. Indeed, introducing 
evidence of BWS and thereby addressing the woman’s perceived pejorative 
psychological state actually undermines any use of self-defence.70 Consequently 
utilising evidence of BWS to support a plea of diminished responsibility provides an 
explanation for both society and the criminal justice system when a woman murders 
her abusive partner, namely that she did so because she was mad. Using this 
explanation of madness fails to acknowledge that battered women who kill were 
acting in justifiable self-defence. Indeed, labelling a battered woman who kills her 
                                                          
68 Sanghvi and Nicolson, 1993, p.737  
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abusive partner as mad is in contrast to the feminist jurisprudence model which 
‘[e]xplains the battered woman who kills as … a rational individual who defended 
herself under reasonable life-threatening circumstances.’71  
From the above it is clear the evidence of BWS was historically used in 
relation to both the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation. With the 
recent amendments to the law it appears that the form of BWS commonly used will 
still be utilised to support the defence of diminished responsibility, with the new 
defence of loss of control requiring women to at least present themselves as 
battered, if not using evidence of BWS. As a result women who plead loss of control 
and present evidence that they were battered are labelled as victims, whereas 
women who use evidence of BWS to support a plea of diminished responsibility are 
labelled as mad. It is clear that the use of both the labels, victim and mad, ‘[a]lways 
actively shift the emphasis from the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions to her 
personality in a way which confirms existing gender stereotypes [and] silences 
battered women.’72  
 
5.2 Infanticide — the Mad Woman 
Throughout history, a common response to female violence has been to 
medicalise and pathologise women’s behaviour, reflecting the gendered construction 
of women as inherently irrational, mentally deranged and controlled by their raging 
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hormones.73 Lombroso and Ferrero were amongst the first proponents of 
pathologising female offenders’ behaviour. Their work on the female criminal 
concluded that as a result of their biological make-up, women were less highly 
developed than men and therefore they were less likely to commit crime. They 
stated that women were ‘[m]ore primitive, the consequence of which was that they 
have less scope for degeneration.’74 The female criminal was therefore labelled as 
“abnormal” and “pathological”. Lombroso and Ferrero’s work has subsequently been 
universally criticised.75 However, both society and the law continue to locate 
women’s criminality within the “psy” discourses, with more recent studies of female 
criminals finding that they are psychologically disturbed and unstable.76 This is 
particularly the case for female killers, especially for women who kill their children. 
The pathologisation of these women is demonstrated by the offence/defence of 
infanticide for women who kill their young children. 
The Infanticide Act 1938 repealed and re-enacted, with modifications, the 
provisions of the Infanticide Act 1922. The introduction of the Infanticide Act was the 
result of ‘[a] policy decision to promote leniency for women who kill their own 
children.’77 Section one of the Act states:  
Where a woman by any wilful act or omission causes the death of her child, 
being a child under the age of twelve months, but at the time of the act or 
                                                          
73 Wilczynski, Ania, “Mad or bad? Child-killers, gender and the courts” British Journal of Criminology, 
37, 3,  (1997), 419, p.425  
74 Newburn, 2007, p.301  
75 Hansford Johnson, Pamela, On Iniquity—Some Personal Reflections Arising out of the Moors Murder 
Trial (London: MacMillan, 1967) p.21 
76 Jones, Ann, Women Who Kill (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of New York, 2009) 
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77 Ogle, Robbin and Maier-Katkin, Daniel, “A rationale for infanticide law” Criminal Law Review, 
(December 1993), 903, p.911 
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omission the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having 
fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the 
effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child, then, 
notwithstanding that the circumstances were such that but for this Act the 
offence would have amounted to murder, she shall be guilty of felony, to wit 
of infanticide, and may for such offence be dealt with and punished as if she 
had been guilty of the offence of manslaughter of the child.78 
Before a more detailed discussion of infanticide takes place, it is essential to note 
several particulars about the Infanticide Act, as outlined above. Firstly, women can 
plead infanticide as their defence, as well as being convicted of the offence of 
infanticide. To maintain cohesion and clarity within this chapter, the word “offence” 
will be used when discussing infanticide. Secondly, the offence of infanticide is only 
available to the biological mother of the child who has been killed. Thirdly, the age 
limit of the victim is set at 12 months, and finally ‘it is the only offence known in 
English law for which a pre-condition is the possession of an abnormal mental 
state.’79  
The offence of infanticide provides a clear example of the assumed 
‘[u]nderlying pathological nature of mothers who kill their children.’80 This is 
reflected in the legal basis for the plea of infanticide: puerperal psychosis. Puerperal 
psychosis is; ‘[a] relatively rare and severe mental disorder which affects one or two 
out of every 1,000 women within the first few weeks of childbirth. The symptoms 
                                                          
78 The Infanticide Act 1938, section 1(1) 
79 Mahendra, B., “Whither infanticide?” New Law Journal 156, (2006), 664, p.664 
80 Morris, Allison, and Wilcyznski, Ania, “Rocking the Cradle—Mothers Who Kill Their Children” in 
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span a number of categories of psychosis … from mania to delusions to acute 
depression.’81 Despite puerperal psychosis in theory being required to convict a 
woman of infanticide, it ‘[i]s very rarely the cause of a mother killing her child. 
Estimates are that this occurs in around five cases a year.’82 As a result, in practice 
the requirement of puerperal psychosis is interpreted far more liberally, often to 
include any sort of mental illness. However, research cited by Morris and Wilczynski 
also suggests that ‘[a]bout half of the women who ... are convicted of infanticide are 
not suffering from any identifiable mental disorder at all.’83 Statistics such as these 
demonstrate that women are being convicted of infanticide and having their actions 
pathologised despite not satisfying the required criteria.  
Women who are convicted of infanticide but are not suffering from a mental 
disorder are therefore routinely being labelled as mad without having any evidence 
to support such an assertion. Labelling these women as mad results in psychiatric 
treatment and stigmatisation as well as reinforcing pathological feminine gender 
stereotypes.84 It is submitted that the reasoning behind convicting women of 
infanticide when they are not suffering from any identifiable mental disorder is that 
it offers an explanation for their actions. In the case of infanticide: she killed her child 
because she was mad. Viewing filicidal women as mentally ill, regardless of whether 
                                                          
81 Morris and Wilcyznski, 1993, pp.206-207  
82 Morris and Wilcyznski, 1993, p.207  
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there is evidence to support such an assertion, reflects gender discourse surrounding 
appropriate femininity, particularly motherhood.85 According to Frigon:  
At the beginning of the twentieth century ... Motherhood was ... constructed 
as “natural” and a consequence of heterosex. As “compulsory motherhood” 
was introduced, it meant more than the imposition of pregnancy and birth 
but also “entry into the nexus of meanings and behaviours which are deemed 
to constitute proper mothering.”86 
 
The qualities and behaviours which constitute proper mothering are a 
reflection of those which constitute appropriate feminine behaviour, with women 
‘[a]ssumed to be inherently passive, gentle, and tolerant; [similarly] mothers are 
assumed to be nurturing, caring and altruistic.’87 The actions of filicidal women are so 
starkly in contrast with the construction of appropriate motherhood and mothering 
behaviour that an explanation must be sought for their actions. This explanation can 
be found in the form of the Infanticide Act that operates, as noted above, within the 
“psy” discourses. The Act presumes that a woman ‘[m]ust have been “mad” to kill 
her own child.’88 The unthinkable nature of the crime of infanticide and its 
dichotomy to the discourse surrounding appropriate femininity and motherhood 
means that women who kill their children ‘[c]an only be immutably unnatural.’89  
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From the above analysis it is clear that women can be convicted of infanticide 
even if they are not suffering from puerperal psychosis. Frigon highlighted this point 
by acknowledging that: ‘[v]irtually any type of perceived psychiatric, emotional, 
personal or mental problem whatsoever can be interpreted (if the psychiatrists, 
lawyers and/or judges so choose) as the severe mental illness (puerperal psychosis) 
theoretically required for the Infanticide Act.’90 In addition, those women convicted, 
either rightly or wrongly, of infanticide are more likely to be dealt with by psychiatric 
treatment, rather than punitively.91 I would suggest that it is appropriate for those 
women suffering from a genuine and identifiable mental illness to be charged with 
the offence of infanticide and therefore be treated appropriately as a result. 
However, it is arguably troubling to think that women who are not suffering from any 
identifiable mental illness whatsoever are being convicted of infanticide in order to 
offer an explanation for their “unthinkable” actions.  
Convicting a woman of infanticide when she is not suffering from the 
requisite mental illness often results in her being given a non-custodial prison 
sentence at the expense of her being labelled as mad. These women are more likely 
to be given supervisory sentences such as probation orders or psychiatric 
dispositions.92 From this it seems fair to suggest that the Criminal Justice System 
would rather label a filicidal mother as mad, regardless of whether she actually is, in 
order to provide an explanation for her behaviour, than acknowledge her agency 
over her actions. The existence of such a practice within the criminal justice system 
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further entrenches gender stereotypes surrounding women. That is to say that it 
enforces the idea that women are mad generally, but especially when they commit 
murder. 
 
5.3 The Bad Woman  
It must be noted at the outset that “bad” is a word which is used throughout 
the literature and therefore is one which will also be used in this chapter and the 
thesis more broadly. However, it is acknowledged that the use of the word bad to 
label women who kill is problematic, as society would view most criminals as being 
bad people. Therefore, when using the term bad in the context of women who kill 
what is actually being alleged is that these women are perceived as being wicked, an 
“extra element” of bad that goes beyond their actual crime. This extra element of 
bad is as a result of the violation by these women of too many societal and gendered 
norms which cannot be explained through the use of the labels mad or victim. So, for 
example, a woman who kills her child but is not diagnosed with a recognised 
psychological disorder allowing her to be labelled as mad, is labelled as bad. The 
extra element of bad, leading to her being perceived as wicked, is her violation of the 
gendered and societal norm of “good motherhood” for women.93  
It has been shown that if the required conditions are met or even if the facts 
of the case or the behaviour of the woman in question can be moulded to fit the 
                                                          
93 See chapter three, section 3.4.1 for a detailed discussion on the construction of motherhood in the 
context of appropriate femininity. The discourse surrounding bad mothers in the context of women 
who kill is discussed later in this chapter in section 5.3.2. 
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required conditions, then women will be labelled as mad or as victims. However, if 
the actions of the female killer and her background cannot be moulded in such a way 
as to fit either label, then another explanation for her actions must be found. This 
explanation takes the form of labelling her as bad. The distinction between good and 
bad women is not a new one. In their work on the female born criminal, ‘[L]ombroso 
and Ferrero defined distinctive sub-species of women as “good” and “bad.”’94 
Indeed, the dichotomy between good and bad women is not only found within 
academic work but can also be seen in literature, art and the media more widely.95 It 
therefore becomes clear that there is a trend to label female killers as bad when 
their actions cannot be explained utilising the other labels discussed earlier in the 
chapter.  
‘“[B]ad” women are cold, selfish and are “non-women” or masculine or even 
monsters.’96 This can be contrasted with so-called good women who, according to 
Pollack: ‘[a]re conventional socially and morally and if they do transgress it is in 
ladylike and peculiarly feminine ways.’97 The immediate difference between so-
called good and bad women is the way in which their lifestyle and behaviour either 
does or does not accord with appropriate feminine behaviour as dictated by gender 
discourse. A similar principle applies to women who kill. Although these women can, 
for obvious reasons, never be labelled as good, if their homicidal behaviour and 
lifestyle more generally cannot be explained by labelling them as mad or as a victim, 
and they have the requisite extra element of badness, then the only other 
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explanation on offer for their actions is quite simply that they are “inherently bad”. 
Bad women are often sub-categorised into particular types of bad women. These 
categories include, but are not limited to, women who kill who display sexually 
deviant behaviour and women who kill who are considered to be bad mothers. 
 
5.3.1 Sexually Deviant Women  
Women who kill and also display what is regarded as sexually deviant  
behaviour are often labelled as bad. Labelling women as bad for this reason 
demonstrates an attempt by both society and the law to regulate female sexuality.98 
Historically, women were harshly judged if they challenged the norms surrounding 
appropriate female sexuality of chasteness, passivity, modesty and monogamy.99 
Similar ideals are still expected of women today: women must still conform to what 
is considered to be appropriate sexual behaviour. In other words they must not have 
too many sexual partners and they must engage in the “right kind” of sex. Moreover, 
there is still the view that having children should be women’s ultimate fulfilment.100 
Linked to this is the idea that women’s relationships should be heterosexual, with 
women engaging in lesbian relationships considered to be especially deviant, as 
female homosexuality is considered to be ‘[s]everely at odds with the contemporary 
normative ideal of marriage and motherhood for women.’101 Consequently it is clear 
that women can be labelled as sexually deviant if they are sexually promiscuous, too 
sexually adventurous or are not involved in heterosexual relationships. 
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Many feminist criminologists have argued that patriarchy requires that 
women who are considered to be sexually deviant must be controlled. Heidensohn 
has noted that the law, particularly the criminal law, is the main control mechanism 
in this context. She has suggested that the law controls female sexuality in four ways: 
1. The courts operate a “double standard” with respect to sexual behaviour, 
controlling and punishing girls, but not boys for premature and promiscuous 
sexual activities. 
2. The courts—and probation officers and social workers—“sexualise” normal 
female delinquency and thus over-dramatise the offence and the risk. 
3. “Wayward” girls can come into care and thence into stigmatising 
institutions without ever having committed an actual offence. 
4. Deviant women … that is, women who do not conform to accepted 
standards of monogamous, heterosexual stability with children, are over-
represented amongst women in prison because the courts are excessively 
punitive to them.102  
 
Drawing upon Heidensohn’s theory, I suggest that women whose sexuality 
requires regulation by the criminal law are considered to be bad women. The 
behaviour of these sexually deviant, bad women is oppositional to that of good 
women, whose sexuality does not need to be controlled by the law. Consequently, 
female killers who demonstrate sexual deviancy when committing their crimes, or 
indeed demonstrate it within their lifestyle more generally, are most certainly bad 
and must therefore be controlled through punishment. Not only have they offended 
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against appropriate feminine behaviour by being murderers, they have also offended 
against appropriate female sexuality through demonstrating sexually deviant 
behaviour. Therefore, the only label considered to be suitable for such women is 
bad. 
The cases of the female serial killers Myra Hindley and Rosemary West are 
examples of female killers who also demonstrated sexual deviancy and were 
consequently labelled as bad women. Although these women were convicted in 1966 
and 1995 respectively, the infamy of their cases means that they are both still 
regularly mentioned in the media, as well as frequenting academic research.103 
Therefore an analysis of their cases is particularly relevant to this thesis. Moreover, 
the cases of both women are representative of the pervasive and enduring narratives 
that surround women who kill who are labelled as bad.  
Myra Hindley, along with her partner Ian Brady, murdered104 five children in 
and around Manchester between 1963 and 1965. However, she was only tried and 
found guilty of the murder of two of these children, Edward Evans and Lesley Ann 
Downey, and as an accessory in the murder of John Kilbride.105 The evidence against 
Hindley was compelling. The body of Edward Evans was found in Brady and Hindley’s 
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house after David Smith, Hindley’s brother-in-law, witnessed his murder and 
reported it to the police. The police also found pictures of Lesley Ann Downey and a 
tape recording of the murder of the young girl, on which Hindley’s voice could clearly 
be heard telling the young girl to “shut up” when Lesley Ann pleaded with her to let 
her go home.106 Pictures taken of Hindley crouched over the grave of John Kilbride 
on the Moors were also found.  
Following her conviction and imprisonment, Hindley confessed to some 
involvement in the murders for which she was convicted as well as involvement in 
the murders of two other children; Pauline Reade and Keith Bennett.107  However, it 
is interesting to note that the most that Hindley ever confessed to was her 
involvement in the planning and abduction of the victims, insisting that it was Brady 
who actually committed the sexual assaults and murders.108 During Hindley’s trial the 
prosecution sexualised all of her relationships even if they were not sexual in nature. 
For example, the friendship that she had with ‘[h]er young neighbour Pat Hodges, 
[was described] as giving her “a kick”, “certain enjoyment” and “morbid 
satisfaction.”’109 Before, during and after her trial, the media made much of Hindley’s 
deviant sexuality: the fact that she engaged in sadistic sexual behaviour with her 
partner in crime, Ian Brady, that she allowed him to take pornographic photographs 
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of her110 and that once she was in prison she began a lesbian love affair with one of 
the female prison wardens.111 
Similarly, in the case of Rosemary West, the judge used his summing up to 
condemn her deviant sexuality. West was found guilty of the murder of ten girls and 
young women, including her sixteen year old daughter, in 1995. These crimes were 
alleged to have been committed alongside her husband Fred. However, he 
committed suicide before the trial began and therefore West became the sole 
defendant. It has been observed that; ‘in British legal history, at least, there has 
never been a murder trial like that of Rosemary West.’112 Indeed, the only other 
witnesses to the murders of the young women were dead. 113 The case was based on 
the discovery of the victim’s bodies which were found buried in and around homes 
which were inhabited by the Wests.114 Evidence was also heard from a number of 
women who claimed that they had been sexually abused by West as well as other 
witnesses who described the way she abused her children, her prostitution and her 
brutal sexuality. 
In the judge’s summing up West was labelled a prostitute and was described 
as being either bisexual or a lesbian. The judge also noted that she; ‘[p]ossessed a 
collection of dildos, rubber underwear, pornographic videos, a rice flail, and a whip 
                                                          
110 Mail Online, “The Making of Myra Hindley Part 4: Her obsession with Ian Brady” (20 February 
2007), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-436975/The-Making-Myra-Part-4-Her-
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available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-468630/Unmasked-nun-Myra-Hindleysgay-
lover.html  
112 French, 1996, p.29 
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and a suitcase which contained a quantity of leather straps and buckles.’115 This 
collection of sex toys was depicted as solely belonging to West, despite the fact that it 
could have just as easily belonged to both her and her husband. In fact it is submitted 
that it should not have mattered who they belonged to, as their existence had limited 
legal relevance, despite the judge suggesting otherwise. Media reports and academic 
writing on West and her crimes also highlighted her sexual deviance, particularly her 
sexual relationships with other women116 and the sexual abuse she inflicted on her 
own children.117 Therefore it is suggested that a significant part of West’s 
‘[p]ersecution was primarily based on her sexual crimes and her violent, debauched 
sexuality, thereby contravening the strictest social taboos of “normal” 
heterosexuality.’118  
More recently, the case of female serial killer Joanne Dennehy has 
demonstrated the discourse of deviant sexuality found in the cases of some women 
who kill who are labelled as bad. In February 2014 Dennehy pled and was found 
guilty of murdering three men in ten days, as well as the attempted murder of two 
others. She was tried alongside three men who had assisted her in dumping the 
bodies in remote areas in the hope that they would not be found. In his sentencing 
remarks Mr Justice Spencer highlighted Dennehy’s deviant sexuality, noting she had 
a ‘[s]adistic lust for blood’ and how she had ‘sexually whetted’ the appetite of her 
third victim, Kevin Lee, by ‘[t]elling him … [she was] going to dress him up and rape 
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him.’119 Attention was also drawn to the fact that Dennehy had dressed Lee up in 
one of her black sequinned dresses and then disposed of his body wearing the dress, 
deliberately positioning it so that his bare buttocks were exposed.120 The judge 
explicitly referred to the ‘[s]exual and sadistic …’121 conduct exhibited by Dennehy 
during Lee’s murder when considering an appropriate sentence. He also 
acknowledged the diagnosis within the psychiatric report of Dennehy suffering from 
‘[p]araphilia sadomasochism, a disorder of preference for sexual activity involving 
the infliction of pain or humiliation or bondage’122 as well as other psychiatric 
disorders.  
 
Despite being diagnosed with numerous psychiatric and personality disorders, 
Dennehy’s guilty plea, her sexual deviance and her failure to put forward any partial 
defence to murder based upon her psychiatric conditions meant that it was the label 
of bad, rather than mad which was attached to her. This construction and label of 
bad attached to Dennehy was reaffirmed by Mr Justice Spencer when he stated that 
her personality and psychiatric disorders did not afford any mitigation.123 Dennehy 
was sentenced to life imprisonment with a whole life order, the first female killer to 
be handed such an order by a judge rather than by the Home Secretary, thus 
reflecting the seriousness of her crimes and her label as a bad woman.  
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5.3.2 Bad Mothers 
Another subcategory of bad women is that of bad mothers. Women who kill 
their children are routinely considered to be bad mothers if the specifics of their case 
cannot be moulded in such a way to allow them to utilise the plea of infanticide. 
These women are bad because not only have they committed murder, they have 
murdered their own child, thereby demolishing the construction of motherhood for 
women. An example of this is the case of Susan Poole,124 who allowed her son to 
starve to death. Despite suffering from depression, she was found culpable for her 
actions. Poole was charged alongside her partner, Frederick Scott, with the murder 
by starvation of her 10-month-old son, Dean. She pled guilty to manslaughter on the 
grounds of diminished responsibility. At trial, four psychiatrists and one doctor gave 
evidence that Poole was suffering from a personality disorder and severe depressive 
illness at the time she committed the offence.125 However, at the time of the trial 
Susan had made a substantial recovery from her psychological disorder(s).  
The judge also portrayed her as a bad mother: ‘when one thinks of the 
extraordinary maternal sacrifice and care shown by lower animals, one has to 
wonder at her apparent selfishness.’126 Despite a probation order with the 
requirement of mental treatment being recommended, the judge instead sentenced 
Poole to seven years imprisonment.127 She successfully appealed against her 
sentence and it was reduced to five years. When considering her appeal, the Court of 
                                                          
124 The case of Susan Poole was chosen for analysis due to the “bad mother” narrative which is 
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Appeal concluded ‘[t]hat a sentence of seven years was excessive in all the 
circumstances of this case. There was the appellant’s unstable background, her age, 
her previous good character and her plea of guilty.’128 They also noted that her 
depression accelerated rapidly and ‘[t]hat it played a very substantial part’129 in 
Dean’s death. However, the Court clearly still felt that Poole needed punishing for 
her actions. They agreed with the trial judge’s verdict on her responsibility, as well as 
refusing to issue the recommended probation order with mental treatment instead 
of the continuation of her prison sentence. Therefore, it is reasonable to infer that 
the Court of Appeal also felt that Poole was a bad mother and deserved 
imprisonment.130 Indeed, as was noted by Morris and Wilczynski: ‘it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that it was the negative portrayal of her as a woman and as a 
mother which was the determining factor in her treatment within the criminal justice 
system.’131 
The reasoning behind the labelling of filicidal women as bad when they either 
fail in pleading, or cannot utilise the plea of, infanticide is a consequence of society’s 
construction of motherhood. The status of women, both socially and legally is 
determined by motherhood.132 Women are not only expected to be mothers, but 
more specifically they are expected to be good mothers: 
The single defining characteristic of iconic good motherhood is self-
abnegation. Her children’s needs come first; their health and happiness are 
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her primary concern. They occupy all her thoughts, her day is constructed 
around them, and anything and everything she does is for their sakes. Her 
own needs, ambitions, and desires are relevant only in relation to theirs. If a 
good mother takes care of herself, it is only to the extent that she doesn’t 
hurt her children.133 
When mothers do not meet these standards of behaviour without a reasonable and 
rational explanation, they are labelled as bad mothers. This dichotomy between 
‘“[g]ood” and “bad” mothers serves as a means of patrolling, controlling and 
reinforcing the boundaries of behaviour considered “appropriate” for ALL women 
and mothers.’134 Those women who fail to meet the standards of good motherhood 
are labelled and constructed as deviant or criminal.135 Consequently the law often 
treats mothers who commit crimes against their children, without the explanation of 
suffering from a recognised mental disorder, harshly for violating the traditional 
gendered role.  
Bad women are considered to be ‘[e]specially difficult to construct in relation 
to acceptable performances of femininity.’136 This is in contrast to those women 
whose homicidal actions are explained by labelling them as mad or as victims, 
concepts regularly associated with femininity, and who are therefore more 
recognisably feminine. Consequently, female killers who are constructed as bad, 
either because they are sexually deviant or because they are bad mothers, are 
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harshly punished.137 These bad women are viewed as being doubly deviant:138 not 
only have they broken the law but they have also violated appropriate gender 
behaviour. They are punished more formally and severely than women whose 
behaviour can be more readily constructed in relation to appropriate femininity and 
who often benefit from more informal means of social control.139 This harsh 
treatment is particularly true for women who murder either their own or other 
women’s children: ‘these women not only break the law, but by breaking the law 
they transgress their own female nature and their primary social identity as a mother 
or potential mother.’140 
 
5.4 Labelling and Active Denials of Agency 
The labelling of female killers is symbiotic to their active agency denial. That is 
to say, labelling women actively denies the recognition of their ability to choose to 
act in a particular way, and vice versa. More specifically, labelling women who kill as 
mad, bad or victims, actively denies the recognition of their ability to have made the 
choice, however limited or constrained that choice may have been, to kill their 
victims. As noted in the introduction,141 active agency denial is referring to the 
creation of a new identity for women who kill through labelling. So not only do the 
labels attached to women who kill reflect the deviance and gendered constructions 
of these women, but the labelling also creates a new all-consuming identity for them. 
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As such this is, I would argue, a positive act of doing, and is reflected in the use of the 
term active. These labels become the new identities of these women as a result of 
their construction as legal objects.142 All three of the labels used for women who kill 
actively deny the agency of these women in slightly different ways.  
Labelling women who kill as victims actively denies their agency because the 
concepts of agency and victimisation are understood in opposition to, and in the 
absence of, one another. As explained by Mahoney: ‘in our society, agency and 
victimisation are each known by the absence of the other: you are an agent if you are 
not a victim, and you are a victim if you are in no way an agent.’143 Thus when 
women who kill are labelled as victims this becomes their new identity and therefore 
their agency cannot be acknowledged. By using victimology theory when labelling 
women who kill, their responsibility, culpability, and most importantly in the context 
of this thesis, their agency is actively denied. Whilst this approach is ‘[u]ndeniably 
often successful in securing reduced sentences, the disadvantages of such a strategy 
outweigh the benefits in terms of improving general societal attitudes to, and 
challenging negative myths and stereotypes of, women.’144  
This active denial of women’s agency when invoking the victim label can be 
seen in the discourse surrounding battered women who kill. Battered women are 
just that: battered. Therefore they are not seen to act, let alone to have made the 
choice to act, they are merely the products of their battering partner.145 The 
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utilisation of the phrase battered women who kill serves to reinforce the active 
agency denial of such women because ‘the woman herself is neatly elided by the 
clash of the terms “battered” and “kill.”’146 Labelling battered women who kill as 
victims and foregoing their agency not only makes it easier to control them, but 
perhaps more importantly, it ensures the maintenance of the appropriate gender 
behaviour status quo. Indeed, as noted by Morrissey: 
The campaign to allow BWS evidence into court may well have begun with 
the best of intentions, then, but the theory now seems to fast be becoming a 
straitjacket which tries to confine the realities of battered women and 
domestic violence within rigid parameters which do little to challenge 
society’s or the law’s understanding of spousal abuse, women’s violence, 
female agency and femininity itself.147 
Women killers labelled as mad when pleading infanticide or using BWS 
evidence to support a plea of diminished responsibility, have their crime 
acknowledged but their agency actively denied. Indeed within the law more 
generally, the utilisation of pathological discourses often does not recognise the 
ability of an individual to choose how to act for themselves. For example, under the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 ‘[a] person lacks capacity in relation to a matter if … he is 
unable to make a decision for himself in relation to the matter because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.’148  
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The use of “psy” discourses presents women who kill labelled as mad ‘[a]s not 
intending the deed, as not knowing or understanding that they are committing it, as 
experiencing nothing in relation to it.’149 Using the mad label for these women relies 
on the discourse of irrationality and weakness that is readily associated with 
femininity. Thus, by focusing on the influence of women’s mental state or their 
biological functions and constructing a new identity which reflects the mad label, the 
agency of these women is actively denied, rendering them harmless. This denial of 
agency for filicidal women labelled as mad is reflected in sentencing. ‘[O]f the 49 
women convicted of infanticide between 1989 and 2000, only two were jailed; the 
rest were given probation, supervision or hospital orders.’150 As explained by 
Wilczynski, this lenient sentencing reflects the belief that filicidal killings by women 
who plead infanticide are ‘[a]bherrant “tragedies” for which they are not responsible 
... they need “help to come to terms with” what they have done.’151 
Labelling women who kill as bad actively denies their agency in a subtly 
different way to constructing them as victims or as mad does. The agency of bad 
women is actively denied by transforming the woman’s identity into a monstrous, 
mythical, evil being, thus rejecting and removing her humanity. Therefore, ‘the 
agency denial which takes place in this technique is specifically that of human 
agency. The murderess is considered to have acted, but not as a human woman.’152 
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As explained by Morrissey, a murderous woman labelled as bad is ‘[n]ot just 
monsterised but transformed into the living embodiment of mythic evil through her 
relation to figures traditionally interpreted in this way.’153 Therefore her agency as a 
human and as a woman is denied, with any agency that she is afforded being that of 
an inhuman mythic creature. Bad women who kill do not have human agency.  
The agency denial of Myra Hindley is perhaps most illustrative of this point, 
with her portrayal as the icon of evil and more specifically ‘[t]he feminine face of 
evil.’154 As a result she was considered not only to lack femininity and be beyond 
womanhood, but also to be non-human, thus being placed ‘[i]nto a realm of mythical 
monstrosity.’155 Indeed writing on Hindley continually utilises the monster imagery 
and identity to describe her, with headlines such as: ‘Myra Hindley, the Moors 
Monster, dies’,156 ‘The Monster Body of Myra Hindley’,157 and descriptions of her as 
being ‘[M]edusa-like.’158 It is clear then that that the vivid dichotomies of the good 
and bad, human and inhuman woman and the continued reference to lack of 
adherence to appropriate femininity combine to actively deny the agency of bad 
women. 
Although I made clear in my methodology that I would not be taking a 
comparative approach to the position of men who kill, in order to prevent the 
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reinforcement of women as the Other,159 it is perhaps necessary here to engage with 
the response to men who kill in order to more clearly illustrate my arguments in 
relation to women who kill labelled as bad. Myra Hindley’s partner in crime, Ian 
Brady, was also labelled as evil and a monster by the media, albeit, less frequently 
than Hindley.160 However, Brady’s status as a man and thus a recognised subject and 
agent meant that when he was labelled as a monster or as evil for his involvement in 
the Moors Murders, these labels did not become his new primary identity. Indeed, as 
a subject and agent Brady was still ultimately constructed as a male, albeit one who 
had participated in a particular heinous and monstrous crime. This can be contrasted 
to the position of his co-offender Hindley, who, as noted above, was labelled as an 
evil monster which became her new primary identity as a result of her status as a 
legal object. Her primary identity changed; it was no longer that of a woman who 
had committed a horrendous crime, but rather a monster.  
Similarly to Ian Brady, Derrick Bird, who killed 12 people and injured 11 others 
on a shooting spree before killing himself, did not have his primary identity replaced 
with another. Although he was labelled as a ‘crazed killer’161 and a ‘mass killer’162, 
these labels did not become his new primary identity. As a man and thus a subject 
and agent, Bird’s primary identity remained as that of a man, albeit one who was 
labelled as a killer because of his crimes.   
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It is clear that each of the labels; mad, bad and victim, deny the agency of 
women who kill in slightly different ways. However, it is submitted that despite these 
slight differences in how these women’s agency is actively denied, there is only 
perhaps one acceptable explanation as to why these agency denials occur. One 
contentious explanation mooted by Morrissey for these continued denials of female 
agency is that female perpetrators of crime, particularly of homicide, are relatively 
rare and therefore it has been unnecessary to consider introducing the concept of 
the reasonable woman, which may have allowed the acknowledgment of women’s 
agency.163 This explanation is difficult to digest, not least because it suggests that as 
women are not “major-players” in the criminal justice system their experience is 
somehow of less importance.  
Another perhaps more realistic explanation also suggested by Morrissey 
reflected on the threat that women killers pose to patriarchal structures and gender 
relations. She explained that by labelling women who kill as victims or as mad, 
‘[t]hen the radical implications of [their] acts are muffled, [their] challenge to 
oppression nullified, at least as far as the dominant purveyors of cultural meaning 
are concerned. [These women are] returned to [their] place of passivity and 
silence.’164 This makes it clear that it is easier to give explanations for the actions of 
homicidal women than it is to recognise their ability to have made the choice to act 
in the way that they did. Indeed, it is certainly arguable that giving women agency 
over their murderous actions would disturb and challenge established gender norms. 
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However, continuing to deny the agency of female murderers arguably presents far 
more serious issues than merely challenging gender stereotypes. 
 
5.5 Problems with Actively Denying the Agency of Women Who Kill 
The discussion on the different labels applied to women who kill 
demonstrates how women who have committed essentially the same crimes as one 
another, that of killing another human being, can be viewed differently depending on 
the construction of their crime, their gender and their sexuality. It has become 
obvious that there is a correlation between the label given to female killers, their 
treatment within the criminal justice system and more broadly the social responses 
to their actions. Despite the differences in the treatment of these women depending 
on how they are labelled, it is clear that all three of the labels actively deny the 
agency of, and are consequently uniformly damaging to, the women they are attached 
to. As noted by Frances Heidensohn: 
What is so striking about all of these images of deviant women is how 
profoundly damaging they are, once attached to any particular woman or 
group of women. Amongst them all, there is no conception of the “normal” 
exuberant delinquency characteristic of males. Any women would be 
damaged by being portrayed as a witch or a whore; and while a “sick” female 
deviant may be less punitively treated, she will attract other stigma.165  
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Indeed, it cannot be denied that using these labels to depict female killers, whether 
using them correctly or not, perpetuates and entrenches feminine gender 
stereotypes within both society and the law. The use of these labels may allow 
individual women, in particular circumstances, to win their battle but they do little to 
allow women to win the war against having to conform to appropriate feminine 
behaviour or asserting their individual agency. 
 
5.5.1 Issues of Justice For Women Who Kill 
Another issue that arises from the use of the above labels and active denials 
of agency is that of justice. That is whether justice is actually being done, or indeed 
whether it can be seen to have been done,166 when female killers are labelled in this 
way and have their agency actively denied. When women commit violent crimes 
more questions are asked of, and simultaneously more explanations are made for, 
the violent actions of these women. This is because women are processed by the 
criminal justice system ‘[i]n accordance with the crimes which they committed and 
the extent to which the commission of the act and its nature deviate from 
appropriate female behaviour.’167 This is particularly the case with women who kill. 
When these women are tried for their crimes there is a focus on their character and 
behaviour and the extent of their deviance from appropriate feminine behaviour.168 
This gendered dimension to the trial process reinforces gender stereotypes and 
denials of women’s agency, in turn creating a form of gendered criminal justice. This 
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form of gendered justice does not just focus on the murder committed by the 
woman in question, but also the degree to which her behaviour and often her 
lifestyle have deviated from the norms of appropriate femininity.  
This gendered justice was recently evident in the sentencing of Magdelena 
Luczak and her partner for the murder of her son, Daniel Pelka. In her sentencing 
comments, although the judge acknowledged that both Luczak and her partner 
breached their position of trust as parents to Daniel, she explicitly referenced 
Luczak’s failings as a mother. She emphasised: ‘your breach of trust Magdelena 
Luczak is wholly irreconcilable with the loving care that a mother should show 
towards her son’,169 and ‘[y]ou, Magdelena Luczak, were fully complicit in these acts of 
incomprehensible cruelty towards your own son …’170 Although both Luczak and her 
partner were given the same prison sentence, the fact that particular focus was 
placed on Luczak’s deviance as a mother demonstrates how the concept of justice for 
women who kill takes a gendered form. Luczak was not just being sentenced for 
murder, but arguably also for breaching her primary social identity of a mother. 
The consequences differ for women who kill depending on the label attached 
to them and the way in which their agency is actively denied. This is most prevalent 
in cases of women who kill their children, with filicidal women whose pre-homicidal 
behaviour does not meet the standards of good motherhood being treated more 
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punitively than those whose behaviour is reflective of these norms.171 Filicidal 
women who successfully plead infanticide and have their actions pathologised are 
generally treated with a degree of leniency and sympathy. A mad mother has her 
agency actively denied as she is not considered to know or understand what she was 
doing when she killed her child. Therefore her ability to have made the choice to act 
in the way that she did cannot be recognised because she was acting in a moment of 
madness. As a result, her actions ‘[a]re characterised as isolated and contained 
incidents that can be easily altered through medication and therapeutic 
treatment.’172  
It is important to re-emphasise here that despite The Infanticide Act being 
specific as to the requirement of puerperal psychosis for a successful plea of 
infanticide, the ‘[c]oncept and scope of madness in infanticide cases is deliberately 
nebulous, so that judges, juries, and the media can selectively draw upon it to 
provide leniency for women whom they believe deserve sympathetic treatment.’173 
In contrast, bad mothers are often treated much more punitively within the criminal 
justice system. The agency of bad mothers is actively denied through their placement 
within a realm of monstrosity which denies their humanity and thus their human 
agency. A bad mother is ‘“[d]epraved” … “ruthless, cold, callous, neglectful of [her] 
children or domestic responsibilities, violent …”’174 Her actions cannot be 
pathologised and therefore the act of killing her child which is “[c]onsidered so 
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antithetical to the behavioural norms of motherhood [is used] to justify the 
“demotion” of status from “mother” to the pre-maternal state of “woman”’175 and 
finally to that of monster, thus actively denying her agency.  
The selectiveness with which the justice system can draw upon the concept of 
madness in cases of women who kill their children means that if a filicidal woman’s 
case either cannot be constructed, or is not perceived in such a way that she has her 
agency actively denied as a result of being labelled as a mad mother, it will be done 
through labelling her as a bad mother. It is clear then that the way in which filicidal 
women are labelled and how their agency is subsequently actively denied directly 
affects their treatment within the criminal justice system. Consequently, a woman 
who kills her child would arguably fare better being diagnosed with a recognised 
psychological disorder and having her actions pathologised (even if she does not 
meet the threshold of puerperal psychosis), in the hope of being treated more 
leniently within the justice system. If she does not succeed in her quest to be labelled 
as a mad mother, the alternative label of a bad mother awaits, with the potential for 
a harsher punishment and an altogether different active agency denial.  
It is not just for women who kill their children that judicial treatment differs 
depending on how they are labelled and the way in which their agency is actively 
denied. The consequence of labelling and agency being actively denied often results 
in either arguably very lenient, or extremely harsh punishment for any women who 
kill, with no clear middle ground existing between these two extremes. The case of 
Nicola Edgington is perhaps most illustrative of this point. Edgington killed her 
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mother in 2005 and was consequently diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, with a 
prominent mood disorder. As a result she successfully pleaded guilty to her mother’s 
manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. She was detained indefinitely 
under the Mental Health Act 1983, a clear acknowledgment that she was suffering 
from a mental disorder at the time she killed her mother. Despite her sentence of 
indefinite detention in a psychiatric facility, Edgington was released three years later 
as she was no longer considered a danger to the community. In October 2011, 
Edgington attacked Kerry Clark and killed Sally Hodkin and was subsequently found 
guilty of murder and attempted murder after the jury rejected her plea of diminished 
responsibility. On 4th March 2013 Edgington was sentenced to a minimum of 37 years 
in prison.176  
During her trial for murder and attempted murder in 2013, psychiatric 
evidence was presented declaring that Edgington was indeed suffering from an 
abnormality of mental functioning. However, the jury concluded that any such 
abnormality did not meet the requirements for diminished responsibility. Therefore 
the court concluded that her mental abnormality did not substantially impair her 
ability to form a rational judgment, or to exercise self-control. Sentencing Edgington, 
the judge acknowledged that she suffered from a ‘mental disability’, but accepted 
the jury’s findings that there was not a convincing case ‘[t]o conclude that the 
abnormality reduced [her] culpability to any significant extent.’177 This seemingly 
drastically reduced any weight that the judge attached to the mitigating factor of 
                                                          
176 Judiciary of England and Wales, “Sentencing Remarks R v Nicola Edgington” (4th March 2013), 
available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-r-v-edgington.pdf p.4 
177 Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013a, p.4  
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suffering from a psychological disorder. Moreover, in his sentencing report the judge 
recognised several aggravating factors, including ‘[p]remeditation, and a 
determination to overcome failure in order to achieve [her] ends’178 and the fact that 
the attacks were ‘unprovoked and random.’179 He also explained that he could not 
‘ignore the fact that Nicola had killed before.’180  
Comparing the two homicide cases brought against Edgington, several things 
become apparent. In the first case in 2006, Edgington was arguably labelled as a mad 
woman by the court as she was suffering from a mental abnormality that ultimately 
denied her culpability for killing her mother. Consequently the court felt that she 
needed treatment, rather than punishment. In contrast, in the 2013 case, Edgington 
was labelled as a bad woman, and consequently needed punishment rather than 
treatment. This is despite her obvious on-going mental disorder, which in itself 
presumably required further treatment. What is clear then is that the responses in 
both cases are at the opposite ends of the spectrum.181  
It seems then that the current law on murder and manslaughter, when being 
applied to cases of women who kill, sits best when working at extremes, rather than 
focusing on a more measured middle ground. For Edgington, this had the 
consequence that her actions were pigeonholed in such a way that although her 
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181 It should be noted here that this dichotomous approach extends beyond the response to female 
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and Rackley, Erika, (Eds), Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010). 
 
 220 
agency was actively denied in both instances, she was either labelled as mad and 
arguably treated leniently, or as bad and was treated punitively. The bad label which 
became Edgington’s new exclusive identity, does not seem to be prepared to 
acknowledge or incorporate, to any significant degree, a defendant with some form 
of mental disorder. Similarly, the mad label as an identity arguably fails to 
acknowledge any significant degree of “badness” for the defendant’s actions, 
reflected in the limited punishments often given. Pigeonholing Nicola into being 
labelled and identified as either mad or bad, when she arguably falls into both 
categories to some degree, arguably demonstrates the need for a clearer middle 
ground for female defendants in cases such as these. This middle ground could go 
some way to being filled with an approach within criminal legal discourse which 
acknowledges the agency of women who kill and thus prevents these labels from 
becoming new identities for these women.  
Battered women who kill their abusive partners face specific justice based 
issues when they are labelled as victims. Although labelling them in this way actively 
denies their agency over their murderous actions, it simultaneously emphasises the 
responsibility these women have in becoming victims in the first place. Indeed, as 
noted by Lorraine Radford: ‘the topsy turvy justice of patriarchal law puts women on 
trial for their own victimisation. Thus … questions asked in courts of battered women 
who kill emphasise women’s own responsibility for prolonged victimisation. Why 
don’t battered women leave their abusers? Why are they abused so many times?’182 
Therefore, it is argued that although these women do not currently have agency over 
                                                          
182 Radford, 1993, p.177  
 221 
their own actions, they are deemed to have some responsibility for the actions of 
their abusive partners. Focusing on battered women’s responsibility in this way 
refutes ‘[s]ociety’s complicity in the killing and the situation which helped precipitate 
it’,183 as well as diverting attention away from the criminal justice system’s responses 
to these women.  
As well as being held responsible for their own victimisation, battered women 
who kill must also conform to prescribed forms of “victim appropriate” behaviour in 
order to secure justice, as noted earlier in the chapter.184 As explained by Radford, 
this appropriate behaviour and the life-history scripts which are written for these 
women are done so by ‘[p]rofessionals and medical experts within and behind the 
scenes of the courtroom.’185 The deserving victims include, ‘[t]he upper middle class 
man’s ideal bride … “good mothers”, “good wives”, “good housekeepers”, “good 
heterosexual servicers”…’186 In contrast, women who may be perceived as 
attempting to assert some agency (albeit unsuccessfully) within their life script by 
attempting to fight back against, or resist their partners’ abusive behaviour are not 
really battered.  
 
5.5.2 Issues of Justice for Their Victims 
Denying the agency of women who kill also presents issues regarding justice 
both being done, and being seen to be have been done, for the victims of the crimes 
                                                          
183 Sanghvi and Nicolson, 1993, p.735 
184 See chapter five, section 5.1.1 at pp.175-183  
185 Radford, 1993, p.195 
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committed by these women. One such example, which highlights the point most 
dramatically, is that of filicidal mothers who are able to plead infanticide, despite not 
suffering from the required puerperal psychosis. These women have their agency 
actively denied and often receive a non-custodial sentence, usually a probation 
order, despite the fact that they have murdered their child. This does not sit well 
with societal expectations of justice, which usually requires those who commit 
murder to be imprisoned for a significant period of time. Indeed research has found 
that ‘public support for the life sentence [increases] in relation to the seriousness of 
the crime.’187 It is submitted that women who are erroneously able to utilise the 
defence of infanticide are quite literally “getting away with murder” as a result of 
being labelled as mad and having their agency actively denied. Therefore their 
victims are not getting the justice that they and the rest of their family deserve. It 
should be noted here that I am not suggesting that these women should not be able 
to utilise another defence, such as diminished responsibility. It is simply being 
suggested that they should not be able to utilise the defence of infanticide if they are 
not suffering from puerperal psychosis, or as a minimum, suffering from a serious 
mental disorder, akin to that of puerperal psychosis, which allows for more lenient 
treatment within the criminal justice system.  
Linked into this issue of victim justice is the fact that actively denying female 
criminal agency through the use of labels directly denies the existence of female 
violence. Although female killers are relatively unusual, case studies such as those 
outlined throughout this chapter demonstrate that women are indeed capable of 
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extreme violence. As it is therefore impossible to say that such cases do not exist, 
actively denying the agency of these women through labelling them and creating a 
new identity for them allows an explanation to be invoked which goes some way to 
denying the propensity of women for violence. These labels and the consequent 
active denials of agency which occur fails to give credence to the notion that 
women’s violence ‘“[i]sn’t always personal, private, or impulsive, that sometimes it is 
… a means … of furthering an ambition … a vehicle to her own empowerment.”’188 
Not only does this demean the rights of their victims to be valued,189 it also 
‘[r]adically impedes our ability to recognise dimensions of power that have nothing 
to do with formal structures of patriarchy. Perhaps above all, the denial of women's 
aggression profoundly undermines our attempt as a culture to understand violence, 
to trace its causes and to quell them.’190  
 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Drawing upon analysis from previous chapters on labelling and construction 
theory and gender discourse surrounding appropriate femininity, this chapter has 
argued that there is a symbiotic relationship between labelling women who kill as 
either mad, bad, or a victim and the continuous active denials of their agency. When 
women who kill are labelled as either mad, bad, or victims, they are given a new all-
consuming identity which reflects that of the label and subsequently actively denies 
their agency. Labelling female killers as a victim actively denies their agency by 
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portraying them ‘[a]s so profoundly victimised that it is difficult to regard them as 
ever having engaged in an intentional act in their lives.’191 Female killers who are 
labelled as mad have their agency actively denied by acknowledging the crime they 
have committed ‘while removing the agency and responsibility for its commission.’192 
Labelling female killers as bad actively eliminates their agency by suggesting that 
‘[a]lthough the action took place, the actor was not a human woman but a 
personification of evil.’193 These active denials of female agency present a number of 
justice based issues for the women themselves, their victims and the criminal justice 
system. It also ensures the continued reinforcement of gender norms within both 
legal and societal discourse.  
Although I shall return to these issues in my thesis conclusion, it is worth 
noting some interim conclusions. In order to take account of some of the concerns 
raised within this chapter surrounding issues of justice which are raised when 
labelling and active agency denial occur, it is submitted that reform is required within 
both the criminal justice system and the criminal law. Initially the criminal justice 
system needs to end the judgment of women according to their adherence to, or 
deviance from, social and gender norms, instead focusing only on the crime that they 
have committed. In turn this would allow for less focus to be ascribed to the labels 
that are currently attached to women who kill and which actively deny their agency. 
It is submitted that the concept of agency within the criminal law and particularly the 
relationship between women and agency needs further exploration and analysis 
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within the academic literature. This could be done through reviewing a range of case 
studies of women who have been convicted of murder, considering the labels which 
were attached to these women, the way in which their agency was actively denied 
and the consequences that this has had for both these women and their victims. 
Doing so will affirm the premise that acknowledging women’s agency can, and 
indeed would, exist in harmony alongside the aims and principles of the criminal 
justice system and the criminal law. 
Having explored the concept of agency and its relationship to women and 
more specifically women who kill it has become apparent that their agency is denied 
both passively and actively. As discussed in chapter four, passive agency denial 
occurs due to women’s construction as legal objects, rather than subjects. The 
construction of the criminal legal subject as the masculine gendered reasonable 
person ensures the continuing passive denial of women’s agency. In addition, the 
labelling of women who kill as either mad, bad or victims has the effect of attaching 
new identities to these women and actively denying their agency. These approaches 
– the combination of active and passive agency denial – combine to completely deny 
the agency of women who kill within criminal legal discourse. The next and final 
substantive chapter of my thesis proposes the creation of a new agency-based model 
for women who kill. It will explore and question the viability of reform in allowing for 
the agency of women who kill to be acknowledged. More specifically it seeks to open 
up space(s) in which to allow for the possibility of interrupting the passive and active 
agency denials of these women which currently takes place.  
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It will propose the interruption of passive agency denial by creating new 
discursive space(s) within which woman as a subject of law can be recognised, a 
space which allows these women as subjects to have agency: to be recognised as 
agents.194 The space thus created will allow for the altering of the construction of the 
current legal subject: the reasonable person. This ceasing of passive agency denial 
will simultaneously be reaffirmed by, and interrupt, the active agency denial of 
women who kill when they are labelled as mad, bad or victims. It is not being argued 
that the labelling of women who kill would cease, as the removal of labels attached 
to offenders of both genders is impossible because it is so prevalent within society. 
What in particular is being suggested is that when women’s passive agency is 
acknowledged through their recognition as legal subjects and agents, the labels 
attached to these women are no longer constructed as their whole identity; the label 
is not all-consuming, thus interrupting the process of active agency denial. Before the 
next chapter delves into the finer details of the proposed creation of a new agency-
based model for women who kill under the criminal law, the reasons why such an 
approach is needed will be reaffirmed. 
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Chapter Six – Recognising the Agency of Women Who Kill 
   
6.1 Why Must Criminal Legal Discourse Recognise the Agency of Women Who Kill? 
 As noted in the previous chapter,1 the current non-agentic discourse 
surrounding women who kill reaffirms and re-emphasises current norms of 
appropriate feminine behaviour: those women who conform to appropriate 
femininity are rewarded contingently, those who deviate are punished. It is therefore 
submitted that denying women’s agency plays a significant part in attempting to 
normalise women into adhering to appropriate feminine behaviour. Similarly, 
labelling women who kill and the consequent active denials of women’s agency 
under the law reinforces feminine gender stereotypes. For example, the denial of 
agency symbiotic with the label of mad attached to women who kill, reinforces the 
notion that women are pathological, irrational beings. Moreover, the labelling and 
active agency denial of battered women who kill their abusive partners promotes a 
particular conception of femininity which is rejecting of the notions of women as 
strong, assertive and outgoing. Instead these women are constructed as passive 
individuals who, if they assert their sexuality, are viewed as demonstrating aggressive 
behaviour.2 As Ferraro explains, the current construction of femininity promoted by 
BWS and the subsequent labeling and agency denial is reflective of gender discourse 
surrounding appropriate femininity, which has the consequence that only those 
battered women who conform to such notions are viewed as “truly” being battered. 
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2 Ferraro, 2003, p.120  
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‘Women who are strong, competent, aggressive, and sexually active do not 
correspond to the imagery connoted by “learned helplessness”’3 and therefore are 
‘[v]iewed unsympathetically by courts and juries because they violate these 
[established] boundaries’4 of appropriate femininity in the context of battered 
women.  
 Acknowledging the agency of women who kill allows for the constructions of 
appropriate femininity currently ingrained within socio-legal discourse to be 
challenged and reconstructed. Indeed, agency acknowledgment allows questions to 
be asked of the current normative representations of women through an 
engagement with, and an analysis of, a wider range of existing and novel gender 
representations of women. Although it is apparent that both the invocation and 
influence of gendered norms within the context of women who kill has the potential 
to benefit individual women, for example in the severity of the charges they face or 
their sentencing,5 the wider pejorative influence of such invocations cannot be 
ignored. It is certainly arguable that acknowledging women’s agency has the 
potential to create different, more pejorative, outcomes for individual women who 
kill, for example receiving harsher sentences. Indeed, as Lacey and Zedner explain, 
agents must justly be held responsible and punished accordingly and proportionately 
for their offence(s).6 However, I suggest that the beneficial effect it would have on 
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women more widely within socio-legal discourse by challenging existing gender 
norms is arguably greater and therefore cannot be ignored.  
Denying the agency of women who kill also denies society’s responsibility for, 
and complicity in, the circumstances which may have precipitated the murderous 
actions of these women. This is perhaps most evident in the context of women who 
kill who present evidence of BWS in their defence and are subsequently labelled as 
mad or as victims without agency. As noted by Morrissey: ‘important issues such as 
societal responsibility for the crime of domestic violence and women’s right to safety 
are thereby elided ...’7 Indeed, the socio-economic issues afflicting battered women, 
the power imbalances in their relationships both with their partners and within the 
context of society more widely, and the lack of alternatives available to them are 
ignored by focusing on agency denial. Thus society’s role and complicity in their 
murderous response to being battered are also effaced.8 Similarly, in the context of 
infanticide, where women who kill labelled as mad (WKM) have their agency actively 
denied, attention is diverted away from social issues, such as poverty and a lack of 
paternal responsibility: issues that may be relevant in understanding the mother’s 
actions.  
By continuing to label these women and actively deny their agency, the acts 
of these women are emptied of all external social meaning. Therefore, if the law 
acknowledges the agency of women who kill there is the obvious potential to allow 
for a better acknowledgment of the social issues which underlie and contribute 
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towards the murderous actions of these women. As highlighted above, this is 
particularly important in the context of battered women who kill and those women 
who commit infanticide. The importance of acknowledging the context within which 
these women commit their offences is reiterated in the Feminist Judgments project, 
where ‘[a]lmost all of the feminist judgments introduce additional ‘social framework’ 
material to place the particular facts of the case and/or the legal issues involved in a 
broader context.’9 
Through agency acknowledgement it becomes possible for legal discourse to 
initiate a discussion not only on society’s role in contributing towards the issues 
facing these women, but perhaps more importantly it can also shift the focus onto 
the ways in which society can effectively combat these issues. Thus for battered 
women who do not leave their abusive partners and ultimately murder them, legal 
discourse can acknowledge and initiate improvements to be made in the services 
offered to these women. Such improvements could include better legal provisions to 
protect these women from their violent partners, improved socio-economic 
alternatives, such as housing or refuges and the creation of a discursive language 
that focuses on and attempts to combat male violence against women. Such 
improvements are arguably likely to be more successfully implemented in the 
context of a socio-legal discourse which acknowledges women’s agency, thus 
allowing the focus to be concentrated on the underlying issues rather than ensuring 
that women’s agency denial occurs.   
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Although women who kill labelled as bad (WKB) have their agency actively 
denied, the agency denial which takes place in this context is subtly different from 
that which takes place in cases of WKM or women who kill labelled as victims 
(WKV).10 Labelling women who kill as bad, thus actively denying their agency, fails to 
allow discursive space(s) to be created within socio-legal discourse which accurately 
reflects their murderous actions. This lack of discursive space that currently exists for 
bad women is, perhaps surprisingly, reflected in feminist discourse, with the 
continued ignorance that some feminist scholarship has largely shown towards these 
women.11 This feminist ignorance of WKB, is succinctly explained by Morrissey who 
notes that: 
[t]he actions of [bad] women … are effectively excluded from feminist 
representation because, unlike the cases of battered women … their actions 
cannot be read as examples where women overthrow their oppression and 
retaliated against either their specific abusers or a general representative of 
them.12 
It is therefore ‘[c]rucial that feminist research does not confine itself to “ideologically 
sound” cases of women who kill and those that are easy to sympathise with.’13 
Rather, a recognition by feminists of the agency of women who kill, particularly those 
labeled as bad, will allow the ‘[b]roader feminist project of challenging derogatory 
stereotypes and restrictive gender norms ...’14 to be successfully conducted.  
                                                          
10 See chapter five, section 5.4 at pp.209-210 
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12 Morrissey, 2003, p.156 
13 Seal, 2010, p.3 
14 Seal, 2010, p.3  
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Moreover, in the same way that much of feminist scholarship unquestioningly 
holds men responsible for their pejorative behaviour, it is submitted that feminist 
scholarship needs to make a greater acknowledgment of, and take more 
responsibility for, the behaviour of women considered to be deviant,15 something 
that can only truly be achieved through agency recognition, particularly by 
recognising the agency of bad women. I would argue that it is not only feminist 
literature that can be criticised for a lack of engagement with women who kill, 
particularly WKB, but also academic literature, legal professionals, actors within the 
criminal justice system and society more widely. There is a general failure to engage 
with and thus create a discursive space to allow constructive discussions around the 
actions of these bad women to occur, and for their agency to be considered. 
Part of the discursive language which needs to be constructed around women 
who kill, especially WKB, is one which acknowledges their agency, thus in turn 
allowing an acknowledgement of their ability to commit extreme violence qua 
women. Women who kill challenge accepted gender norms and discourse and 
therefore the current socio-legal response to these women is to make their actions 
more culturally thinkable and perhaps acceptable through the use of labels which 
actively deny their agency. However, denying the agency of women who kill 
undermines the existence of extreme female agentical violence. Acknowledging 
women’s agency and thus creating a discursive language which acknowledges 
women’s ability to carry out extreme violence, allows the incorporation of the 
concepts of female rationality, power and accountability so that the rationality of 
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some female violence is not automatically undermined.16 Taking the example of 
battered women who kill their abusive partners, these women can be viewed as 
exercising their agency: making the choice to take justifiable action and ‘[d]efending 
themselves from life-threatening violence, albeit in ways that the criminal justice 
system does not recognise as legitimate.’17 
Finally, creating a discursive space whereby women are acknowledged as 
legal subjects with agency presents a novel opportunity to explore how women are 
confined by gender norms within both societal and legal discourse.18 This is 
particularly true in the context of women who kill because engaging with women 
whose behaviour is viewed as deviant allows a critical engagement with the norms of 
appropriate femininity to occur. As Roberts remarks: 
It may be deviant mothers, rather than compliant ones, who reveal the 
mechanisms by which the institution of motherhood confines women and the 
price women pay if they resist. We must condemn mothers' violence against 
their children. However, their violence may force us to confront the 
complexity of women's subordination and the radical measures we must take 
to eradicate it.19 
Although the above statement is made in the context of motherhood specifically, it is 
submitted that this approach is also applicable in the context of women who kill 
more generally. Indeed, acknowledging the agency of women who kill would allow 
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some of the constraints and pervasiveness of feminine gender norms to be 
challenged, for example the construction of women as objectified, irrational beings is 
confronted once women are acknowledged as subjects and agents with associated 
rationality.  
Similarly an approach which acknowledges agency would allow the current 
reliance on gender acceptable explanations for these women’s actions to be 
abolished. Instead I suggest introducing a system whereby, although their actions are 
undoubtedly reprehensible, some choice is attached to the actions of these women. 
That is to say that these women made the choice to act in the way that they did. 
Such an approach allows voices to be given to these women, when previously their 
voices have been silenced or sidelined through the invocation of gender acceptable 
explanations, thus exposing the realities of their lives.20 When evaluating the choice 
that these women have made in the context of this proposed system, it is necessary 
to take into account whether there may have been some (perhaps unknown or 
inexplicable) purpose behind their actions or whether their choice has been limited 
by external or internal factors. For example, taking the previously explored case 
study of Nicola Edgington discussed in chapter five,21 under the proposed system of 
agency recognition, not only would the choice she made to kill be recognised, but 
also that her choice was largely inhibited or influenced by her psychological 
condition. This would go some way to addressing the issue of a middle ground being 
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pp.36-37. 
21 See chapter five, at pp. 217-220 
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needed for the treatment of women who kill within the criminal justice system that 
was raised in chapter five.22   
 
6.2 Acknowledging Women’s Agency  
Fully acknowledging women’s agency within criminal legal discourse will 
require a dual approach. As explored in chapters four and five, women’s agency is 
currently denied both passively and actively. Therefore a full and complete 
recognition of the agency of women who kill requires an approach that will combat 
both of these existing types of agency denial. It is important to note several 
particulars about the agency recognition that will be discussed in this chapter. Firstly, 
it is human agency, not female-specific agency, which is being acknowledged within 
the context of the model I am proposing. The acknowledgment of female-specific 
agency would have the potential to further reinforce and entrench gender discourse 
and the existing norms surrounding appropriate femininity, which are already so 
pervasive within criminal legal discourse. Recognising this form of agency would 
arguably do little to improve the current socio-legal response to women who kill, a 
notion reflected in later discussions in this chapter which focus on the issues 
associated with the creation of a “reasonable woman.”23 Secondly, it is 
acknowledged within the thesis more broadly that there is clearly the potential for 
the agency recognition of women who kill to increase both the basic responsibility of 
these women, as well as their consequential responsibility. That is to say that as a 
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result of agency recognition women who kill may receive harsher sentences than 
they currently do. It is important to make clear that this is not the aim of recognising 
the agency of women who kill, even though in certain contexts there is certainly the 
potential for a case of harsher sentencing to be made.24  
Finally, the agency recognition which will take place will be contextualised 
within the existing social structures that have the potential to limit women’s exercise 
of agency. That is to say that although the aim of this chapter is to create a discursive 
space within which criminal legal discourse can recognise the agency of women who 
kill, it is also important to acknowledge that their exercise of this agency may be 
limited, but not altogether eradicated or denied, by current structures and schemas 
of power which exist. So for example, it will be suggested that battered women who 
kill their abusive partners do have agency over their murderous actions and indeed 
exhibit and utilise that agency when they kill their partner. However, their exercise of 
agency may be limited within the confines of, for example, the various socio-
economic factors that means they cannot leave their abusive partner. Similarly, 
women who kill and plead infanticide should not have their agency actively denied as 
a result of being labelled as mad, but instead have it acknowledged alongside a 
simultaneous recognition that their agency exercise may have been limited by their 
mental impairment.  
The importance of the proposed agency acknowledgment taking place in this 
chapter is therefore not only that women who kill must have their agency 
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recognised, but that it must also be acknowledged that this exercise of agency may 
be limited or constrained by existing social and power structures. This is reflective of 
the stance taken by Lacey on the contextualisation of an agent’s acts. She notes that: 
‘[t]he context within which an agent has acted – a history of domestic abuse, for 
example – will be relevant to an evaluation of the disposition which that action 
expresses.’25 However it must be reinforced that an evaluation of the context and 
relevant constraints and limitations on agency exercise does not remove an 
individual’s agency in the agency-based model being proposed in this chapter. 
 
6.3 Interrupting Passive Agency Denial  
As noted earlier in the thesis in chapters two and four the criminal legal 
subject is currently gendered masculine.26 Therefore in order to interrupt the passive 
agency denial of women who kill, a criminal legal subject that creates a discursive 
space for the incorporation of women and femininity could and indeed should be 
created and acknowledged. This recognition of women’s passive agency through 
their acknowledgment as legal subjects and thus as agents has to occur before active 
agency denial, which occurs when these women are labelled, can be interrupted.  
At the outset it is important to highlight that the agency creation that is the 
subject of analysis in this thesis is one of human agency, rather than gendered 
agency, as reflected in the work of Rollinson.27 However, his suggestion that this take 
                                                          
25 Lacey, 2007, p.239 
26 See chapter two, section 2.4.1 and chapter four, section 4.4.1 
27 Rollinson, 2000, p.122 
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place through the creation of a universal subject to whom universal rights are 
ascribed28 is, it is submitted, the utopian ideal. In an ideal world this utopian ideal 
would be realised and would arguably be the most effective means by which to 
acknowledge women who kill as legal subjects and consequently ascribe them 
agency. However, within the existing working confines and structures of the criminal 
law and justice system, as well as within the limitations of societal discourse, such a 
utopian ideal cannot and indeed could not be realised or successfully implemented. 
The pervasiveness of gender norms within criminal legal, and socio-legal discourse 
would, it is submitted, make it impossible for such a universal subject to be created 
in the near future.  
Even if a universal subject was introduced into criminal legal discourse, it 
would arguably meet the same fate that many of the other universal ideologies have 
met. For example, the existing legal subject of the “reasonable person” is meant to 
be a neutral, genderless, classless individual, but is in fact currently gendered 
masculine. Similarly, legal discourse has promoted the notion of sex equality through 
statutes, for example The Equal Pay Act 1970 and The Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
which have recently been codified into a single statute; The Equality Act 2010. 
However as MacKinnon rightly explains, sex equality cannot truly exist because by 
their very nature the sexes are inherently different, they are binary opposites.29 
Therefore, woman will always be “the Other”30; she will be inferior to man.  
                                                          
28 Rollinson, 2000, p.122  
29 Barnett, 1998, p.18  
30 Beauvoir, 2010, p.6 
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 In contrast, some feminist legal scholars, including Forell and Matthews have 
suggested the introduction of the reasonable woman standard into criminal legal 
discourse. Such a concept would combat some of the problems previously 
acknowledged and that would be raised in creating a universal legal subject. Indeed 
this is a concept which has already found resonance in the United States, where the 
law on sexual harassment adopted the reasonable woman standard in the case of 
Ellison v Brady.31 The rationale for adopting this standard in sexual harassment cases 
specifically is that the majority of sexual harassment victims and claimants are 
women.32 In the context of such cases, the standard assesses the harasser’s conduct 
from the perspective of the reasonable woman victim.33  
Forell and Matthews in their monograph A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable 
Woman as a Measure of Man,34 suggested that the reasonable woman standard 
should be taken further than merely sexual harassment cases and be applied to the 
conduct of men in all contexts where women are the victims of male aggression, 
sexual or otherwise. Such an approach would allow a focus to be maintained on 
respect for women’s ‘[b]odily integrity, agency and autonomy …’ 35 They also suggest, 
perhaps most importantly in the context of this thesis, that female aggressors would 
also be held to the reasonable woman standard.36 Therefore, unlike creating a 
universal subject, the introduction of the reasonable woman standard within criminal 
                                                          
31 924 F.2d.872 (9th Cir. 1991) 
32 Sanger, Carol, “Reasonable Women and the Ordinary Man” S. Cal. L. Rev., 65, (1991-1992), 1411, 
p.1413 
33 Sanger, 1991-1992, p.1413  
34 Forell, Caroline and Matthews, Donna, A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of 
Man (New York: New York University Press, 2000) 
35 Forell and Matthews, 2000, p.xvii 
36 Forell and Matthews, 2000, p.xvii 
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legal discourse would arguably allow women’s experiences to be directly 
acknowledged and taken into account in criminal cases.  
Moreover, introducing the concept of the reasonable woman could arguably 
provide women with the opportunity to develop their own discursive language which 
represents their lived experiences. This would reflect Smart’s argument that women 
are able to discursively construct themselves.37 Therefore such a language could 
allow for alterations to existing pervasive gender norms which are structured and 
enforced within a patriarchal society and allow women to discursively (re)construct 
themselves, for example through an alteration of the current norms surrounding 
“good motherhood” which requires women to be totally selfless, putting her children 
and family’s needs before her own.38  
However, constructing this reasonable woman within criminal legal discourse 
fails to acknowledge the material conditions of life that currently constrain the 
formation of women as subjects. Indeed, any subjectivity given to women in the 
context of the reasonable woman within criminal legal discourse would exist within 
the confines of a phallocentric culture. Consequently, the notion that women can 
construct their own language to represent their lived experiences must take into 
account the power imbalances which exist for women within a patriarchal society. 
Foucault’s theory of “capillaries of power” suggests that power is productive: it is 
everywhere and within everyone.39 According to this theory, power is not 
hierarchical and therefore it can, and indeed, should be exercised by everyone 
                                                          
37 See chapter two, p.64 
38 See chapter three, section 3.4.1 for a more detailed discussion on the discourse surrounding good 
motherhood. 
39 Foucault, 1980, p.39   
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individually within their social relationships and their everyday lives. For Foucault it is 
this exercise of power that produces subjects, discourse and knowledge.  
However, the reality for women within a patriarchal society is that their 
power can only be exercised effectively as a collective,40 with individual attempts to 
exercise power often failing to produce the desired outcomes for women. Collective 
power exercise is not a concept which is usually associated with the criminal law and 
criminal justice system, where it is individuals who are exercising their power either 
as defendants or as victims seeking justice.41 So in the context of women who kill, 
these women are attempting to exercise their power as individual defendants, with 
the aim of securing the least severe punishment for their crime or securing an 
acquittal. They are not acting as a collective and therefore their ability to successfully 
create their own discursive language within existing societal discourse must be 
questioned. Similarly, the power imbalance that currently exists within a patriarchal 
society and the criminal justice system raises real doubts as to whether such a 
language would or indeed even could, be effectively accommodated if created.   
Moreover, woman’s construction as “the Other”42 means that even if the 
concept of the reasonable woman as a legal subject was successfully introduced, 
current gender and criminal discourse dictates that a woman can never truly be 
viewed as reasonable. Indeed the characteristics inextricably interlinked with 
femininity, such as pathology, emotionality and irrationality mean that women 
                                                          
40 See chapter four, pp.144-146 for a more detailed discussion on this. 
41 The notion of collectivity within criminal legal discourse normally arises in the context of the state 
bringing a case based on the premise that it is both the victim and the state who has been offended 
against, or when several victims are involved in the same criminal case.  
42 Beauvoir, 2010, p.6 
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within a patriarchal society are viewed as incapable of being reasonable. Moreover, 
in the context of women who kill, these women are not considered to be acting 
reasonably because of their extreme deviance from the norms of appropriate 
femininity. As illustrated by Morrissey: 
It is not in the least surprising ... that battered women find it very difficult to 
convey to juries and the judiciary that their actions were reasonable. The idea 
that a woman could kill her partner and still meet the legal standard of 
reasonableness, particularly that of the reasonable perception of danger, is a 
reality few people want to acknowledge, let alone accept.43 
Similarly, the introduction of the reasonable woman standard has the 
potential to further reinforce, rather than dispel, gender discourse and norms 
surrounding appropriate femininity. Indeed as noted by Sanger, in one case in the 
United States, where, as noted above, the reasonable woman standard has been 
introduced in cases of sexual harassment, ‘[n]on-legal notions of what it means to be 
a reasonable woman were hard at work. For example, [the victims’] testimony was 
attacked for being too “emotionless”, the current characterisation in American public 
discourse of conduct that might once have been called “dignified.’”44 Therefore with 
the introduction of the reasonable woman standard, I would suggest that the 
performative nature of gender, more specifically of appropriate femininity, would 
arguably be further highlighted and thus reinforced.  
 
                                                          
43 Morrissey, 2003, p.98 
44 Sanger, 1991-1992, p.1413  
 243 
6.3.1 (Re) Constructing the Legal Subject and Interrupting Passive Agency Denial 
Having critically engaged with some of the proposed alternative constructions 
of the legal subject, it is suggested that one way, perhaps the most realistic and 
attainable way, of successfully interrupting passive agency denial within criminal 
legal discourse is to alter the construction of the legal subject in its existing form, 
that is by altering the “reasonable person”. As noted earlier in this chapter and 
previously in chapter four, the “reasonable person” in its current form, although 
theoretically a gender-neutral construction, is in fact one which is gendered 
masculine. The reasonable person in its current form is most commonly used in 
relation to the masculine defences of self-defence and loss of control.45  
The specifics of the reasonable person can be found in the defence of loss of 
control detailed in The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 which refers to: ‘a person of 
D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the 
circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D.’46 As 
Herring notes:  
The reference to sex in the section is rather odd. It implies that different 
degrees of tolerance and self-restraint might be expected from men and 
women. While it is arguable that a particular insult or circumstance might be 
graver for a woman than a man, or vice versa, there is no good reason why 
the level of tolerance or self-restraint should be any different.47 
                                                          
45 See chapter four, section 4.4.2 for a discussion on the gendering of defences. 
46 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(1)(c)  
47 Herring, Jonathan, Criminal Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press, fifth ed, 
2012) pp.250-251 
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Therefore the very fact that there is a requirement of considering an individual’s sex 
included in the “gender neutral” reasonable person enables the masculine gendering 
of the existing legal subject. It is submitted that in order to truly restore the intended 
gender neutrality of the reasonable person, it is necessary to remove the section ‘[a] 
person of D’s sex …’48 from the phraseology. So the altered form of the reasonable 
person which would be introduced would read: ‘a person with a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the 
same or in a similar way to D.’  
The importance of removing the mention of the defendant’s sex from the 
construction of the reasonable person is reflected in a quote from MacKinnon, who 
explains: ‘when [the state] is most ruthlessly neutral, it will be most male; when it is 
most sex blind, it will be most blind to the sex of the standard being applied.’49 Thus 
by not making any reference at all to sex, even in a neutral guise, the construction of 
sex, which is normalised as male within patriarchal society, will not be considered as 
the standard to be applied. Indeed, ‘[i]t is obvious that in practice the distinctions of 
gender, so pervasive and insistent outside of the law, do constantly intrude of even 
its most intentionally neutral operations.’50 Thus, if there was no reference at all to a 
defendant’s sex or gender within the construction of the reasonable person, this 
intrusion would arguably be minimised as it would not be a characteristic that 
formally and explicitly needs to be considered. Moreover, as Allen explains the very 
concept of the reasonable person is intended to provide '[a]n objective standard of 
                                                          
48 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(1)(c)   
49 MacKinnon, Catharine, “Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence” Signs 8(4), (1983), 635, p.658  
50 Allen, 1988, p.430 
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comparison beside which the subjective state of legal subjects can be judged.’51 
However, as she rightly notes, in having a requirement of considering the 
defendant’s sex, the reasonableness required of female offenders is that of normal 
and ordinary women, a standard which in and of itself is hard to quantify52 with 
women’s construction as ‘the Other’. Thus removing any mention of the defendant’s 
sex from the construction of the reasonable person not only ensures that the 
construction of the reasonable person is gender neutral, as there is no reference to 
gender or sex within its construction, but it also removes this hurdle for women to 
overcome.  
Restoring, and perhaps more importantly maintaining, the gender neutrality 
of the reasonable person as the legal subject could create a discursive space within 
which both men and women can be viewed as legal subjects, rather than women in 
their current status as legal objects. Indeed, it is the gendering of women as feminine 
and the associated attributes which universally depict them as emotional and 
irrational beings who lack power that currently constructs them as legal objects 
rather than subjects, thus denying their agency. If such gendering is at least severely 
limited, if not entirely abolished, through alterations to the reasonable person as the 
legal subject, then women’s legal subjecthood can be recognised, allowing passive 
agency denial to be interrupted and women to be recognised as agents.  
Indeed, altering the reasonable person creates a discursive space where 
women as objects, as “the Other”, and as the abject can become culturally 
                                                          
51 Allen, 1987, p.22 
52 Allen, 1987, p.49 
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intelligible53 legal subjects. This is somewhat reflective of Butler’s theory that the 
abject is part of the foundations of the subject, that is to say, that without the abject 
the subject would not exist.54 It is also reflective of Naffine’s argument that women 
have a role to play in the construction of the legal subject: it is women’s role as “the 
Other” that allows man’s construction as “One”.55 Therefore the 
feminine/woman/Other already forms part of the masculine/man/One. Explicitly 
removing the concept of gender, that is masculinity, from the reasonable person, 
means that it is this person, which includes both subject (man) and abject (woman) 
as part of its foundations, that is the new legal subject. Thus a discursive space for 
woman as a legal subject can be created.  
Unlike attempting to create a universal legal subject to whom universal legal 
rights are ascribed, as critiqued above, the altered reasonable person, suggested in 
this chapter, would not make arguably unattainable, utopian claims regarding the 
equality of men and women. Although altering the reasonable person test would 
allow the agency of both men and women to be acknowledged, it must be noted that 
there is no grand overarching aim of achieving equality between the sexes within 
this. Indeed, it is acknowledged throughout this chapter, that even once women are 
recognised as legal subjects and as agents, their exercise of agency is limited within 
the existing socio-legal structures of a patriarchal society. These structures and the 
power relationships within them are arguably adverse to women’s agency exercise. 
However, I would suggest that by acknowledging women who kill as legal subjects 
                                                          
53 Loizidou, 2006, p.1 
54 Butler, 1993, p.3  
55 See chapter two, pp.60-61. 
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and agents, an immediate and positive shift in the power relationship between these 
women and existing structures would occur, thus reflecting Foucault’s argument that 
power is mobile, as discussed in chapter two.56 It is submitted that agency 
acknowledgment of women who kill is the first step in altering the social and legal 
structures that inhibit all women from consistently and successfully asserting their 
agency.  
Moreover, altering the existing reasonable person as the legal subject, rather 
than creating a subject of the reasonable woman, as critically discussed earlier in the 
chapter,57 ensures that the gender norms associated with appropriate femininity are 
not reinforced. Indeed, creating the legal subject and agent of the reasonable 
woman and reinforcing these norms would arguably inhibit the successful exercise of 
agency by individual women within existing patriarchal structures.  
Despite the undoubted importance of altering the theoretical basis of the 
reasonable person to recognise women as legal subjects, it is submitted that it is not 
enough to merely alter the reasonable person in theory, but that there also needs to 
be alterations in the practical approach being taken within the criminal justice 
system.58 Indeed as Allen notes, the pervasiveness of gender discourse ‘[c]onstantly 
intrudes on even [laws] most intentionally neutral operations’59 and thus it is 
important that both theoretical and practical approaches are considered to ensure 
the recognition of women as legal subjects and agents. 
                                                          
56 See chapter two, pp.67-68  
57 See pp 239-242, above 
58 There is room for future research here, something I discuss in chapter seven, at pp.286-289. 
59 Allen, 1988, p.430 
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Within practical criminal legal discourse that is, within the courtroom and 
criminal justice system itself, it is suggested that one way passive agency recognition 
could be reflected in practice is through increased focus on the removal of gendered 
language. Currently gendered language is regularly and pejoratively used in judicial 
sentencing remarks in cases of women who kill. This is evident in the case of 
Magdelena Luczak.60 Luczak, alongside her partner Mariusz Krezolek, was found 
guilty of the murder of her son Daniel Luczak. In sentencing, Mrs Justice Cox, stated: 
‘both of you are in breach of what is probably the most important position of trust, 
as the parents of a small child who was entitled to their protection, their love and 
their care.’61 She then goes on to specifically mention the deviance that Luczak 
demonstrated from the norms surrounding appropriate motherhood: ‘your breach of 
trust, Magdelena Luczak, is wholly irreconcilable with the loving care that a mother 
should show towards her son.’62 The use of gendered language in sentencing 
remarks can also be seen in the cases of Myra Hindley and Rosemary West, as 
discussed in detail in chapter five.63 
This culture of pejorative gendered language use is not just confined to cases 
of women who kill, but also to women who commit other serious criminal offences, 
for example child sexual abuse. In the relatively recent case involving Lost Prophets 
singer Ian Watkins and two female co-perpetrators referred to as B and P, Mr Justice 
Royce’s sentencing used gendered language specifically when referring to the two 
female co-defendants. Referring to B’s involvement he stated: ‘but you were a 
                                                          
60 See chapter five, p.215 for more discussion on this case. 
61 Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013, p.5 
62 Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013, p.5  
63 See chapter five, at pp.198-201  
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mother. Your infant was only 10 months old. A mother naturally loves, protects, 
shields, nurtures and cherishes. Your infant would have trusted you implicitly. You 
totally betrayed that trust.’64 Similarly when referring to P’s involvement, he 
emphasised: ‘[y]ou P betrayed your daughter for your own selfish ends.’65 It is 
important to note here that it is arguably not just the use of pejorative gendered 
language that is harmful to agency acknowledgment, but the use of any such 
language, even in a positive form. This is because the inclusion of gendered language 
in any form has the effect of focusing attention on the feminine gender norms, which 
have been so instrumental in confining women to their position as objects whose 
agency is denied.     
One argument against the complete abolition of such language is that 
including it may be of particular relevance to a case. For example, exploring the 
difference in physical strength of a woman and her husband in a case involving 
domestic violence, or looking at physical issues in sexual offences cases. However, I 
would argue that should reference need to be made to an individual’s sex in 
exceptional cases, such as those mentioned above, the judge could include a 
direction to the jury specifying its relevance and why it has been mentioned, thus 
addressing this concern.  
There is also the potential issue that maintaining the mention of “sex” in the 
reasonable person construction, is necessary for the defence of loss of control. As 
                                                          
64 Judiciary of England and Wales (2013b), “Sentencing Remarks R v Watkins and P and B”, (18th 
December 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-
v-watkins-and-others.pdf p.3 
65 Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013b, p.6  
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noted earlier in the thesis66 battered women who kill may arguably be able to 
introduce evidence of BWS if it can be linked into the qualifying trigger being utilised 
under the act. Moreover, as Edwards notes:  
In the context of battered women as defendants in murder cases, sex is 
especially relevant to the circumstances since it is the female sex as a group 
that are especially subject to violent abuse … It is argued that sex has been 
“showcased” in this way precisely to accommodate the problems 
predominantly affecting women who the law now concedes face continuous 
abuse, and in this the law implicitly recognises their lack of physical 
strength.67 
Thus, by specifically mentioning sex within the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, and 
the construction of the reasonable person detailed within it, it is arguable that it 
underlines the importance of this characteristic in the context of cases of battered 
women who kill. However, as Edwards also acknowledges; ‘[i]t can be argued that 
sex in this context would be relevant, in any event, under “the circumstances of the 
defendant”’,68 found in section 54(1)(c) of the Act. Indeed, loss of control is a 
relevant defence for murders outside of the context of battered women who kill, and 
therefore other characteristics such as race and religion would come under “the 
circumstances of the defendant”. Therefore I would argue that such concerns 
regarding the abolition of sex within the definition of the reasonable person in this 
context can be ameliorated in this way. Linking this into the discussion above, a 
                                                          
66 See chapter five, section 5.1.1 at pp. 171-172 
67 Edwards, Susan, “Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control” Journal of Criminal 
Law, 74(3), 2010, 223, p.237 
68 Edwards, 2010, p.237  
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direction could be made to the jury acknowledging that attention has specifically 
been brought to the fact that the defendant is a woman, because it is women who 
are especially likely to be victims of domestic violence.  
 The removal of gendered language in its entirety would arguably go some 
way towards being more reflective of the legal subject as being a “person” rather 
than being gendered masculine, which would consequently aid the interruption of 
passive agency denial within criminal legal discourse. Similarly the removal of such 
gendered language could allow women who commit serious crimes, such as 
homicide, to be viewed as deviant people rather than as deviant women, the latter of 
which has more negative connotations and can result in harsher sentencing or 
difficulties for these women when attempting to successfully utilise a particular 
defence. Indeed as noted in chapter five,69 women who kill their abusive partners 
and want to introduce evidence of BWS to support their defence must not only 
adhere to the requirements of both the syndrome and the defence, but they must 
also conform to the behaviour expected of a battered woman.70 Amending the 
existing construction of the reasonable person by removing the mention of an 
individual’s sex would prevent the current associations being made between a 
woman’s criminal behaviour and her degree of deviance from gender discourse and 
appropriate femininity. As such it would arguably ameliorate the issue of some 
women who kill being viewed as doubly deviant71 and being labelled as bad as a 
                                                          
69 See chapter five, section 5.1.1 at pp.175-183 
70 Edwards, 1996, p.252  
71 This is a concept which has been discussed previously throughout the thesis. Where women who kill 
(labelled as bad) are viewed as being doubly deviant; they have not only offended against society 
when committing their crime but also against their gender. Removing gendered language from jury 
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result. Moreover, removing the mention of an individual’s sex within the 
construction of the reasonable person would be a tentative, but positive step, 
towards achieving the currently unrecognised and unachievable utopian ideal of a 
completely gender neutral legal subject.  
Another practical approach that could be adopted to ensure the gender 
neutrality of the legal person is that suggested by Allen in relation to instructing jury 
members. She suggests that ‘[t]he notion of a neutral legal personhood … could be 
inserted by straight fiat into any existing doctrine, and that once properly instructed, 
even the law’s most ordinary agents [e.g. jury members] could quite competently 
work with it.’72 Allen suggests that simply asking juries to decide whether the 
defendant acted as a reasonable person might have done may be ‘[i]nsufficiently 
explicit’,73 and therefore it might be more appropriate to first acknowledge to the 
jury the pervasiveness of gender discourse, norms and constructions, ‘[b]efore 
formally and explicitly outlawing them’74 being used.  Allen then goes further and 
envisages how this may work in more detail: 
The jury members might be instructed, for example, that in deciding whether the 
defendant acted as a reasonable person, they must have in mind the whole range 
of reasonable human responses, even any that would normally be considered 
reasonable only in one sex or the other, and then ask themselves whether the 
behaviour of the defendant (regardless of gender) fell anywhere within that 
                                                                                                                                                                       
remarks and judicial comments may help to ameliorate the potential issue of harsher sentencing 
which may arise from the agency recognition of women.  
72 Allen, 1988, p.429 
73 Allen, 1988, p.430 
74 Allen, 1988, p.430 
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range. Alternatively, they might be instructed to consider only such responses as 
they would regarded as equally reasonable in either sex, and thus to exclude as 
unreasonable any response that would not be considered reasonable in both. 
Such explication may well be cumbersome, but hardly more so than is already 
judicially commonplace.75 
It is therefore clear that there are practical approaches that could be taken within 
criminal justice procedures to ensure that the gender neutrality of the reasonable 
person is maintained, both in theory and in practice. In turn, this would allow for a 
discursive space to be created within which women could be acknowledged as legal 
subjects and as agents. 
 
6.4 Labelling and Interrupting Active Agency Denial 
As noted earlier in the thesis in chapter five, labeling women who kill as mad, 
bad or a victim, when combined with passive agency denial, actively denies their 
agency. Therefore, passively recognising the agency of women within criminal legal 
discourse by altering the definition of the reasonable person to acknowledge women 
as legal subjects with agency has a direct impact on active agency denial. That is to 
say that once women’s status as criminal legal subjects is acknowledged and their 
passive agency is asserted, the active agency denial which took place through the use 
of the labels mad, bad and victim is interrupted. As explained throughout this thesis, 
the labels currently attached to women who kill contribute to the denial of their 
                                                          
75 Allen, 1988, p.430 
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agency. Although labels, such as mad, bad and victim, would arguably, and 
undoubtedly, still be attached to women who kill, once these women are recognised 
as legal subjects and as agents they would no longer have the effect of actively 
denying their agency because these labels would not be attached to them as objects 
and thus not become their identity. 
 Indeed as noted earlier in the thesis, the labels attached to women who kill, 
that is mad, bad and victim are currently all consuming for the women that are 
labeled. That is to say that when such labels are used, the label becomes their 
exclusive identity and as such actively denies their agency. At the outset it is 
important to note that it is recognised that these labels will still be attached to 
women who kill because society has historically, and therefore presumably will 
continue to, attach labels to those who exhibit deviant behaviour.76 Indeed it is 
important to note that this is not the aim of this thesis, not least because the 
attachment of labels to deviant individuals or to their deviant behaviour is both 
prevalent and normalised within social discourse.77  
Moreover, it may be that the attachment of particular labels to these women 
is reflective of some, if not all of, their lived experiences, for example battered WKV. 
It is undeniable that these women are victims in the traditional sense of the word 
used for those who have been subject to a criminal act at the hands of another. 
However, the way in which these labels are currently used is gendered, reflecting the 
                                                          
76 To suggest that labels should be removed entirely would again be a utopian ideal which is not 
achievable within the confines of current socio-legal discourse. 
77 See chapter two, section 2.3 for a detailed discussion on labelling theory and the attachment of 
labels to deviants. 
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pejorative gender norms surrounding women and ultimately actively denying their 
agency. Therefore it is submitted that although these labels cannot be eradicated 
entirely, acknowledging the agency of the women they are attached to means that 
when they are used on a subject, on an agent, they would no longer become an 
exclusive identity and their current effect of actively denying agency is interrupted. 
  Indeed, it is submitted that when labels are attached to subjects they are less 
influential and pervasive than when they are attached to objects. That is not to say 
that when labels are attached to subjects they do not have any resonance 
whatsoever, merely that they do not become the new identity of the subject that 
they are being attached to. Put another way, the person is still the subject, albeit 
with a label, rather than an object who assumes the label as their new identity. This 
is apparent within societal discourse when exploring the prevalence of the labels 
attached to the Moors Murderers Myra Hindley and Ian Brady. Both Hindley and 
Brady were labelled as evil by the media because of the horrendous crimes that they 
had committed. However, the media attached the label of “evil” to Hindley far more 
frequently than to Brady. This may arguably be because Brady was sectioned under 
the Mental Health Act. However, when I used Nexis to search for media reports on 
both Hindley and Brady, the discrepancy in the labels used was highlighted.  
I used specific search parameters, searching for each of their names 
separately, “Myra Hindley”/ “Ian Brady”, in headlines only. I specified the search to 
be within UK publications only and selected for duplicate options to be “on – high 
similarity.” I searched within the results produced separately for Hindley and Brady 
for the word “evil” with the duplicate options still “on-high similarity”. Ensuring these 
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specifics were used for both searches I conducted, 172 results were produced for 
Hindley compared with 106 for Brady. Using otherwise the same search parameters, 
I altered the search term I used within the results from “evil’ to ‘mad”, which 
produced 27 results for Brady, compared with 26 for Hindley. Altering the search 
within results term again from “mad” to “mental” highlighted a large discrepancy in 
the results, with 445 for Brady and only 36 for Hindley.  
These results reflect the labelling of Hindley as bad within socio-legal 
discourse, a label which ultimately denied her agency because as a woman she was 
constructed as a legal object, rather than a legal subject. It is also worth noting here, 
that despite these results demonstrating that Brady was more readily labelled as 
mad when compared to Hindley, attaching this label to Brady does not have the 
effect of actively denying his agency in the same way it would have done if the label 
had been attached to Hindley. This is because Brady as a man is recognised as a legal 
subject and thus as an agent and therefore attaching this label to him does not mean 
that it becomes his new identity.  
Successfully altering the labelling culture within criminal legal discourse 
initially requires the acknowledgment of women’s passive agency as discussed earlier 
in the first section of this chapter.78 Acknowledging women as legal subjects rather 
than objects, through the alteration of the reasonable person, has clear potential to 
enable alterations to the labelling culture, thus interrupting the denials of women’s 
active agency. Traditionally in labelling theory79 it is not women who are doing the 
                                                          
78 See sections 6.2 and 6.3, above.  
79 See chapter two, section 2.3 for a detailed discussion on labelling theory.  
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labelling as they do not have the power within socio-legal discourse to label.80 
Indeed as Naffine explains; ‘in its female version, labelling theory seems to have lost 
sight of the deviant as actor and as social critic … Stripped of any ability to challenge 
or question her position in society, she is conceived as object rather than agent.’81 
However, once women are recognised as legal subjects, that is as agents, through 
the discursive space created by altering the reasonable person, their power 
relationship within criminal legal discourse is similarly altered and ameliorated by 
interrupting passive agency denial.  
It must be noted here that the amelioration of their power relationship is still 
confined within the existing structures of a patriarchal society. However, this 
improvement in women’s power relationships within criminal legal discourse has 
clear potential for women to successfully participate in labelling, particularly self-
labelling, thus allowing them to alter or overthrow the labels attached to them. This 
reflects Foucault’s argument, acknowledged in chapter two of this thesis,82 that 
power is mobile and therefore individuals can utilise power in order to change their 
powerless circumstances. It is also reflective of Butler’s theory of performativity 
which suggests that individuals who are labelled have the ability to resist and reverse 
the labels attached to them.83    
Self-labelling would not only be reflective of women actively exercising their 
agency as subjects but would also allow for women to offer alternative labels which 
they designate as more reflective of their lived experiences. For example, it has been 
                                                          
80 Grana, 2009, p.72 
81 Naffine, 1987, p.83  
82 See chapter two at pp.67-68  
83 See chapter two, section 2.5.2 at pp.76-78 for a more detailed discussion on this.  
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suggested in some feminist literature, as well as by those that work with battered 
women, that they should be labelled as survivors, rather than as victims.84 Indeed, it 
is argued that the survivor label invokes imagery of strength and determination, 
often reflected in the actions of battered women who have developed strategies of 
resistance, whilst simultaneously trying to provide for their own safety and that of 
their families.85 As Dunn explains, whilst battered women labeled as victims are 
‘[p]resented as trapped … survivors, conversely, are shown as making choices …’86 
Therefore depending on which label is attached, women are placed ‘[a]t opposite 
poles of an agency continuum.’87  
Despite alterations in the theoretical typifications of battered women, there 
has arguably never been a discursive space successfully created which allows for the 
construction of battered women as survivors to fully be realised as a reality within 
practical criminal legal discourse. Interrupting passive agency denial and thus 
recognising women as subjects and agents, is reflective of the “survivor” label and its 
associated attribute of agency. Therefore the reflective nature of this label for 
women as agents means that there is arguably the potential that when used by 
women to self-label, it will replace that of a victim for these women, thus reinforcing 
their agency.88  
                                                          
84 See for example: Kelly, Liz, Surviving Sexual Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988); Hoff, Lee Ann, Battered Women as Survivors (New York: Routledge, 1990); and more recently; 
Dunn, Jennifer, “”Victims” and “Survivors”: Emerging Vocabularies of Motive for “Battered Women 
Who Stay”” Sociological Inquiry, 75(1), 2005, 1 
85 Dunn, 2005, p.5 
86 Dunn, 2005, p.2  
87 Dunn, 2005, p.2 
88 It is important to reinforce the point here that despite creating a discursive space within which 
women’s agency can be recognised, thus allowing them to self-label as survivors and for others to 
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Women’s potential to self-label as a result of being recognised as subjects 
and agents, as well as their potential for resisting the labels attached to them as a 
result of interrupting active agency denial has the added benefit of potentially 
altering gender discourse. These labels, used in the existing context of women as 
objects, are used because they are a way to explain and justify the actions of women 
who kill in a way that reflects gender discourse within a patriarchal society and legal 
system. However, by acknowledging women as legal subjects and agents, the power 
attached to these labels has diminished, not least because they no longer become 
the overwhelming identity of agentic women who kill. Therefore even if these labels 
continue to be used to describe these women without becoming their identity, 
arguably the power attached to them without the ability to actively deny women’s 
agency will be lessened, and in turn the gender stereotypes they reflect will not be so 
entrenched. Interrupting agency denial through the recognition of women as legal 
subjects and agents therefore, I would argue, has the clear potential to begin a 
process of altering and ameliorating the pejorative gender norms associated with 
femininity.     
Taking each of the labels currently attached to women who kill in turn, it is 
possible to see how interrupting passive agency denial has resulted in these labels no 
longer actively denying the agency of these women, instead creating a space within 
which more questions can be asked of these women’s experiences and the socio-
economic factors which may have contributed to them committing their crimes. The 
                                                                                                                                                                       
label them as such, their ability to exercise their agency as survivors is limited within the existing 
structures of a patriarchal society. Therefore, the support provisions such as alternative 
accommodation, counseling etc which are in place for these women are still required.  
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importance of creating a space within which women’s lived experiences and the 
realities of their lives can be recognised is acknowledged and reflected within the 
Feminist Judgments project. Indeed, particular concerns for the project were 
‘[w]riting women’s experiences into legal discourse … challenging gender bias … 
contextualisation [of the] reality of women’s lived experience [and] improving the 
conditions of women’s lives.’89 Interrupting passive denials of agency reflects these 
particular concerns and allows more questions to be asked of women’s experiences 
and the choices that they make.  
Currently for WKM, their agency is actively denied through the invocation of 
“psy” discourses, which present these women as irrational, as not understanding and 
therefore not intending to kill their victim.90 For women currently constructed as 
legal objects their new identity becomes that of the mad label and therefore their 
agency is also actively denied. However interrupting passive agency denial, through 
the expansion of the legal subject and the acknowledgment of women as agents, has 
the consequence that attaching the label of mad to women who kill interrupts active 
denials of their agency. This is because agents are rational actors and madness is a 
concept that is oppositional to, and thus inherently incompatible with, an agentical 
subject. This has the consequence that although the label of mad will undoubtedly 
still be used to describe the murderous actions of these women, when they are 
labeled, they are being labeled as subjects with agency, that is as agents, rather than 
as objects and therefore mad will no longer become their overwhelming identity. 
                                                          
89 Hunter et al., 2010, p35  
90 See chapter five, section 5.4, pp. 208-209 for a more detailed discussion on how women who kill 
labeled as mad have their agency actively denied. 
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Instead, they will be viewed as women who have made the choice to kill, with the 
acknowledgment that the nature of this choice may (on the facts of the particular 
case) have been impeded or limited by mental health problems. 
Prima facie, it may appear that individuals labeled as mad can never have 
their agency acknowledged, and indeed it has become apparent that women in their 
current position as legal objects who are labelled as mad consistently have their 
agency denied. However the idea of subjects with mental health issues still being 
treated as agents who can make choices regarding their lives and behaviour is 
already reflected in law for men, demonstrated in the recent sterilisation case: An 
NHS Trust v DE.91  
In this case DE, a 37-year-old man who suffered from learning difficulties, 
already had one child with his long term partner. He made it clear that he did not 
want any more children but was considered to lack the capacity to make decisions as 
to the use of contraception, including whether to have a vasectomy. Therefore the 
NHS Trust sought a declaration that it was lawful for him to undergo a vasectomy. In 
its reasoning the Court clearly attached significant weight to DE’s wishes with regard 
to fathering more children, despite also finding he lacked capacity: ‘Dr Milnes 
regarded the most magnetic factor in favour of vasectomy as being DE’s desire not to 
have any more children. It is undoubtedly a magnetic factor carrying considerable 
weight …’92 Therefore it is submitted that women as legal subjects could similarly be 
labeled as mad (without it assuming their new identity) and still simultaneously be 
                                                          
91 [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam) 
92 An NHS Trust v DE [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam), official transcript, para 96. 
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treated as agents, albeit with some limitations.  
 Acknowledging women as legal subjects and thus as agents and interrupting 
active agency denial when using the mad label, allows wider contextual issues to be 
deliberated when considering the behaviour of these women. For women convicted 
of infanticide and labeled as mad, statistics highlight that many of them do not 
actually meet the legal basis for the plea: puerperal psychosis.93 Therefore, viewing 
these women as agents allows for consideration of why these women made the 
choice to kill their child outside of the confines of the “psy” discourses. A lack of 
support for mothers, failure of fathers to fulfil their paternal role, and social and 
financial pressures can therefore all be seriously contemplated when active agency 
denial ceases.  
 Within existing criminal legal discourse and practice, some women who kill 
their abusive partners are labelled as victims and thus have their agency actively 
denied. Currently, when these women are labelled as victims their new identity 
becomes that of a woman who is so profoundly victimised that she is incapable of 
making a choice with regards to how to act, or indeed that she is able to commit any 
sort of act with intention. However, recognising women as agents means that 
although the label of victim may still be attached to these women, it is used as a label 
which reflects their lived experience, rather than one which becomes their all-
consuming new identity and actively denies their agency. Indeed, the concepts of 
agent and victim ‘[a]re usually understood to represent the opposing categories of a 
                                                          
93 See chapter five, section 5.2 for a more detailed discussion on the defence of infanticide and the 
legal basis of the plea: puerperal psychosis. 
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dichotomy’94 and therefore women as agents cannot also have the identity of 
victims. However, that is not to say that these women have not been victimised, in 
the criminal and legal sense of the term, and therefore they may well be referred to 
as victims, without that becoming their identity.  
Recognising battered women who kill as legal subjects exerting their agency is 
actually arguably more reflective of their murderous behaviour than the current 
system of agency denial. That is to say that these women made the choice to kill 
their abusive partners in order to alleviate the abuse they were suffering, but that 
their choice was one which was made within and thus limited by the confines of their 
abusive relationship. Interrupting passive agency denial and thus in turn interrupting 
active agency denial, creates a discursive space within which to ask the pertinent 
question of why these women chose to exercise their agency in this way, i.e. by 
killing their abuser. Indeed it also provides the opportunity for a new legal narrative 
to emerge, one which allows women to give an account of their experience, an 
opportunity ‘[t]o say in her own words how she perceives her own social reality.’95 
This has the potential to form the basis of tangible discussions on the existing legal 
and social provisions available to victims of domestic violence, such as the adequacy 
of existing legal injunctions, the issue of alternative accommodation and the societal 
response to such abuse. These discussions would arguably have more resonance and 
impact if they occurred in the context of a socio-legal discourse that does not actively 
deny the agency of these women by labelling them as victims. 
                                                          
94 Chiu, 2000, p.1241  
95 Naffine, 1987, p.86 
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It must be noted here that acknowledging the agency of battered women 
who kill does not equate to these women being able to control or influence their 
abuse or their abuser. Agency is being used in this context as a term which refers to 
the individual woman’s choice with regard to her actions and behaviours, not with 
regard to that of others. Similarly, as noted earlier in the thesis, the agency that 
women can exercise in this new theoretical model is still limited within existing social 
structures, one of which is the domination of the discursive construction of 
masculinity over femininity within a patriarchal society. Therefore it would be 
extremely problematic to suggest that even if battered women have agency they are 
in some way responsible for their abuse or capable of preventing it, because arguably 
they lack the power within existing patriarchal social structures to do so.  
WKB currently have their agency denied through the invocation of an extra 
element of badness, which constructs them as monsters, as mythic Medusa-like 
creatures who are not human.96 The use of the label bad actively denies the agency 
of these women by personifying them as evil, thus denying that it was a human that 
acted and so denying their human agency. Accepting women as legal subjects and 
agents means that their humanity is asserted beyond doubt. Therefore, when 
women who kill are acknowledged as agents and are labelled as bad the active 
agency denial that previously took place is interrupted. Instead, when the label of 
bad is attached to agentic women, it is used in such a way to suggest that it is a 
particular type of woman that has acted, i.e. a bad woman, rather than the label 
becoming the new identity of these women and denying their humanity. The label of 
                                                          
96 See chapter five, section 5.4 at pp.209-210 for a more detailed discussion of how the label of bad 
actively denies the agency of women who kill.  
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bad is thus used in its colloquial, every day meaning in such a context that is, as 
‘lacking or failing to conform to moral virtue.’97 Therefore when the label of bad is 
attached to women as agents what is being said is that this woman made the choice 
to act in the way that she did and she acted in a bad way. She is a woman who 
exercised her agency in a pejorative, bad way.  
Interrupting the active agency denial associated with the use of the label bad 
also allows an arguably much needed discussion surrounding the motives and 
behaviours of these women who kill to occur. As Helen Birch noted, women like 
Myra Hindley bewilder us because we do not have a language to accurately 
represent these examples of female killing,98 so we mythologise their actions and 
label such women as bad to explain their murderous behaviour and actively deny 
their agency. However, with women’s agency being acknowledged in the new model 
being proposed, there is a tangible opportunity to develop an engagement and 
understanding of this type of crime committed by women. An article written by 
Yardley on the recent case of female serial killer Joanna Dennehy, who pleaded (and 
was subsequently found) guilty of the murders of three men,99 highlights the 
importance of engaging with an approach that does not merely label these women 
as bad. As she explains; ‘[i]f we are to develop a more meaningful understanding of 
this type of crime, we need to resist the urge to dismiss her as a … bad aberration 
                                                          
97 Oxford Dictionaries, “bad” available at http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/bad  
98 Birch, Helen, “If looks could kill – Myra Hindley and the iconography of evil” in Birch, Helen (Ed), 
Moving Targets – Women, Murder and Representation (London: Virago Press Ltd, 1993) p.61 
99 See chapter five, pp.201-202 for a more detailed discussion on the case of Joanne Dennehy.  
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and look at the bigger picture in which fatal violence emerged.’100 Acknowledging 
women’s violence and interrupting active agency denial has the potential to allow 
this to happen through a presentation of women as having the ability to have chosen 
to kill, but contextualising this choice within their lived social experiences.  
As discussed earlier in the chapter, acknowledging women as agents also has 
the effect of interrogating and questioning the existing gender discourse which 
surrounds appropriate femininity. One current consequence for WKB is that they are 
often sentenced far more harshly than WKV or WKM because they are viewed as 
doubly deviant, offending against both society and their gender. However, 
recognising women as legal subjects and the subsequent interrogation of feminine 
gender norms which could occur may have the consequence that agentical women 
who kill labelled as bad will not continue to be sentenced based on their perceived 
gender deviance, but purely on the crime that they have committed and their 
offending against the state.  
 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
 Drawing upon analysis in previous chapters of this thesis, this chapter has 
suggested an approach which could be taken within criminal legal discourse which 
would allow the acknowledgment of the agency of women who kill. Having 
                                                          
100 The Guardian (2014a), “Women like Joanna Dennehy confuse us. Calling her mad or bad doesn’t 





acknowledged the importance of agency recognition within the context of women 
who kill, I have argued that altering the existing construction of the criminal legal 
subject found in the reasonable person, by removing any reference to sex or gender 
would actually make it gender neutral, rather than simply claiming to be, as is the 
case currently. This would allow women to be recognised as criminal legal subjects 
and thus have their agency passively acknowledged.  
In turn, I have argued that once this occurs it would have the effect of 
interrupting the active agency denial which currently occurs when the labels mad, 
bad or victim are attached to these women and become their exclusive identities. 
That is not to say that these labels will no longer be attached to women who kill, but 
rather that recognising women as legal subjects and thus as agents would mean that 
when these labels are used, they would no longer become their new identities and 
thus actively deny the agency of these women. 
Despite proposing a model for acknowledging the agency of women who kill, 
this chapter has also made it clear that any subsequent exercise of agency would 
currently be limited by social structures within a patriarchal society. However, I have 
also made it clear in my arguments and justifications for introducing this agency 
based model, that acknowledging women’s agency is the first step in altering social 
structures and thus allowing women to successfully exercise their recognised agency 
within socio-legal discourse.  
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Chapter Seven – Thesis Conclusion 
 
7.1 Initial Observations 
 The analysis conducted throughout this thesis leads to some initial 
observations. The first of these is that the concept of agency is one that is 
normatively gendered masculine. As discussed in chapter four, the notion of agency 
is not one that is associated with the constructions surrounding femininity. Agency is 
typically associated with the commonly associated masculine traits of rationality and 
the privileging of the mind over the body, with the consequence that men are 
constructed as agents. In contrast, the construction of femininity that focuses on 
women’s inability to control their emotions, their control at the hands of their own 
bodies and a patriarchal society, as well as their construction as “ideal victims”, 
combine to ensure that within societal discourse women’s agency is denied. Indeed, 
women are constructed as individuals who are acted upon, rather than positively 
choosing to act themselves. The constraining role of social structures and societal 
norms in this agency denial are also evident, with them re-affirming women’s agency 
denial and their subsequent inability to exercise agency. Therefore it is arguable that 
it is only by acting collectively that women’s agency can currently be exercised within 
existing social structures.  
 A similar approach to agency denial is taken within criminal legal discourse 
where women’s agency is passively denied. However, within such discourse there is 
rarely, if ever, the opportunity for women to collectively exercise their agency due to 
the nature of the criminal justice process which usually involves individuals as victims 
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or perpetrators, and the state.1 Although the criminal legal subject claims to be 
gendered neutral, that is the reasonable person, the analysis undertaken in chapters 
two and four has argued that it is still gendered masculine, thus reflecting the 
historical construction of the legal subject as that of the reasonable man. Indeed, 
despite the apparent gender neutrality of the reasonable person test, amended and 
codified in The Coroners and Justice Act as: ‘a person of D’s sex and age, with a 
normal degree of tolerance and self-restrain and in the circumstances of D might 
have reacted in the same or a similar way to D’,2 it has been argued that a discourse 
of masculinity still pervades this legal standard of subjecthood. This argument can, 
and indeed has been, further reinforced by the fact that the reasonable woman is a 
standard that has never been considered within legal discourse, not least because 
the terminology of reasonable woman conjoins two words that exist at the opposing 
sides of a dichotomy within socio-legal discourse.  
The masculine gendering of the legal subject and the consequential denial of 
women’s status as legal subjects has the effect of passively denying the agency of 
women within criminal legal discourse by reflecting a pre-existing state of affairs in 
patriarchal society. The gendered dimension found within the criminal law more 
generally, reflected in the gendered nature of defences to murder, further reinforces 
this passive denial of agency. I have argued that excuse defences, such as diminished 
responsibility, are gendered feminine, whereas justification defences, such as self-
defence, are gendered masculine.  Justification defences accept responsibility for the 
                                                          
1 This is also true for men. However, unlike women, men currently have their agency acknowledged 
within criminal legal discourse as a result of the masculine gendered legal subject.  This was discussed 
in detail in chapters two, four and six.  
2 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(1)(c) 
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defendant’s actions whilst acknowledging that their behaviour was correct. Thus 
gendering these defences as masculine reinforces the passive denial of agency of 
women by associating responsibility, and thus choice and agency with men and 
masculinity.   
 The masculine gendered nature of agency and the legal subject reflects an 
overarching observation that can be made of the pervasive nature of gendered 
norms within both societal and legal discourse. Indeed, it has become apparent that 
gender discourse also has a significant role to play when exploring the labels 
attached to women who kill of mad, bad or victim. The labels mad and victim in 
particular are reflective of gendered constructions surrounding femininity, reflecting 
the notion of women as pathological and emotional individuals and of their status as 
“ideal victims”. All three labels are utilised not just to explain the act of homicide 
perpetrated by these women, but also to explain their deviance from appropriate 
feminine behaviour as dictated by gender discourse. For example, the label of bad 
not only explains the act of killing but also the fact that the female perpetrator was a 
bad woman either in her lifestyle and its deviance from appropriate femininity, or in 
the specifics of the way in which she perpetrated the offence, or perhaps both.  
 
7.2 Overall Conclusions 
 This thesis engaged critically with the existing academic literature on a 
number of concepts including labelling and construction theory and gender discourse 
so as to explore the impact these concepts have on, and their relationship to, the 
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concept of agency. I have argued that women who kill have their agency denied 
within socio-legal discourse. More specifically, I have suggested that their agency is 
denied both actively and passively. Passive agency denial occurs because as women 
their status within criminal legal discourse continues to be that of legal objects rather 
than legal subjects, thereby reflecting the broader position within patriarchal society 
that women are acted upon, rather than actors with agency. This is reflected in the 
construction of the criminal legal subject as the reasonable person, which I have 
argued is gendered masculine. Although pertaining to be a gender neutral 
construction, I have suggested that the inclusion and reference to an individual’s sex 
within the reasonable person test,3 simultaneously enables and ensures the 
continuation of the masculine gendering of the legal subject. As agency is regarded 
as being the property of subjects, not objects, it is initially their status as women who 
lack legal subjecthood, which passively denies the agency of women who kill within 
criminal legal discourse.  
When women commit homicide, both society and the law labels them as 
either mad, bad or victims. Which of the three labels is used depends on the specifics 
of their crime and their defence, as well as the degree to which their behaviour more 
generally is perceived as having deviated from the norms surrounding appropriate 
femininity. When these labels are attached to women who kill as objects, rather than 
subjects and agents, they become all-consuming and reflect a new identity for the 
women they are attached to. Each of the labels, when attached to women whose 
                                                          
3 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, section 54(1)(c) refers to “a person of D’s sex and age, with a 
normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the 
same or in a similar way to D.” 
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agency is passively denied, have the effect of actively denying their agency in slightly 
different ways. The mad label actively denies agency by utilising discourses of 
pathology and irrationality, thus presenting women as not intending or 
understanding what they were doing, and thus lacking the ability to have made the 
choice to act in that way. The bad label invokes imagery of a monstrous and mythical 
being that lacks humanity with the consequence that the woman is transformed into 
a Medusa-style character. The active agency denial apparent in this context is that of 
human agency, that is to say that the woman did not act as a human and thus did not 
have the ability to choose how to act in the context of her humanity and femininity. 
Finally, the victim label actively denies the agency of the women it is attached to 
because as they currently exist, the concepts of agency and victimisation are 
incompatible with one another: they sit at opposing sides of a dichotomy. The 
discourse of victimisation suggests that the woman was so victimised that she was 
unable to choose how to act and indeed did not act at all. Rather she was product of 
her batterer and victimisation at the hands of her partner.  
The agency denial, both passive and active, of women who kill has been 
presented as problematic within this thesis and thus in need of reform for numerous 
reasons. These include, but are not limited to, the umbrella issues of concerns with 
justice for both women who kill and for their victims. As a result I have argued that 
numerous justifications can be advanced for the recognition of the agency of these 
women within criminal legal discourse. These include creating a discursive space 
within which the construction of, and norms surrounding appropriate femininity can 
be challenged, a more detailed engagement with societal responsibility for the 
homicidal actions of these women and a clearer acknowledgment that women are 
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capable of committing extreme acts of violence. I have therefore attempted to 
create a discursive space within which the agency of women who kill can be 
recognised and which will allow a model to be created which acknowledges their 
agency. 
I have argued that women’s agency needs to be passively acknowledged 
before active agency denial can be interrupted and the agency of women who kill 
can be effectively recognised within socio-legal discourse. I have suggested that the 
existing construction of the criminal legal subject, currently the reasonable person 
which is gendered masculine, needs to be (re)constructed. In my analysis I critically 
explored various potential (re)constructions, including introducing the concept of the 
reasonable woman and creating a universal subject to whom universal rights are 
ascribed. However I felt that both of these constructions would ultimately be too 
problematic to utilise and therefore concluded that the most effective approach 
would be to alter the existing composition of the reasonable person to one which is 
actually, rather than simply theoretically, gender neutral.  
Therefore it was suggested that the existing reasonable person test, codified 
in the defence of loss of control,4 should remove any reference to the defendant’s 
sex or gender and instead read as: ‘a person with a normal degree of tolerance and 
self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a 
similar way to D.’ Ensuring the reasonable person, and thus the legal subject is 
gender neutral potentially allows women to be recognised as legal subjects, whilst 
                                                          
4 See The Coroners and Justice Act section 54(1)(c) which defines the reasonable person as: ‘a person 
of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, 
might have reacted in the same of a similar way to D’ 
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simultaneously allowing for a contextualisation of the circumstances of the homicidal 
actions of the female killer to occur. It is important to reiterate here that I 
acknowledge that even once women’s agency is recognised through their status as 
legal subjects their ability to actually exercise this agency will arguably still be read 
through the prism of patriarchy. Indeed, I have made clear throughout my thesis that 
any agency exercise which occurs has to be contextualised within the existing social 
structures of a patriarchal society. However, I have also suggested that 
acknowledging women’s agency in this way within criminal legal discourse is an initial 
step in ameliorating patriarchal discourse for women so that not only is their agency 
recognised but they can go on to also successfully exercise their agency within socio-
legal discourse. 
Passively recognising the agency of women within criminal legal discourse by 
altering the current definition of the reasonable person to acknowledge women as 
legal subjects and agents, has a direct impact on active agency denial. I have argued 
that although the existing labels of mad, bad and victim would still be attached to 
women who kill, by recognising them as legal subjects and agents, the active agency 
denial associated with the use of these labels would be interrupted. It is important to 
reiterate that nowhere in the thesis am I suggesting that as a result of agency 
recognition these labels will cease to be attached to women who kill. Indeed, within 
societal discourse labels have always been attached to those individuals who are 
perceived to be deviant in their behaviours and therefore I would suggest this is 
unlikely to change.  However, I have argued that when such labels are attached to 
subjects with agency they are less influential and pervasive than when attached to 
objects who lack agency. Therefore, by passively acknowledging women’s agency and 
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their status as legal subjects I have suggested that the active agency denial currently 
symbiotic to their labelling will be interrupted because the labels no longer become 
the new identities of the female subjects they are attached to. This proposed 
approach of dealing with both passive and active agency denial within criminal legal 
discourse ensures that the agency of women who kill is recognised.  
 
7.3 Implications of This study 
There are numerous potential implications that arise from the arguments put 
forward in this thesis and the ultimate acknowledgment of women as legal subjects 
with agency within criminal legal discourse that is being proposed. The first of which 
is the relationship between legal and societal discourse. Traditionally, the law and 
legal discourse has trailed behind societal discourse when exploring legal reform. 
This is perhaps most recently, accurately and clearly reflected in the context of 
legalising same-sex marriage. Indeed, a poll conducted in September 2008 found that 
a majority (55%) of Britons supported same-sex marriage, whilst 45% disagreed,5 
whilst in June 2009 an opinion poll published in The Times reported that 61% of 
Britons agreed that gay couples should have an equal right to marriage and not just 
be limited to civil partnerships, with 33% disagreeing.6 However, it was not until 
March 2012 that the Government launched a consultation on legalising same-sex 
civil marriage in England and Wales, with The Marriage (Same-Sex Couples) Bill 
                                                          
5 The Guardian (2008a), “Sex uncovered poll: Homosexuality” (26thOctober 2008), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2008/oct/26/relationships  
6 Religious Tolerance.org, “Same-sex civil partnerships and marriages in the UK 2004 to 2010: 
Increasing support for same-sex marriage in the UK”, available at 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_maruk3.htm  
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receiving Royal Assent in July 2013, and same-sex marriages being legally performed 
from midnight on 29th March 2014.  
The six-year gap between a majority of people signalling support for same-sex 
marriage and the required legalisation being passed highlights how legal discourse 
often trails significantly behinds societal discourse when responding to and 
implementing reforms. However, I would argue that in the context of acknowledging 
women’s agency, implementing the model suggested in this thesis would allow legal 
discourse the opportunity to take the lead in altering societal discourse, rather than 
the other way around. Indeed, the fact that societal discourse surrounding women 
and agency denial is reinforced by patriarchal institutions, such as the law and the 
legal system, means that for societal discourse to be sufficiently altered, I would 
suggest that it would have to be at least reflected in, if not initiated by legal 
discourse. So, by acknowledging women’s agency within criminal legal discourse 
through adopting the proposed changes and agency based model suggested within 
this thesis, societal discourse would also be prompted to alter so as to allow 
women’s agency to be acknowledged there too. I would argue that this would also 
then have the potential to ultimately alter existing social structures which would 
currently limit women’s successful exercise of agency, even when acknowledged. 
 Further reinforcement for the argument of legal discourse taking the lead and 
initiating change within societal discourse can be found in the implications that 
adopting an agency-based model for women who kill could arguably have on gender 
discourse. More specifically, I would suggest that acknowledging women’s agency 
might ameliorate some of the existing pejorative gender norms that surround 
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women and femininity. For example, I have argued that recognising women as legal 
subjects and agents and thereby interrupting active agency denial has the 
consequence that the labels attached to women who kill will no longer become their 
primary identity. Disrupting these labels in the context of primary identity 
implementation, I would argue, lessens the pervasiveness of the gender norms 
associated with their use.  
Taking each of the labels individually: preventing mad from becoming the 
primary identity of homicidal women by acknowledging them as agents, creates a 
discursive space within which to interrogate and question the associated pejorative 
gender stereotypes and norms of women being ruled by their hormones and 
emotions, being inherently irrational and the construction of the defective feminine 
body. No longer attaching the bad label as a primary identity has the potential to 
prevent women who deviate from the norms typically associated with appropriate 
femininity from being labelled as deviant and therefore averting the reinforcement 
of all gender stereotypes. Finally, preventing the label of victim becoming the 
primary identity of homicidal women may arguably help to end the enforcement of 
norms such as passivity and weakness from being associated with women and 
femininity, as well as the notion of women as being “ideal victims”.  
  Indeed, I would argue that an additional implication of acknowledging 
women as legal subjects and agents within criminal legal discourse is that it may have 
an implication on the construction of women as ideal victims. As I noted in chapter 
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four7 of my thesis, women are constructed as ideal victims within criminal law 
because they are most legitimately given the status of a victim. Typically the ideal 
victim lacks agency and is seen as virtuous and blameless for the criminal behaviour 
to which they have been exposed. However by readily constructing women as ideal 
victims, when they do not meet the expected standards, particularly of perceived 
blamelessness outlined above, their status as “real” and “deserving” victims is 
questioned and undermined. By failing to meet the criteria expected of them 
through their construction as ideal victims, these women become imperfect victims.8 
This is particularly the case where women are victims of domestic and sexual 
violence. As noted in chapter five,9 battered women who kill are expected to be 
passive, submissive, and meek in the face of violence from their partner, with those 
women who fail to do so, for example by attempting to fight back, being viewed as 
“underserving viragos”. Similarly, I would argue that to qualify as ideal and thus as 
true victims of rape women must not have engaged in in what may be perceived as 
“risk-taking behaviour” at the time of the rape, such as wearing revealing clothing, 
walking home alone in the dark, being intoxicated or acting in any way that could be 
perceived as “sexualised”.10  
 As I have argued elsewhere,11 the continuing construction of women as ideal 
victims without agency means that if women are perceived as attempting to have 
exercised their agency in any way, for example by choosing to walk home alone at 
                                                          
7 See chapter four at p.140 
8 Weare, Siobhan “You shouldn’t have to be perfect to ‘qualify’ as a rape victim” The Conversation, 2nd 
July 2014, available at https://theconversation.com/you-shouldnt-have-to-be-perfect-to-qualify-as-a-
rape-victim-26012 
9 See chapter five at pp.175-183 
10 Weare, 2014   
11 Weare, 2014  
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night in what is considered to be revealing and sexualised clothing before being 
raped, their status as any sort of victim, ideal or otherwise is called into question. 
Similarly, a battered woman who is having an extra-marital affair and physically 
resists and fights back against her partner also has her status as a victim 
questioned.12 This reflects the argument presented in this thesis that the current 
concepts of agency and victimisation are incompatible with one another. However, 
acknowledging women as legal subjects with agency would arguably alter and 
ameliorate the discourse surrounding this ideal victim construct. If women’s 
subjecthood and agency is readily acknowledged within criminal legal discourse, then 
when these women do attempt to exercise their agency by making choices with 
regard to their behaviour it will no longer undermine the victimisation they have 
suffered. Moreover by acknowledging women’s agency, a discursive space will be 
constructed within which the construction of the ideal victim could be undermined 
and thus deconstructed, allowing for women whose victimisation currently goes 
unrecognised because they are “imperfect victims”, to have it appropriately 
recognised, regardless of their behavioural choices and agency exercise.  
It should also be noted, that for such an approach to be truly effective there 
needs to be a simultaneous refocusing within societal discourse on women as agents 
rather than as victims. So rather than focusing on women as ideal victims, as the 
victims of men and of a patriarchal society more widely, societal discourse needs to 
think of women as agents who are fighting back against victimisation, empowering 
themselves and attempting to change their circumstances and experiences in any 
                                                          
12 Weare, 2014 
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way that they can.13 A dual approach that focuses on altering both societal and legal 
discourse once women are acknowledged as legal subjects with agency, ‘[w]ould 
mean that all women who have been victimised, regardless of what decisions they 
made, could expect violations of their bodily rights to be rightly acknowledged – 
rather than dismissed when they fail to match an insidious and damaging 
stereotype.’14 
Although the discussions within this thesis are focused within the context of 
women who kill, I would argue that the proposals regarding agency acknowledgment 
and labelling interruption are also applicable within the context of women as 
perpetrators of other serious criminal offences. In a current work in progress15 I have 
proposed that female co-perpetrators of child sexual abuse are labelled as victims in 
a similar way to women who kill. More specifically I argue that criminal legal and 
societal discourse responds to the actions of these female co-perpetrators by 
constructing them as victims of their male co-offender, thus suggesting that they are 
acting as a result of victimisation, coercion, violence and/or abuse from him. In the 
same way as women who kill labelled as victims have their agency actively denied, 
female co-perpetrators of child sexual abuse have their ability to have chosen to 
participate in the sexual abuse actively denied.  
 
This discourse of victimisation and active agency denial is evidenced in 
particular case examples, for example the recent case involving Lost Prophets singer 
                                                          
13 Weare, 2014 
14 Weare, 2014 
15 Weare, Siobhan, “Denying the Agency of ‘Victimised’ Female Co-Perpetrators of Child Sexual Abuse: 
Issues For Their Child Victims” (not yet published) 
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Ian Watkins and two female co-defendants, B and P. The prosecutor in the case, 
Chris Clee QC, said of the two female defendants: ‘both … admitted they have 
sexually abused their children at the behest of Ian Watkins’,16 thus suggesting there 
was an element of coercion involved. Similarly, in the media experts suggested that 
these women were groomed by Watkins into committing the abuse and that without 
such grooming and coercion it would have been unlikely these women would have 
abused their children.17 The use of language such as “grooming” suggests that these 
women were also the victims of Watkins. Even in the sentencing remarks, the judge 
acknowledged the role that Watkins played in the women’s commission of the sexual 
abuse. He noted how both women met Watkins when they were teenagers, were 
manipulated by him and his corrupting influences.18 Both women were also 
considered as falling below the threshold necessary for dangerousness,19 and were 
thus given determinate sentences of 14 and 17 years respectively.20 Despite such 
lengthy jail terms, the discourse of victimisation which pervaded the legal process, 
reflected in the lack of dangerousness associated with these women, ensured that 
their agency was actively denied.  
 
The active agency denial which takes place in the context of female co-
perpetrated child sexual abuse has some specific consequences for the child victims 
including but not limited to: the silencing of victims, minimisation of the harm caused 
                                                          
16 Wales Online, “Ian Watkins trial: Lostprophets singer pleads guilty to attempting to rape a baby” 
26th November 2013, available at http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/ian-watkins-trial-
lostprophets-singer-6343182  
17 BBC News Wales, “Lostprophets’ Ian Watkins groomed before baby abuse” 26th November 2013, 
available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-25108690  
18 Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013b, pp.2-3  
19 Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013b, p.9  
20 Judiciary of England and Wales, 2013b, p. 11  
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by these female co-perpetrators and the risk of future harm to vulnerable children 
posed by women who are constructed as non-ideal sex offenders. Thus, by 
acknowledging women as legal subjects and agents and interrupting the active denial 
of agency that is symbiotic to the labelling of female co-perpetrators, I would argue 
that it prevents the construction of these women as victims of their male co-offender 
being automatically assumed. Instead I would suggest that the discourse of 
victimisation would only be invoked in those cases where the case facts suggest it is 
wholly appropriate to do, rather than being the “go-to” response within criminal 
legal discourse as it is now. In turn, this could allow some of the existing issues for 
their child victims to be ameliorated.  
For example, acknowledging women as agents and interrupting the active 
agency denial associated with the label of victim, would acknowledge the ability of 
these women to choose, however limited the choice, to actively participate in the 
sexual abuse. As a consequence I would argue that this could combat some of the 
consequences and issues mentioned above. For example, acknowledging the agency 
of female co-perpetrators of child sexual abuse would allow a discursive language to 
be created around this type of criminal behaviour perpetrated by women which, I 
suggest, would help to prevent the silencing of victims by making it easier for them 
to come forward and report their victimisation. In turn, victims may feel they are 
more likely to be believed when they report the abuse. 
Implications of recognising women as legal subjects and agents are not just 
recognisable in the context of female defendants but also in that of women as the 
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victims of crime, particularly sexual violence. In a current work in progress,21 I 
suggest that the current construction of women as legal objects and the subsequent 
denials of agency which occur may have a role to play in the continuing low 
conviction rates in female rape trials. I argue that the importance of agency in this 
context can be seen when comparing male and female rape conviction rates. 
According to the most recent detailed statistics issued by the Ministry of Justice on 
Sexual Offending in England and Wales, in 2011 2,045 men were sent for trial at the 
Crown Court for the rape of a female (female rape). In total 1,044 of those men were 
found guilty, either because they pled guilty or because of a guilty verdict returned 
by the jury, that’s an overall conviction rate of 51.1%.22 This rate can be broken down 
and analysed further, to explore the number of convictions which arose specifically 
as a result of the trial process and jury verdict, rather than a guilty plea or the 
defendant ultimately not being tried. So of those 2,045 men sent for trial, 1,594 pled 
not guilty and thus actually stood trial, with only 625 being found guilty by a jury.23 
That is a guilty verdict rate of 39.2%. These figures can be compared to those 
available for the rape of a male (male rape) in 2011. 144 men were sent to trial for 
raping a male, of which 90 were found guilty, either because they pled guilty or were 
found to be so by a jury, at the Crown Court. That is an overall conviction rate of 
                                                          
21 Weare, Siobhan “Comparing Male and Female Rape Convictions: The Role of Agency” (not yet 
published) 
22 Gov.UK, “Sexual Offending Overview Tables”(10th January 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/an-overview-of-sexual-offending-in-england-and-wales 
Table 4.6, Rape of a Female, year 2011 
23 “Sexual Offending Overview Tables”, Table 4.6, Rape of a Female, year 2011 
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62.5%.24 Breaking these figures down further, 99 men entered a not guilty plea, with 
49 of them being found guilty by a jury. That is a guilty verdict rate of 49.5%.25 
As a percentile proportion of cases taken to the Crown Court in 2011, both the 
overall conviction rate and the guilty verdict rate was significantly higher in cases of 
male rape than in those of female rape.  Thus, in 2011, the overall conviction rate in 
cases of male rape was 11.4% higher than female rape, and the guilty verdict rate 
was 10.3% higher. The article will therefore explore the role of agency as a potential 
contributing factor and thus as a potential explanatory factor for the continual 
proportionately lower conviction and guilty verdict rates in cases of female rape 
when compared to male rape. 
Women’s current status as legal objects means that there is no recognition of 
their agency, that is their ability to choose to act in a certain way. I argue that in the 
context of rape cases this denial of women’s agency means that they are denied the 
ability to exercise choice when it comes to refusing to consent to sex. Indeed, the 
normative position in the context of heterosexual sexual activity is for both men and 
women to consent. That is to say that there is a presumption of consent. Thus the 
element of choice, and thus the exercise of agency available in the context of sex 
involves refusing to consent. This may take the form of, for example, saying “no”, 
through body language, or by physical rejection.  
This normative position of consenting and the agentical element of refusing 
to consent to sex is reflected in the phrasing typically used within rape discourse that 
                                                          
24 “Sexual Offending Overview Tables”, Table 4.6, Rape of a Male, year 2011 
25 “Sexual Offending Overview Tables”, Table 4.6, Rape of a Male, year 2011 
 285 
“no means no”, as well as the legal definition of rape which refers to the victim not 
consenting, i.e. saying “no” to the penetration.26 The failure to acknowledge 
women’s agency within criminal legal discourse is thus relevant in the context of rape 
because it does not readily recognise their ability to deviate from the normative 
presumption of consent by refusing to consent to sex. In contrast, the automatic 
acknowledgment of men as agents means that their ability to refuse to consent to 
sex is readily accepted. This relationship between agency and consent in cases of 
rape may therefore offer some explanation for the proportionately lower conviction 
rates in cases of female rape. 
As well as being relevant to the issue of presumptive consent, it is submitted 
that agency is also relevant to the legal definition of rape. More specifically I suggest 
that it is of relevance when exploring the statutory requirement that it must be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt that the (male) perpetrator did not reasonably 
believe that the (male or female) victim consented.27 This issue of the defendant’s 
reasonable belief in the victim’s consent goes to the heart of a rape trial and it is in 
this context that I suggest that the agency of the victim plays a significant role. In a 
scenario involving a male defendant and a female victim, the male defendant, as a 
legal subject has his agency automatically recognised within criminal legal discourse. 
The female victim however, constructed as a legal object, does not have her agency 
readily acknowledged and therefore her ability to deviate from the normative 
presumption of consent by refusing to consent to sex with the defendant is not 
automatically asserted. Therefore, in relation to section 1(1)(c) of The Sexual 
                                                          
26 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 1(1)(b) 
27 The Sexual Offences Act 2003, section 1(1)(c) 
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Offences Act, the requirement of the defendant’s reasonable belief in the victim’s 
consent, may be more easily satisfied as her ability to refuse to do so is not readily 
acknowledged. This may therefore offer some explanation for the proportionately 
lower conviction rates in cases of female rape. 
 Therefore by implementing the suggestions made in this thesis, and 
acknowledging women as legal subjects with agency, there is the potential to combat 
some of the issues raised above with regard to female rape conviction rates by 
creating a new discursive space within criminal legal discourse with regards to 
women, agency and consent to sex which more clearly allows women’s ability to 
refuse to consent to be acknowledged. Moreover, it is also arguable that by 
acknowledging women as subjects, some reiteration of men’s status in this regard 
may occur, as well as focusing more broadly on the issue of rape convictions and 
therefore also potentially having a positive impact on the conviction rates for male 
rape.  
 
7.4 Further Research 
 Having explored some of the key implications that arise as a result of the 
research conducted for, and arguments proposed within, this thesis, it is clear that 
there is a significant amount of future research which could be conducted in order to 
further the conclusions advanced here. The first piece of research, and the one that 
is perhaps most directly related to the female agency recognition model proposed in 
this thesis, could focus on the practical steps that need to be taken to ensure that the 
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agency-based model is successfully implemented by legal and criminal justice bodies 
and agencies. Indeed due to the word limit constraints of this thesis, a sufficiently 
detailed engagement with the practicalities of implementing the proposed agency-
based system could not be undertaken. However, in order to give true credence to 
the proposals made in the thesis, there would be a clear benefit from engaging with 
the practical, as well as theoretical, side of things. Indeed, having critically engaged 
with the work of Butler in chapter two,28 and criticised her for failing to sufficiently 
explore the practicalities within her research, I am aware that it would be all too easy 
to fall into the same trap. 
Therefore future research projects could cover issues such as altering judicial 
and barrister training to direct them to eliminate the use of gendered language in 
criminal law trials. Similarly, members of the judiciary and legal profession could 
focus more on the issue of agency within the criminal trial process, highlighting to 
the jury that women, as recognised legal subjects are agents, but that their ability to 
choose how to behave may have been impaired, perhaps to a significant degree, by 
both internal and external factors, such as a psychiatric disorder or a violent and 
abusive relationship. There could also be jury directions given during criminal trials 
warning them not to take into account the gender of the defendant, unless it is of 
particular relevance to the trial, e.g. in cases involving infanticide which is a female 
specific defence.  
There is also potential to suggest that a report could be prepared by The Law 
Commission, exploring the issue of “practically” recognising women as legal subjects 
                                                          
28 See chapter two, section 2.5.2  
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through altering the reasonable person test, currently found in the defence of loss of 
control, codified in The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, to that which has been 
proposed in this thesis. Greater awareness of the issue of women’s agency within 
criminal legal discourse could also be facilitated by a focus on the issue within legal 
education. For example, women’s agency and issues such as the use of gendered 
language could be covered within undergraduate degrees in the criminal law, legal 
theory or gender and the law modules. Similarly, within postgraduate legal 
qualifications such as the Legal Practice Course (LPC) and the Bar Professional 
Training Course (BPTC), there could be a focus on ensuring that these future lawyers, 
barristers and judges acknowledge women’s agency and do not include gendered 
language within documentation they produce or submissions that they make to the 
court.  
Another area of further research to be considered is that of undertaking 
empirical research. Having understood and developed a theoretical basis and 
framework for acknowledging the agency of women who kill within criminal legal 
discourse, conducting empirical research would allow for a more practical approach 
to be explored.  Indeed, conducting empirical research into the experiences of 
officials within the criminal justice system in dealing with women who kill would 
provide an additional dimension to the research conducted in this thesis, allowing an 
exploration of whether the theoretically based arguments and proposals advanced 
are, and indeed could be, reflected and implemented within the structures and 
agencies that currently exist within the justice system, or whether additional reform 
would be required. I would envisage this empirical research engaging with key 
gatekeepers and stakeholders within the criminal justice system including the Crown 
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Prosecution Service, defence barristers involved in cases of women who kill, prison 
officers and probation officers with experience of working with homicidal women. 
Engaging with a wide range of officials with experience of working with these women 
at different points during their time involved in the justice system would give a more 
complete understanding of the experiences, treatment of and perspectives on, 
women who kill.  
 One area explored within this thesis, was the influence of gendered language 
on criminal legal discourse. The importance of this issue within the context of this 
thesis and the agency-based model that has been proposed arguably makes it an 
area ripe for further research. Within the context of the areas explored and 
arguments made in this thesis, a particular area for future research could include a 
detailed engagement on the use of gendered language in judicial sentencing remarks 
and media reporting in cases of women who kill. I suggest that such a project could 
lend itself to using a text mining29 approach, whereby words or clusters of words 
within these documents could be analysed to determine the similarities or relations 
between them in the context of gendered language. Understanding the full and 
detailed scope of the problem of gendered language use by the judiciary as well as 
within the media, would be useful not only as a piece of research in its own right, but 
also within the context of research on the practical approach to agency 
acknowledgment, discussed above. By understanding the extent of this problem, it 
will allow processes and structures to be implemented in an effort to combat it, as 
                                                          
29 “Text mining can be defined as the art of extracting significative data from large amount of written 
texts. Text mining techniques allow to structure and categorize text contents which are initially non- 
organized and heterogeneous. It allows to identify trends, topics and tones” – Digital Marketing 
Glossary, “What is text mining definition?” available at http://digitalmarketing-glossary.com/What-is-
Text-mining-definition  
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well as to reinforce the acknowledgement of women as legal subjects and agents in 
the theoretical agency-based model that has been suggested.  
 As well as exploring the influence of gendered language in judicial sentencing 
remarks, the continuation of writing feminist judgments would demonstrate a 
practical way in which judgments could be written that acknowledge women as legal 
subjects and agents.  Indeed, continuing with the Feminist Judgments project and 
writing the ‘missing’ feminist judgments of key criminal cases would allow for the 
continued reiteration and highlighting of the issues of gendered language, gender 
bias, the silencing of women and agency denial, as well as demonstrating ways in 
which these issues can be overcome. In the Feminist Judgments Project the need for 
more such judgments to be written was highlighted,30 particularly in relation to 
emphasising the continuing struggle for women in relation to legal subjecthood.31  
 As noted in chapter four,32 there are no detailed figures currently available 
for the use of the defences of loss of control and diminished responsibility that 
include a gender breakdown, since the introduction and changes made by The 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009. As such it would be useful to conduct further research 
into the prevalence and use of these defences by both men and women. In this thesis 
I have argued that excuse defences, such as diminished responsibility are gendered 
feminine, whereas justification defences, such as loss of control are gendered 
masculine. Therefore, to further substantiate the claims I am making based on the 
existing data available, a more detailed exploration of the use of these defences 
                                                          
30 Hunter et al., 2010, p.28 
31 Hunter et al., 2010, p.28 
32 See chapter four, at p.160  
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would be useful. When collecting this data I would argue such research would 
benefit from not merely focusing on numerical data, e.g. how many women versus 
men successfully pleaded diminished responsibility post the 2009 Act, but also 
including a contextualisation within which these successful pleas were made, e.g. a 
brief analysis of the case facts etc..  Other than being useful in further substantiating 
the claims I have made regarding the gendering of defences, collecting and 
interrogating such data may also reveal additional patterns and intricacies, as yet 
unnoticed, and which may themselves be worthy of further research.  
 Looking outside of the specific confines and context of this thesis, I would 
suggest that there is also room for further research on the topic of agency and its 
denial, acknowledgment and application to different groups of people. As noted 
above, one of the implications of the research conducted in this thesis extends to 
exploring the labels attached to female co-perpetrators of child sexual abuse. 
Although I have already drafted an article on this area, the recent Children’s 
Commissioner Report on Intrafamilial Child Sexual Abuse has highlighted that the 
majority of existing literature on the area focuses on male perpetrators,33 and 
therefore more research needs to be conducted into female perpetrators of such 
abuse. As such I would suggest that additional research focusing on the issue of 
agency, perhaps alongside some empirical research into offending and reporting 
rates, could begin to fill this gap in the literature.  
                                                          
33 Office of the Children’s Commissioner, ““It’s a lonely journey”: A Rapid Evidence Assessment on 
Intrafamilial Child Sexual Abuse” (3rd July 2014), available at 
http://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/content/publications/content_821 p.12 
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Another area that could be of interest for future research is the agency of 
children within criminal legal discourse. Much like women, children are considered to 
be non-ideal offenders. Therefore it would be interesting to see if there are any 
similarities in the socio-legal response to child offenders, particularly of serious 
violent crimes such as homicide and sexual abuse, when compared with the issues 
raised in this thesis, especially in the context of labelling and active agency denial. It 
may be of particular interest to explore the impact of a child’s age on agency denial 
or acknowledgment within criminal legal discourse, taking into consideration the fact 
that the age of criminal responsibility is 10. 
 
7.5 Concluding Thoughts 
 The existing academic literature on women who kill has acknowledged the 
issue of agency denial and some of the consequences that this has for the treatment 
of these women within the criminal justice system. This thesis has made significant 
progress in attempting to address the issue of agency denial by proposing a new 
model that allows the agency of these women to be recognised within criminal legal 
discourse. It has created a platform from which further research can be conducted 






--- ‘Obituaries – Sir Roger Ormrod’ at 
http://www.jsasoc.com/Family_archive/Archive/Roger%20Ormrod/roger%20ormrod
%20obit%20times.pdf 
A Year of Feminist Classics, “Introducing Gender Trouble by Judith Butler” available 
at http://feministclassics.wordpress.com/2011/11/06/introducing-gender-trouble-
by-judith-butler/ 
Abbott, Pamela, and Wallace, Claire, An Introduction to Sociology: Feminist 
Perspectives (London: Routledge, second ed, 1997) 
About.com, “Feminist Theory: An Overview” available at 
http://sociology.about.com/od/Sociological-Theory/a/Feminist-Theory.htm 
Abrams, Kathryn “Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory” 
Colum. L. Rev, 95, (1995), 304 
Ahmed, Sara, Differences that Matter: Feminist Theory and Postmodernism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)  
Allen, Hilary, Justice Unbalanced – Gender, Psychiatry and Judicial Decisions (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1987) 
Allen, Hilary, “One Law for All Reasonable Persons?” International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law, 1988, 16, 419 
Allen, Hilary (1987b), “Rendering Them Harmless: The Professional Portrayal of 
Women Charged with Serious Violent Crimes” in Carlen, Pat and Worrall, Anne (Eds), 
Gender, Crime and Justice (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1987) 
Alsop Rachel; Fitzsimons, Annette and Lennon, Kathleen, Theorising Gender 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002)  
American Psychiatric Association, “Gender Dysphoria” DSM-5, available at 
http://www.dsm5.org/documents/gender%20dysphoria%20fact%20sheet.pdf 
Ashworth, Andrew, and Horder, Jeremy, Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, seventh ed, 2013) 
Austin J. L., How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered in 
Harvard University in 1955 (edited by Urmson, J. O. and Sbisà, Marina) (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, second edition, 1976) 
Bandura, Albert, “Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective” Annu. Rev. 
Psychol. 52, (2001), 1 
Barker, Philip, Michel Foucault: An Introduction (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 1998) 
 294 
Barnett, Hilaire, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (London: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 1998) 
BBC News (2010a), “Murder life sentences questioned in attitudes research” (29 
October 2010), available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11648739 
 
BBC News, “Watching a murderess most foul” (22 November 2005) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4439184.stm 
BBC News, “Women say some rape victims should take blame – survey” (15th 
February 2010) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8515592.stm  
BBC News Wales, “Lostprophets’ Ian Watkins groomed before baby abuse” 26th 
November 2013, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-25108690 
Beal, Carole, Boys and Girls: The Development of Gender Roles (New York: McGraw-
Hill, Inc., 1994) 
Beauvoir, Simone de, The Second Sex (translation by Borde, Constance and 
Malovany-Chevallier, Sheila) (London: Random House, 2010) 
Becker, Howard, Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (New York: The Free 
Press, 1963) 
Bennett, W. Lance, and Feldman, Martha S., Reconstructing Reality in the Courtroom: 
Justice and Judgment in American Culture (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
Press, 1981) 
Birch, Helen, “If looks could kill – Myra Hindley and the iconography of evil” in Birch, 
Helen (Ed), Moving Targets – Women, Murder and Representation (London: Virago 
Press Ltd, 1993) 
Blinde, Elaine, and Taub, Diane, “Women athletes as falsely accused deviants: 
managing the lesbian stigma” The Sociologist Quarterly, 33(4), (1992), 521 
Bolich, G.G., Conversing on Gender (Raleigh, NC: Psyche’s Press, 2007) 
Broad Recognition, “Nussbaum on Butler” available at 
http://broadrecognition.com/politics/nussbaum-on-butler/ 
Butler, Judith, Bodies That Matter: On The Discursive Limits of “Sex” (London: 
Routledge, 1993) 
Butler, Judith, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: 
Routledge Classics, 2006) 
Butler, Judith, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997) 
Butler, Judith, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004) 
 295 
Carlen, Pat and Worrall, Anne, “Introduction: Gender, Crime and Justice” in Carlen, 
Pat and Worrall, Anne (Eds), Gender, Crime and Justice (Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press, 1987) 
Carrabine, Eamonn;  Iganski, Paul; Lee, Maggy, Plummer, Ken, and South, Nigel, 
Criminology: A Sociological Introduction (London: Routledge, 2004) 
Carrington, Kerry, “Critical Reflections on Feminist Criminologies” in Anthony, Thalia, 
and Cunneen, Chris (Eds), The Critical Criminology Companion (Sydney: Hawkins 
Press, 2008) 
Chamallas, Martha, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory (New York: Aspen 
Publishers, second ed, 2003) 
Charrad, Mounira, “Women’s agency across cultures: Conceptualising strengths and 
boundaries” Women’s Studies International Forum, 33, (2010), 517 
Chau, P-L. and Herring, Jonathan, “Defining, Assigning and Designing Sex” 
International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family, 16, (2002), 327 
Chiu, Elaine, “Confronting the Agency in Battered Mothers” S. Cal. L. Rev, 74, (2000-
2001), 1223 
Christie, Nils, “The Ideal Victim” in Fattah, Ezzat (Ed), From Crime Policy to Victim 
Policy: Reorienting the Justice System (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1986) 
Collier, Richard, Masculinities, Crime and Criminology: Men, Heterosexuality and the 
Criminal(ised) Other (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1998) 
Collier, Richard, Masculinity, Law and the Family (London: Routledge, 1995) 
Connell, Robert, “Arms and the man: using the new research on masculinity to 
understand violence and promote peace in the contemporary world” in Breines, 
Ingeborg; Connell, Robert; and Eide, Ingrid (Eds.), Male roles, masculinities and 
violence: a culture of peace perspective (Paris: UNESCO Publishing, 2000) 
Cowan, Sharon, ““Gender is no substitute for sex”: A comparative Human Rights 
analysis of the Legal Regulation of Sexual Identity” Feminist Legal Studies, 13, (2005), 
67 
Cowan, Sharon, ““That Woman is a Woman!” The case of Bellinger v Bellinger and 
the mysterious (dis)appearance of sex” Feminist Legal Studies, 12, (2004), 79 
Crawford, Mary, and Unger, Rhoda, Women and Gender: A Feminist Psychology (New 
York: McGraw Hill, fourth ed, 2004) 
Dahlerup, Drude, The New Women’s Movement: Feminism and Political Power in 
Europe and the USA (London:Sage, 1986) 
Daley, Kathleen and Chesney-Lind, Meda, “Feminism and Criminology” Justice 
Quarterly, 5, 1988, 497 
 296 
Davies, Margaret, “Taking the Inside Out: Sex and Gender in the Legal Subject” in 
Naffine, Ngaire and Owens, Rosemary (eds.) Sexing the Subject of Law (London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) 
Delphy, Christine, Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women’s Oppression 
(London: Hutchinson, 1984)  
Descartes, René, Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy 
(translated by Haldane, Elizabeth S.) (Digireads.com Publishing, 2005) 
Detmold, M.J., “The Common Law as Embodiment” in Naffine, Ngaire, and Owens, 
Rosemary (Eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (Sydney: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) 
Devon Rape Crisis Service, “Myths About Rape” available at 
http://www.devonrapecrisis.org.uk/myths-about-rape 
Digital Marketing Glossary, “What is text mining definition?” available at 
http://digitalmarketing-glossary.com/What-is-Text-mining-definition 
Dobash, R Emerson, Dobash, Russell P, Noaks, Lesley (Eds), Gender and Crime 
(Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995) 
Duff, Anthony, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability – Philosophy of Action and the 
Criminal Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) 
Duncan, Sheila, “The Mirror Tells Its Tale: Constructions of Gender in Criminal Law” in 
Bottomley, Anne (Ed), Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law 
(London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 1996) 
Dunn, Jennifer, “”Victims” and “Survivors”: Emerging Vocabularies of Motive for 
“Battered Women Who Stay”” Sociological Inquiry, 75(1), 2005, 1 
Dworkin, Ronald, Law’s Empire (Fontana, 1986)  
Eduards, Maud L., “Women’s Agency and Collective Action” Women’s Studies Int. 
Forum, 17, 2/3, (1994), 181 
Edwards, Susan, “Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self-Control” 
Journal of Criminal Law, 74(3), 2010, 223 
Edwards, Susan, “Loss of self-control: when his anger is worth more than her fear” in 
Reed, Alan, and Bohlander, Michael, (eds) Loss of Control and Diminished 
Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives (Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2013) 
Edwards, Susan, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (London: Blackstone Press 
Limited, 1996) 
Edwards, Susan, Women on Trial: A Study of the Female Suspect, Defendant and 
Offender in the Criminal Law and Criminal Justice System (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1984) 
 297 
Ferraro, Kathleen, “The Words Change, But the Melody Lingers: The Persistence of 
the Battered Woman Syndrome in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women” 
Violence Against Women 9, 1, (2003), 110 
Fineman, Martha, “Feminist Legal Theory” American University Journal of Gender, 
Social Policy and the Law, 13(1), (2005), 13 
Fishwick, Elaine “Sexual Assault and Criminal Justice: A Comparative Perspective on 
Legislation, Policing and Research” in Findlay, Mark, and Hoggs, Russell (Eds), 
Understanding Crime and Criminal Justice (Sydney: Law Book Co, 1988) 
Forell, Caroline and Matthews, Donna, A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as 
a Measure of Man (New York: New York University Press, 2000) 
Foucault, Michel, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-
77 (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980)  
Foucault, Michel, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1 An Introduction (London: 
Penguin Books, 1976) 
Fox, Greer Litton, ““Nice Girl”: Social Control of Women through a Value 
Construction” Signs 2, (1987), 805  
Fox News, “FOXSexpert: Sexual Double Standards” (August 10, 2009) available at 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,538795,00.html 
French, Sean, “Partners in Crime: Defending the Female of the Species” in Myers, 
Alice and Wright, Sarah (Eds.), No Angels: Women Who Commit Violence (London: 
Harper Collins, 1996) 
Frigon, Sylvie, “A Genealogy of Women’s Madness” in Dobash, R Emerson, Dobash, 
Russell P, Noaks, Lesley (Eds), Gender and Crime (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 
1995) 
Gillespie, Rosemary, “When No Means No: Disbelief, Disregard and Deviance as 
Discourses of Voluntary Childlessness” Women’s Studies International Forum, 23(2), 
(2000), 223 
Gov.UK, “Sexual Offending Overview Tables” (10th January 2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/an-overview-of-sexual-offending-in-
england-and-wales 
Grana, Sheryl, Women and Justice (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009) 
Greeson, Megan and Campbell, Rebecca, “Rape survivors’ agency within the legal 
and medical systems” Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35, 4 (2011) 582 
Grenfell, Laura “Making sex: law’s narrative of sex, gender and identity” Legal Stud., 
23, (2003), 66 
Hacking, Ian, The social construction of What? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1999) 
 298 
Hales, Dianne, Just Like a Woman: How Gender Science is Redefining What Makes Us 
Female (New York: Bantam Books, 1999) 
Hansford Johnson, Pamela, On Iniquity—Some Personal Reflections Arising out of the 
Moors Murder Trial (London: MacMillan, 1967) 
Hawkins, Cathy, “The Monster Body of Myra Hindley” Scan Journal of Media Arts 
Culture, (2004), available at 
http://scan.net.au/scan/journal/display.php?journal_id=40  
Hays, Sharon, “Structure, Agency and the Sticky Problem of Culture” Sociological 
Theory, 12(1), (Mar 1994), 57 
Heidensohn, Frances, Women and Crime (Basingstoke: MacMillan Publishers Limited, 
1985) 
Herman, Barbara, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993)  
Herring, Jonathan, Criminal Law Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, fifth ed, 2012) pp.250-251 
Hill, Thomas E., Jr., Human Welfare and Moral Worth – Kantian Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002) 
Hines, Sally, “Recognising Diversity? The Gender Recognition Act and Transgender 
Citizenship” in Hines, Sally and Sanger, Tom (eds)., Transgender Identities: Towards a 
Social Analysis of Gender Diversity (New York: Routledge, 2010) 
Hitlin, Steven and Elder, Glen H., Jr., “Time, Self and the Curiously Abstract Concept 
of Agency” Sociological Theory, 25(2), (2007), 170 
Hoff, Lee Ann, Battered Women as Survivors (New York: Routledge, 1990) 
Huckerby, Jayne, “Women who kill their children: Case study and conclusions 
concerning the differences in the fall from maternal grace by Khoua Her and Andrea 
Yates” Duke Journal of Gender, Law and Policy, 10 (2003), 149 
Hunter, Rosemary; McGlynn, Clare; and Rackley, Erika, (Eds), Feminist Judgments: 
From Theory to Practice (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010) 
 Jackson, Stevi and Scott, Sue (eds). Gender: A sociological reader (London: 
Routledge, 2002) 
Jeffreys, Sheila, “They Know It When They See It: The UK Gender Recognition Act 
2004” BJPIR 10, (2008), 328 
Jones, Ann, Women Who Kill (New York: The Feminist Press at the City University of 
New York, 2009) 
Johnson, Allan G., The Gender Knot: Unravelling Our Patriarchal Legacy (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, revised and updated edition, 2005)  
 299 
Judiciary of England and Wales, “Sentencing Remarks R v Joanne Christine Dennehy, 




Judiciary of England and Wales, “Sentencing Remarks R v Mariusz Krezolek and 
Magdelena Luczak” (2 August 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-krezole-and-luczak-
sentencefinal.pdf  
Judiciary of England and Wales (2013a), “Sentencing Remarks R v Nicola Edgington” 
(4th March 2013), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Judgments/sentencing-remarks-r-v-edgington.pdf  
Judiciary of England and Wales (2013b), “Sentencing Remarks R v Watkins and P and 
B” (18th December 2013), available at 
http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Judgments/r-v-watkins-
and-others.pdf 
Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (translated by Abbott, 
Thomas Kingsmill) (Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008) 
Kelly, Janice and Huston-Comeaux, Sarah, “Gender-Emotion Stereotypes Are Context 
Specific” Sex Roles, 40, 1/2, (1999), 107 
Kelly, Liz, Surviving Sexual Violence (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988) 
Kennedy, Helena, Eve Was Framed: Women and British Justice (London: Vintage 
Press, 1993)  
Lacey, Nicola, “General Principles of Criminal Law? A Feminist View” in Nicolson, 
Donald and Bibbings, Lois (Eds), Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law (London: 
Cavendish Publishing, 2000) 
Lacey, Nicola, “Space, time and function: intersecting principles of responsibility 
across the terrain of criminal justice” Criminal Law and Philosophy, 1, (2007), 233 
Lacey, Nicola, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1998) 
Lacey, Nicola, Women, Crime, and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the 
D’Urbervilles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
Lacey, Nicola; Wells, Celia and Quick, Oliver, Reconstructing Criminal Law: Text and 
Materials (London: LexisNexis Butterworths, Third Edition, 2003) 
Lacey, Nicola and Zedner, Lucia, “Legal Constructions of Crime” in Maguire, Mike; 
Morgan, Rod and Reiner, Robert (Eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, fifth ed., 2012) 
 300 
Lemert, Edwin, Human Deviance, Social Problems and Social Control (Englewood 
Cliffs NJ: Prentice Hall, 1967) 
Lemert, Edwin, Social Pathology: A Systematic Approach to the Theory of Sociopathic 
Behaviour (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951) 
Leonard, Eileen, Women, Crime and Society: A Critique of Theoretical Criminology 
(New York: Longman, 1982) 
Lips, Hilary, Sex and Gender: An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill, sixth ed, 2007) 
Lloyd, Ann, Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: Society’s Treatment of Violent Women 
(London: Penguin, 1995) 
Loizidou, Elena, Judith Butler: Ethics, Law Politics (Abingdon: Routledge Cavendish, 
2007) 
London Evening Standard, “Derrick Bird ‘had no history of mental health problems’” 
(21st March 2011) available at http://www.standard.co.uk/news/derrick-bird-had-no-
history-of-mental-health-problems-6383227.html   
London Feminist Network, “What is patriarchy?” available at 
http://londonfeministnetwork.org.uk/home/patriarchy 
Luckmann, Thomas, and Berger, Peter L., The Social Construction of Reality: A 
Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Open Road Media, 2011) 
Macdonald, Myra, Representing Women – Myths of femininity in the popular media 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1995) 
Mackay, Ronnie, “The Coroners and Justice Act 2009—Partial Defences to Murder 
(2): The new Diminished Responsibility Plea” Criminal Law Review 4, (2010), 290 
MacKinnon, Catharine, “Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist 
Jurisprudence” Signs 8(4), (1983), 635, p.658 
MacKinnon, Catharine, Feminism Unmodified – Discourses on Life and Law 
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1987) 
MacKinnon, Catharine, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, (Cambridge MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989) 
Mahendra, B., “Whither infanticide?” New Law Journal 156, (2006), 664 
Maher, JaneMaree, and Saugeres, Lise, “To be or not to be a mother? Women 
negotiating cultural representations of mothering” Journal of Sociology, 43(1), 
(2007), 5 
Mahoney, Martha, “Victimisation or Oppression? Women’s Lives, Violence and 
Agency” in Fineman, Martha Albertson and Mykitiuk, Roxanne, The Public Nature of 
Private Violence – The Discovery of Domestic Abuse (New York: Routledge, 1994) 
 301 
Mail Online, “Crazed killer Derrick Bird ‘waved at a friend’ – seconds before gunning 
down work rival in Cumbria massacre” (4th March 2011) available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1362687/Cumbria-gunman-Derrick-Bird-
waved-friend-seconds-shot-work-rival.html  
Mail Online, “Rebekah Brooks compared to witch by hacking lawyer: Critic says 
former News International chief looked ‘a little bit Salem’” (13th May 2012) available 
at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2143599/Rebekah-Brooks-compared-
witch-phone-hacking-lawyer-Charlotte-Harris.html 
Mail Online, “Should Rihanna put away her hotpants? Now men say they are turned 
OFF by women in revealing clothing” (26th July, 2013) available at  
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2377791/Men-turned-OFF-women-
revealing-clothes.html 
Mail Online, “The Making of Myra Hindley Part 4: Her obsession with Ian Brady” (20 
February 2007), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-436975/The-
Making-Myra-Part-4-Her-obsession-Ian-Brady 
Mail Online, “They call me evil Myra … I find it deeply upsetting: Hindley’s chilling 
letter to mother of Moors victim” (25th July 2013), available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2376695/Moors-Murderer-Myra-Hindleys-
letter-mother-victims-revealed.html 
Mail Online, “Unmasked, the former nun who was Myra Hindley’s gay lover” (17 July 
2007), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-468630/Unmasked-
nun-Myra-Hindleysgay-lover.html 
Mail Online, “Working Women dress to impress in power suits on Mondays – but by 
Friday they’re in jeans” (23rd March, 2014) available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-2587299/Working-women-dress-impress-
power-suits-Mondays-Friday-theyre-jeans.html 
Marchbank, Jennifer and Letherby, Gayle, Introduction to Gender: Social Science 
Perspectives (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 2007) 
McColgan, Aileen, “General Defences” in Nicolson, Donald and Bibbings, Lois (Eds), 
Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000) 
McNay, Lois, Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self (Boston: 
Northeastern University Press, 1992) 
Meloy, Michelle, and Miller, Susan, The Victimisation of Women: Law, Policies and 
Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 
Messerschmidt (1993) in Greeson, Megan and Campbell, Rebecca, “Rape survivors’ 
agency within the legal and medical systems” Psychology of Women Quarterly, 35, 4 
(2011) 582 
 302 
Milhausen, Robin and Herold, Edward, “Does the Sexual Double Standard Still Exist? 
Perceptions of University Women” The Journal of Sex Research, 36, 4, (Nov.,1999), 
361 
Mind, “Postnatal depression” available at http://www.mind.org.uk/information-
support/types-of-mental-health-problems/postnatal-depression/#.U3sdVcZ6fFI 




Mitchell, Barry, “Years of Provocation, Followed by a Loss of Control” in Zedner, 
Lucia, and Roberts, Julian V. (Eds), Principles and Values in Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice: Essays in honour of Andrew Ashworth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 
Moi, Toril, What is a Woman? And Other Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999) 
Moran, Kate A., Community and Progression in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (Washington 
DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012) 
Morris, Allison and Wilczynski, Ania, “Parents who kill their children” Criminal Law 
Review, (January 1993), 31 
Morris, Allison, and Wilcyznski, Ania, “Rocking the Cradle—Mothers Who Kill Their 
Children” in Birch, Helen, Moving Targets—Women, Murder and Representation 
(London: Virago Press Ltd, 1993)  
Morris, Katherine, “Bêtes-machines”, in Gaukroger, Stephen; Schuster, John, and 
Sutton, John, Descartes’ Natural Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2000) 
Morrison, Todd; Ryan, Travis; Fox, Lisa; McDermott, Daragh; and Morrison, Melanie, 
“Canadian university students’ perceptions of the practices that constitute ‘normal’ 
sexuality for men and women” The Canadian Journal of Human Sexuality, 17(4), 
2008, 161 
Morrissey, Belinda, When Women Kill: Questions of Agency and Subjectivity (London: 
Routledge, 2003) 
Mottarella, Karen; Fritzsche, Barbara; Whitten, Shannon; and Bedsole, Davina, 
“Exploration of ‘Good Mother’ Stereotypes in the College Environment” Sex Roles 60, 
(2009) 223 
Murphy, Thérèse and Whitty, Noel, “The Question of Evil and Feminist Legal 
Scholarship” Feminist Legal Studies, 14, 2006, 1   
Naffine, Ngaire, Female Crime: The Construction of Women in Criminology (Boston: 
Allen and Unwin, 1987) 
Naffine, Ngaire, Law and the Sexes (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990)  
 303 
Naffine, Ngaire, “The Body Bag” cited in Naffine, Ngaire and Owens, Rosemary, (eds.) 
Sexing the Subject of Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997)  
Naffine, Ngaire and Owens, Rosemary, “Sexing Law” in Naffine, Ngaire and Owens, 
Rosemary (eds.) Sexing the Subject of Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1997) 
New World Encyclopaedia, “Lesbianism” available at 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Lesbianism 
Newburn, Tim, Criminology (Cullompton: Willan, 2007) 
Newman, Jacquetta and White, Linda, Women, Politics, and Public Policy: The 
Political Struggles of Canadian Women (Toronto: Oxford University Press, second ed, 
2012) 
Nicolson, Donald, “Criminal Law and Feminism” in Nicolson, Donald and Bibbings, 
Lois (Eds), Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 
2000) 
Nicolson, Donald, “Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and 
Battered Women Who Kill” Feminist Legal Studies (1995) Vol III, no 2., 185 
Nicolson, Donald (2000a), “What the law giveth, it also taketh away: Female-specific 
defences to criminal liability” in Nicolson, Donald and Bibbings, Lois (Eds), Feminist 
Perspectives on Criminal Law (London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000) 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Gay Science (translated by Kaufmann) (New York: Random 
House, 1974) p.24 
Noh, Marianne; Lee, Matthew; and Feltey, Kathryn, “Mad, bad or reasonable? 
Newspaper portrayals of the Battered Woman Who Kills” Gender Issues 27, (2010), 
110 
Noonan, Sheila, “Battered Woman Syndrome: Shifting the Parameters of Criminal 
Law Defences (Or (Re)inscribing The Familiar?)” in Bottomley, Anne (Ed), Feminist 
Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law (London: Cavendish Publishing 
Limited, 1996) 
Norrie, Alan “The Coroners and Justice Act 2009—Partial Defences to Murder (1) Loss 
of Control.” Criminal Law Review 4, (2010), 275 
NUS, “Britain has worst rape conviction rate” (15th May, 2009) available at 
http://www.nus.org.uk/cy/news/britain-has-worst-rape-conviction-rate/  
Nussbaum, C. M., “The professor of parody: the heap defeatism of Judith Butler” The 
New Republic (22nd February 1999), 37 
O’Donovan, Katherine, “Transsexual Troubles: The Discrepancy between Legal and 
Social Categories” in Edwards, Susan (ed)., Gender, Sex and the Law (London: Croom 
Helm, 1985)   
 304 
Office for National Statistics, “Crime Statistics: Appendix Tables – Focus on: Violent 
Crime and Sexual Offences, 2011/12” available at 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/crime-stats/crime-statistics/focus-on-violent-
crime/rft-appendix-tables.xls 
Office for National Statistics, “Focus on: Violent Crime and Sexual Offences, 2011/12 
– Appendix Tables” available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-
reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-290621 
Office of the Children’s Commissioner, ““It’s a lonely journey”: A Rapid Evidence 
Assessment on Intrafamilial Child Sexual Abuse” (3rd July 2014), available at 
http://www.childrenscommissioner.gov.uk/content/publications/content_821 
Ogle, Robbin and Maier-Katkin, Daniel, “A rationale for infanticide law” Criminal Law 
Review, (December 1993), 903 
Oxford English Dictionary, “agency, n.” available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/3851?redirectedFrom=agency#eid (OED Third 
Edition, September 2012) 
Oxford English Dictionary, “patriarchy, n” available at 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/138873?redirectedFrom=patriarchy#eid (OED, 
Third Edition, June 2005) 
Oxford Dictionaries, “bad” available at 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/bad 
Philosophy and Literature, “The Bad Writing Contest - Press Releases, 1996 – 1998” 
at http://denisdutton.com/bad_writing.htm 
Psychiatric News, “New Gender Dysphoria Criteria Replace GID” (5th April, 2013) 
available at 
http://psychnews.psychiatryonline.org/newsArticle.aspx?articleid=1676226 
Radford, Lorraine, “Pleading for Time—Justice for Battered Women Who Kill” in 
Birch, Helen, Moving Targets—Women, Murder and Representation (London: Virago 
Press Ltd, 1993) 
Ransom, Jane, “Feminism, difference and discourse: the limits of discursive analysis 
for feminism” in Ramazanoglu, Caroline (Ed)., Up Against Foucault: explorations of 
some tensions between Foucault and Feminism (London: Routledge, 1993) 
Religious Tolerance.org, “Same-sex civil partnerships and marriages in the UK 2004 to 
2010: Increasing support for same-sex marriage in the UK”, available at 
http://www.religioustolerance.org/hom_maruk3.htm 
Reynaud, Emmanuel, “Manly Aesthetics” in Jackson, Stevi and Scott, Sue (eds). 
Gender: A sociological reader (London: Routledge, 2002) 
Reznek, Lawrie, Evil or ill? Justifying the insanity defence (London: Routledge, 1997) 
Roberts, Dorothy, “Motherhood and crime” Iowa Law Review 79, (1993), 95 
 305 
Rollinson, Matthew, “Re-reading criminal law: Gendering the mental element” in 
Nicolson, Donald and Bibbings, Lois (Eds), Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law 
(London: Cavendish Publishing, 2000) 
Russell, Brenda L., and Melillo, Linda S., “Attitudes towards battered women who kill: 
Defendant typicality and judgments of culpability” Criminal Justice and Behaviour 33, 
(2006), 219 
Russo, N.F., “The Motherhood Mandate” Journal of the Social Sciences 32, (1976), 
143 
Sandland, Ralph, “Feminism and the Gender Recognition Act 2004” Feminist Legal 
Studies 13, (2005) 43 
Sanger, Carol, “Reasonable Women and the Ordinary Man” S. Cal. L. Rev., 65, (1991-
1992), 1411, 
Sanghvi, Rohit, and Nicolson, Donald, “Battered women and provocation: The 
implications of R v Ahluwalia” Criminal Law Review, (October 1993), 728 
Schrock, Douglas; Reid, Lori; and Boyd, Emily, “Transsexual’s embodiment of 
womanhood” Gender and Society, 19(3), (June 2005), 317 
Schur, Edwin, Labelling Deviant Behaviour: Its Sociological Implications (New York: 
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971) 
Seal, Lizzie, “Discourses of single women accused of murder: mid twentieth-century 
constructions of ‘lesbians’ and ‘spinsters’” Women Studies International Forum 32, 
(2009), 209 
Seal, Lizzie, Women, Murder and Femininity: Gender Representations of Women Who 
Kill (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 
Sewell, William, H., Jr, “A Theory of Structure: Duality, Agency and Transformation” 
American Journal of Sociology, 98(1), (1992), 1 
Sharpe, Andrew, “A Critique of the Gender Recognition Act 2004” Bioethical Inquiry, 
4, (2007), 33 
Sharpe, Andrew, (2007a) “Endless Sex- The Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the 
persistence of a legal category” Feminist Legal Studies, 15, 2007, 57 
Shaw, Margaret “Conceptualising Violence by Women,” in Dobash, R Emerson, 
Dobash, Russell P, Noaks, Lesley (Eds), Gender and Crime (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 1995) 
Shepherd, Judy, “Reflections on a Rape Trial: The Role of Rape Myths and Jury 
Selection in the Outcome of a Trial” Affilia, 17, (2002), 69 
Skeggs, Beverley, “Ambivalent Femininities” in Jackson, Stevi and Scott, Sue (eds). 
Gender: A sociological reader (London: Routledge, 2002) 
 306 
Smart, Carol, Feminism and the Power of Law (London: Routledge, 1989) 
Smart, Carol, Law, Crime and Sexuality: Essays in Feminism (London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, 1995) 
Smart, Carol, “Law’s Truth/ Women’s Experience” in Graycar, Regina, (Ed), Dissenting 
Opinions: Feminist Explorations in Law and Society (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1990) 
Stoller, Robert, Sex and Gender: The Development of Masculinity and Femininity 
(London: Karnac Books, 1994) 
Stonewall, “Current Sexual Offences Law” available at 
http://www.stonewall.org.uk/at_home/hate_crime_domestic_violence_and_crimina
l_law/2644.asp 
Storrs, Elisabeth, “Our Scapegoat: An exploration of media representations of Myra 
Hindley and Rosemary West” Theology and Sexuality, 11, 1 (2004), 9 
Stow, Simon, Republic of Readers? The Literary Turn in Political Thought and Analysis 
(New York: SUNY Press, 2008) 
Tannenbaum, Frank, Crime and the Community (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1938) 
Taylor, Laurie J., “Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-Of-Passion 
Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defence” UCLA L. Rev., 33, (1985-1986), 1679 
Thesaurus.com, “Unemotional” available at 
http://thesaurus.com/browse/unemotional 
Tseëlon, Efrat, The Masque of Femininity – The Presentation of Woman in Everyday 
Life (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 1995) 
The Daily Star, “Women who kill: A special look into Britain’s worst female 
murderers” available at http://www.dailystar.co.uk/news/latest-
news/345764/Women-who-kill-A-special-look-into-Britain-s-worst-female-murderers 
The Guardian, “Postnatal depression: what the baby books don’t tell you” (16th May 
2014) available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2014/may/16/postnatal-depression-
baby-blues-risk-factors 
The Guardian, “Rape victim, 13, stoned to death in Somalia” (2nd November 2008) 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/nov/02/somalia-gender 
The Guardian (2008a), “Sex uncovered poll: Homosexuality” (26thOctober 2008), 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2008/oct/26/relationships 
The Guardian (2014a), “Women like Joanna Dennehy confuse us. Calling her mad or 




The Guardian, “Working mothers do no harm to their children, research finds” (22nd 
July, 2011) available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/22/working-mothers-no-harm-
children 
The Independent, “Lesbian tells of violent sex sessions” (18 October 1995), available 
at, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/lesbian-tells-of-violent-sex-sessions-
1578127.html  
The Independent, “Myra Hindley: the other side of evil” (17th November 2002) 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/profiles/myra-hindley-the-
other-side-of-evil-604408.html  
The Independent, “Scrap outdated Infanticide Law, say judges” (4 May 2005), 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/scrap-outdated-
infanticide-law-say-judges-495016.html 
The Law Commission, “Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide,” Law Com No 304, 
2006, available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc304_Murder_Manslaughter_and_Infanti
cide_Report.pdf  
The Law Commission, “Partial Defences to Murder Appendices” available at 
http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/docs/lc290_Partial_Defences_to_Murder_Appe
ndices.pdf 
The Mirror, “Fred West’s former nanny reveals the true story of her survival 20 years 
on from the investigation” (29th April 2012), available at 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uknews/fred-wests-former-nanny-caroline-810706  
The Mirror, “We aren’t freaks: Women who don’t want children should not be made 
outcasts” (22nd June, 2012) available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/lifestyle/women-
are-not-freaks-just-because-905131 
The Social Issues Research Centre, “The Changing Face of Motherhood” (2011) 
available at http://www.sirc.org/publik/CFOM.pdf 
The Sunday Times, “Thanks, Britney, from all bad mothers” (20th January 2008) 
available at 
http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/style/living/article78855.ece#prev 
The Telegraph, “Myra Hindley, the Moors Monster, dies after 36 years in jail” (16 
November 2002), available at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/3304454/Myra-Hindley-the-Moors-
monster-dies-after-36-years-in-jail.html 




The World Bank, “World Development Report 2012: Gender, Equality and 
Development” (2011) available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2012/Resources/7778105-
1299699968583/7786210-1315936222006/Complete-Report.pdf  
Today.com, “Are you a good mother or a ‘bad mother’?” (7 May 2009), available at 
http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/30618909/ns/today-parenting_and_family/t/are-
you-good-motheror-bad-mother/#.TxSB0aVm7T8  
Today.com, “For women in the workplace, it’s still about looks not deeds”  (15th May 
2012) available at http://lifeinc.today.com/_news/2012/05/15/11698778-for-
women-in-the-workplace-its-still-about-looks-not-deeds?lite 
Vincent, Clark, Unmarried Mothers (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961) 
Viss, Denisec and Burn, Shawnm, “Divergent Perceptions of Lesbians: A Comparison 
of Lesbian Self-Perceptions and Heterosexual Perceptions” The Journal of Social 
Psychology 132(2), (1992), 169  
Wales Online, “Ian Watkins trial: Lostprophets singer pleads guilty to attempting to 
rape a baby” 26th November 2013, available at 
http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/ian-watkins-trial-lostprophets-
singer-6343182 
Walklate, Sandra, Gender, Crime and Criminal Justice (Cullompton: Willan Publishing, 
second ed, 2004) 
Weare, Siobhan, “Comparing Male and Female Rape Convictions: The Role of 
Agency” (not yet published) 
Weare, Siobhan, “Denying the Agency of ‘Victimised’ Female Co-Perpetrators of Child 
Sexual Abuse: Issues For Their Child Victims” (not yet published) 
Weare, Siobhan, “You shouldn’t have to be perfect to ‘qualify’ as a rape victim” The 
Conversation, 2nd July 2013, available at https://theconversation.com/you-shouldnt-
have-to-be-perfect-to-qualify-as-a-rape-victim-26012 
Wells, Celia and Quick, Oliver, Lacey, Wells and Quick – Reconstructing Criminal Law, 
Texts and Materials (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, fourth ed, 2010) 
West, Candace and Zimmerman, Don, “Doing Gender” Gender and Society, 1(2), 
1987, 125 
Wiktionary, “Wikisaurus: homosexual woman” available at 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Wikisaurus:female_homosexual 
Wiktionary, “Wikisaurus: promisicuous woman” available at 
http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/Wikisaurus:promiscuous_woman 
Wilczynski, Ania, “Child-killing by parents” Dobash, R Emerson, Dobash, Russell P, 
Noaks, Lesley (Eds), Gender and Crime (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995) 
p.174 
 309 
Wilczynski, Ania, “Mad or bad? Child-killers, gender and the courts” British Journal of 
Criminology, 37, 3,  (1997), 419 
Winter, Jo, “The truth will out? The role of judicial advocacy and gender in verdict 
construction” Social and Legal Studies, 11, 3 (2002), 343 
Worrall, Anne, Offending Women: Female Lawbreakers and the Criminal Justice 
System (London: Routledge, 1990) 
Young, Val, “Women Abusers: A Feminist View” in Elliot, Michele (Ed), Female Sexual 
Abuse of Children (New York: Guilford Press, 1994) 
 
 310 
Table of Cases 
An NHS Trust v DE [2013] EWHC 2562 (Fam) 
Bedder v D.P.P [1954] 1 WLR 1119 
Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 A.C. 467 
Corbett v Corbett [1971] P. 83 
D.P.P. v Camplin [1978] AC 705 
Ellison v Brady 924 F.2d.872 (9th Cir. 1991) 
Goodwin v UK [2002] 35 EHRR 18 
I v UK [2002] 2 FCR 613 
R v Ahluwahlia [1993] 96 Cr App R 133 
R v Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008 
R v Joanne Christine Dennehy, Gary John Stretch, Leslie Paul Layton, Robert James 
Moore (unreported) 
R v Mariusz Krezolek and Magdelena Luczak (unreported)  
R v Nicola Edgington (unreported) 
R v R [1992] 1 A.C. 599 
R v Susan Christina Mary Poole and Frederick David Scott [1989] 11 Cr. App. R. (S.) 
382 
 311 
R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256 
R v Thornton [1996] 1 WLR 1174 
R v Watkins and P and B (unreported) 
R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox Crim. C. 336 
 312 
List of Statutes 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
The Gender Recognition Act 2004 
The Homicide Act 1957 
The Infanticide Act 1938 
The Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 
The Sexual Offences Act 2003 
 
